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PREF ACE.

FEW

years of military annals are so fertile in events as

that which has just expired. Full of varied chances, the year
1862 ought to teach us a great lesson.

It ought to remind

us that "The great principles of war cannot be violated with
impunity."

It may be interesting as well as useful to in-

vestigate the causes, both of the great disasters which have
befallen our armies, and of the successes which they have
achieved.
By passing in review the different operations, and by discussing them from a strictly military stand-point, we may
so perceive the errors of the past campaign as to be able to
avoid similar ones in the campaigns to come. These reasons
have induced me to write a military review of the campaign
of 1862, and even to discuss operations which will probably
take place in I 8 63.
Presumptuous as it may appear to undertake such a task,

I am encouraged to do so by the remarkable manner in which
events coincided with a similar discussion given by me, in a

(v)
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work entitled "Summary of the Art of War," and written
•

at the end of 1861.
I discussed in that work operations which were afterward
made by our generals.

I pointed out the correct line of de-

fense against these operations, and showed the results. The
Rebels adopted this defense; the results were as I had shown
they would be.

The present work may therefore be consid-

ered as a kind of treatise on grand war, and as a sequel to
my "Summary of the Art of War."
I hope the reader will judge it with indulgence, and, while
perusing it, take into consideration that my only sources of
information were the reports published in our newspapers,
and such maps as may be found in any library.

E. S.
January, 1863

•

CONTENTS.

PAGE
•
Introduction ............................................................ ~-·.. 9

I. Principles of Strategy .............................................. 10
Base of Ope1'ation. .. . . . . . . . ... . . . •. . .. . . . . . . . .• . . . . ••. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
Lines of Communication.............................................
Lines of Operation............................................... . ....
Offensive Operations..................................................
Defensive Operations..................................................
Wars of Conquest, or Great Invasions...........................

11
18
13
15
18
22

II. Geography of the Southern Confederacy............ -.

33

Left Zone ..........•....•...................•..•................••••......
~fountains .....•.........................•.•..•....... ~ ••••••••.••.•
Rivers .....•...........•••••...........•.........•..........••.•...•.
Towns .......•••...........•...•••.•... , . . . . . . •. . •. •.. . . .. .• ••• •. . ••.
Lines of Communication ...... .................................
Center Zone ..............................................................
Upper Center Zone .....................................................
~Iountains ............................................ , .. .. . . . . . . . . •
Gaps ....................•...........................•.......•.•......
Rivers ............•....................•............................•
Towns ......................................•........................
Lines of Communication .......................................
Lower Center Zone ................................................ ....
Rivers .................. ........................................ .....
Towns .................. ................................... ~ •. . . . . . . .
Lines of Communication .. .... ... ........ .... . .......... .... ...

85
35
37
41
41
47
47
48
49
49
51
51
54
55
66
57

( vii)

viii

CONTENTS.
PAGE

Movement of Troops in the Lower Center Zone............... 58
Right Zone . . . . . . . •. •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . . . 60

Rivers......... . . . . . . ••. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . .

61

Connections of the several Zones....................... ........

63

Towns............................................................. 61

III. Application of the Maxims laid down in Chapter I. to the Theater of War constituted by
the Southern Confederacy.............................. 64
IV. Campaign of 1862...... . ... .. .. . ... .... .. ..... .... . ....... . .. ... . 88
Review of this Campaign ...................................•......
Operations in the Right Zone.....................................
Operations in the Center Zone....................................
Operations in the Left Zone .......................................

125
130
131
154

V. Campaign of 1863. ......... ...... .. .... ...... ....... ..... .. .... ... 210

C MPAIGNS OF 1862 AND 1863.

discussion of events recently passed, and fresh in
everybody's memory, is a difficult task, as impressions of
all kinds are still alive, and passions OD: the subject are not
entirely subdued. It is therefore necessary, before entering
on the discussion of the past campaign, to establish a sound
basis, or rather to give the reader a correct idea of what in
war is to be considered right and what wrong.
For this, sound knowledge and thorough understanding
of the great maxims of the art, and a familiar acquaintance
with the great geographical features of the theater of the
contest, are absolutely indispensable. We will, consequently,
devote a, few chapters to the principles of strategy, as applied to great wars of invasion; and we will consider the
geography of the Southern Confederacy, in so far as it has
an influence on military operations.
We hope that our readers will carefully peruse those
chapters, though they may be somewhat dry, as the whole
of the reasoning to come will be based upon, and will have
reference to, what has been laid down in them.
(9)
2 ·
THE
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PRINCIPLES OF STR.A.'rEGY.

IN order to understand the following pages, it is neceseary to give a short exposition of the principal maxims of
strategy. These maxims are deduced from the modes of
operation in the field adopted by the great captains of all
ages; they furnish the rules of action in offensive ·or defensive campaigns.
War bas existed nearly since the creation of t~e world ;
the history of every country commences with war and the
feats of its heroes. The objects for which war is waged
have been in all ages nearly always the same. The principles on which it is conducted have remained unchanged
from the first, · although, with the progress of civilization,
the understanding of those principles becomes more general,
_and the manner of fighting different.
The most complete discussion of the principles of strategy is to be found in Qen. J omini's works, especially in
his "Art of War." This work, though a standard one of
its kind, is intended only for the military student, and requires considerable knowledge of military history before
reading it. This is the . reason why, instead of referring
•
simply to his work, I present the following compact and
easily understood treatise, which, however, will also be found
in substance in my '' Summary of the Art of War."

BASE OF OPERATION.
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Three great P:inciples may be laid down as belonging to
the entire science of war. They are1. To concentrate all disposable forces, and to act with
the whole of them against a p~rt only of the enemy's
forces.
2. To act against the weakest part of the enemy; against
his center if his forces be not united, and against his flank
or rear, if they be concentrated. .Also, to act against his
communications without endangering our own.
3. Whatever plan of operations has been decided on, it
hould be executed with the utmost promptness, so that the
object may be attained before the enemy can prevent it.
Simple as these three . great maxims may appear, their
application is nevertheless of the greatest difficultj. In
fact, this application varies with every new tract of land
upon which we enter; with every different position of the .
enelDJ, with every variation in the disposition of his forces
and of our own army. In all these cases the circumstances
vary, but the principles upon which to act remain the same;
and it is in the right application of these maxims to circumstances that the qualities of a great commander are displayed.
Before going farther, let us give here a few definitions
and explanations.
··Base of 0peration.-On opening a campaign we must
have a line for the concentration of our troops, whereon to
place our depots and magazines, and from which to advance
to execute our different plans. This line· is called the base
of operation. The choice of this line is of the utmost importance, for the result of a whole campaign may depend

12
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upon it. Let a b c d be the theater of war. Now if a c
and a b belong to us, and b d be the sea, or the frontier of
some great neutral power, the army of the enemy has but
Fig. 1.

b

d

Ji''

F
I

•
a

C

one line of retreat left, viz., c d. We may choose a b or a c
for our base. In choosing a b, the enemy's army would
always have its retreat to c d free; but in choosing a c, we
may advance from Fto F', cut the army .A. from its communications, and force it into the corner· b, where it would .be
obliged to surrender. The campaign of 1806 may serve as
an illustration: b d, in this case, represents the North Sea;
a b the Rhine, a c the Maine, an~ c d the Elbe ; c d was the
only retreat for the Prussian army ...44 The French army F
advanced from F to F', defeated the Prussian army A at
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Jena and threw it back on the North Sea, where the rem'
nant of it surrendered.
Fig. 2.
Or if ab is our ba~e, and
,,,, a
.,,...-,
...
c d that of the enemy, we
.....
,,,..
......
, ........
might advance from m to c
,.,,---....
.,,
without fear of being driven e,,.,.,
from our communications, -------------------------------11::____________________
---: m
while the enemy would even
be endangered by advancing
on the straight line m n, be- iL
cause we would always be
able to rEttireat to a; but the
b
enemy having only a small
base, will expose his own communications as soon as he
tries to act on ours.
· Lines of Communication are called the lines or roads
•
joining us with our base, or to another army co-operating
with us on the same theater of war.
Lines of Operation.-If the choice of the base of operation is of importance, that of the line of operation is still
more so. We call line of operation the main road or direction which is followed by the principal body of the army.
If there is but one army on the same frontier, the line will
be simple ; if there are two armies, there will be a double
line of operation.
The interior line of operation is the line which two or
more armies would follow, if attacked from different sides
by different armies, but so that they would be enabled to
unite before the various corps of the enemy could do so.

2*
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The way from a to b, in Fig. 3, would be the interior line;
the way from c to d, the exterior line.
We call the lines of two o;r more
Fig. 3.
armies or army corps, starting from
d

C

i><I distant points and meeting together
in one, concentric lines. (See Fig.
1,

IS<i
cl,

l5sl

'5<:I
Fig. 4.
b

C

4.) Divergent lines leave one point
to arrive at two or three distant
points. If leaving a, a b and a a
are divergent lines; if b and c, they
are concentric ones.
If an army is placed between two
hostile armies, so that it can defeat
either of them before they are able
to effect a junction, its position is
called a central one.
Besides the definitions already
given, we call strategic points and

a

lines all such points and lines on
the theater of war the occupation of which may be of importance during the war.
We call lines of defense all those lines which we choose
for defense, or which by the natural configuration of the
ground admits of an easy defense. It is evident that the
line must be a strategic one-that is, it must be so situated
that by its occupation we prevent the enemy attaining his
object.
Each theater of war can be divided into the three zones
-right, left, and center.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS •
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.As general maxims of strategy, we may enumerate the
following : 1. To turn 1;o the best advantage the respective directions
of our base of operation and that oT the enemy.
2. To choose the one of the three zones of the theater
of war on which we can cause the greatest disasters to the
enemy wita the least risk to ourselves.
3. In order to well direct the lines of operation in defense as well as in attack the interior lines are always to be
~pted. In defense, these lines ough to be concentric; in
attack; which is just the .reverse, they ought to be divergent.
4. No. a implies that we ought to choose our lines so
that we can always unite our di visions before the enemy
can unite his, and that with our united force we ought to
beat him in detail.
5. To act with the utmost activity and speed.
~t remains to be shown how these rules are to be applied
to offensive and to defensive operations.
Offensive Operations.-Whatever be the geographical
configuration of the theater of war, it can be divided into
three zones-right, left, and center-as we have already
seen ; but a choice is to be made as to which of the three
zones i~ to be the scene of operations.
Circumstances may be such that one, two, or even all
three zones may be employed: in the first case, we should
have a simple line ; in the two others, several lines of
operation.
1st. If there is but one line, two cases may occur-either
that the enemy occupies a very extended line, or that he
holds a concentrated position. In the first case, the most

16

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

advantageous point to act on is the center, which we should
break with our whole force, and then defeat each of the
wings separately.
In I 796 Napoleon, when opposed to Beaulieu, whose
line was extended from Genoa to Ceva, broke through the
center of the .Austro-Sardinian army at Montenotte, with
bis entire force, and then defeated the two wings, one after
the other, in the engagements of Milesimo, Dego, and
Mondovi.
In 1809, when opposed to the .Archduke Charles, whose
army also formed a very extended line, he acted in a similar way, and defeated successively the Austrian forces in the
battles of .A.bensberg, Landshut, Eckmiihl, and Ratisbon.
In the second case, if the enemy keep his forces concentrated, t~e ma,nceuvre against his center is rendered im-possible, or at least disadvantageous, and we should then
see if an attack on one of the other two zones does not
present the chance of our acting at once o~ the enemy's
communications, without endangering our own.
Figures I and 2 will show how this is possible.

1

When

once on the enemy's communications, we cut off his line of
retrea~ to return to his base he is obliged to force his way
with the bayonet; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated,
he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such opemtions
are to be found in the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806.
In 1805 Mack, wit~ an Austrian army, near Ulm, was
turned by Napoleon and obliged to capitulate.

This result

was obtained in consequence of the position and extension
of the two bases of operation.

Fig. 2 will explain this,

by supposing that a b forms the base of the French, and

~

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

17

that they adv_ance from a to n, and that they cut the -:A-nstrian army, which bas adva{!ced in the direction of m, from
its base c d. The case of the campaign of 1806 is explained under the head of base of operation, illustrating the
meaning of Fig. 1.
Should the enemy, however, maintain such a position
that neither the manreuvres against his center nor against
his communications are possible, it will be necessary to
resort to stratagems which shall induce him to make wrong
m()vements, divide his troops, extend his lines, etc. For
instance, we may give our whole army such a position, or
we may, before the commencement of operations, place the
several corps of our army in such a manner that they can
act with the same facility against two or more points very
distant from each other. The enemy is thus obliged to
divide his force, and our first position must be chosen so
that we may, y a few hidden and forc~d marches, unite
our whole army on the decisive point;. having carried
which, we can then defeat the enemy in detail.
2d. 1£ we form two lines of operation, we should follow
divergent lines-that is, we should place our armies between those of the enemy, and transp_ort our maid. body
alternately from one army to the other. The enemy's
armies bemg isolated, cannot unite, ·and must fall under the
blows of our superior force.
The plan of the campaign of 1800, as devised by Napoleon, is the finest example of this that can be offered.
Melas, with a l~rge army in Italy, had arrived at a short
distance from the French frontier; Kray, with another
army, threatened ~he Rhi~e. Moreau, near Basle, was to act

18
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against Kray, and the reserve army, disposed on the Swiss
frontier, was to . act in Italy. Napoleon's plan was for
Moreau to pass through Switzerland, cross the Rhine at
Shaffhausen, cut off Kray from his communications, and·
thereby destroy his army, while Napoleon himself crossed
the Alps by the passes of the Great St. Bernard, Simplon,
St. Gothard, and S pliigen, and arrived in the rear of Melas.
Moreau did not entirely conform to Napoleon's plan; he
crossed the Rhine near Basle, where he was already in possession of a tete-de-pont, and, therefore, the campaign in
Germany was not so decisive as that in Italy. M elas found
himself turned, and was obliged to fight at Marengo, front
against .Austria; he was defeated, and consequently compelled to enter into a convention with Napoleon, by which
the latter obtained the western portion of Italy as far as the
Mincio. The battle of Marengo, and indeed the whole of
Napoleon's manceuvres, took place only after he had received
a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men from Moreau.

Defensive Operations.-We · may act on the ·offensive
even though the war be a defensive one for us. This will
always be the case when we are ready to take the field before the enemy can; or when his dispositions are faulty'
his army corps dispersed, etc., or when our numerical
superiority is very great. The initiative is always advantageous, and the defensive only should be taken in case of
inferiority in strength.
The defense, as well as the offensive, can act on simple
or on several lines of operation ; the plan of it is al ways
more or less intimately connected with the configuration
of the ground than that of the attack. In the defense, the
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natural or artificial obstacles of the country should supply
the deficiency of men, either in strategical or in tactical
operations. When acting on simple lines, and opposed
only to one army, but that one superior, our own army
should retreat, availing itself of all the natural obstacles of
the theater of the war, such as rivers, mountains, etc.; it
should· organize small bodies for acting in the rear of the
adva cing enemy to endanger his convoys, and force him
to send large detachments to cover them.
In making those detachments, the invading army becomes
smaller the farther it advances, while, on the other hand, the
defen. ding army generally becomes stronger the nearer it approaches the center of its country. If by this the difference
in force is decreased, and the chances rendered more equal,
the army for the defense should pass to a vigorous offensive,
either by unexpectedly attacking ·the enemy, or by awaiting
him in a well chosen and strongly fortified position.
The campaign of 1812 is a fine example of such a defense.
apoleon entered Russia with 450,000 men. The Russian
army retreated, defending only the town of Smolensk. Owing
to the many corps Napoleon was obliged to leave behind to
cover his communications, and to the losses already sustained, he arrived at Borodino with only 132,000 men. The
Russians awaited him there with 1 i 7,000 men, in a partly
fortified position. What was impossible against an army
of 450,000 men could be tried against one of 132,1'00.
When the enemy has chosen two lines of operation, we
may be inclined to take but one line of operation, and bring
our army into a central position between his armies, so as to
fall with our whole force on the first of his corps that pre-

20
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sents itself, and then defeat the other. At the siege of
Mantua, in 1796, Napoleon, being informed that Wurmser,
who had advanced from the Tyrol against him, had divided
his forces and was descending one bank of the Lake of
Garda with his main body, while Quasdanowitch was descending the other, raised the siege of Mantua, advanced
and stationed himself at one end of the lake, thereby gaining a central position, and, separating W urmser from uasdanowitch, the latter was defeated at Louato and the former
at Castiglione.
When obliged to form several lines of operation, we
should arrange them in the following manner:If, for instance, 100,000 men are to resist an invading
army of 150,000, divided into three armies of 50,000 each,
we should divide our force also. We form three corps of ,
observation, each numbering 15,000 men. We keep the remaining 55,000 in·reserve, and transport them successively,
by interior lines and forced marches, to the three army corps,
and form every time a large army of 70,000 men, who should
defeat the 50,000 opposed to them. The two remaining ·
corps of observation, if pressed by their opponents, retreat,
defending every inch of ground, but refusing open battle,
till they are in turn reinforced by the reserve. In those
cases the defense loses ground, but soon regains it.
If the enemy has formed double lines of operation very
distant from each other, we should also form two lines, and
retreat on concentric ones; when we arrive at such points
that our armies are only a few days' march distant from ·each
other, we should leave a corps of observation before one of
the enemy's armies, in order to mask our movements, and,
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with our main body, reach by forced marches our other
army, unite with it, and defeat the enemy by our superiority; we then return to the first army, the fate of which
will not remain long undecided.
In 1796 the .Archduke Charles, in Germany, defeated the
armies of Jourdan and Moreau by retreating in concentric
lines from the Rhine to the Bohemian frontier, where he
united part of his two armies; he first defeated Jourdan
at .Amberg and Wurzburg, and .then Moreau at Emmendingen and Schlingen.
During the war of 17 58-17 62, Frederick · the Great was
attacked by a Russian, .Austrian, and German imperial army.
He resisted those three armies by disposing his own on interior lines. He always transported the mass of his troops
to the endangered point by means of those interior lines,
and defeated the different hostile armies one after the other.
In the years 1813 and 1814 Napoleon, in his defense,
likewise acted on interior lines.
These different rules have reference only to the movements
and operations of one or more armies when once in the field,
but they do not give the great ensemble of a war, nor do they
reflect any light on the manner in which wars of a different
character are to be conducted. The entire plan of a campaign would be different if the war were a civil one, a religious one, a distant conquest, or an invasion. There is but
little resemblance between the campaigns of 1806 and those
of the Peninsular war, though both were wars of conquest.
The configuration of the theater of war, the character of the ·
people, their government, and political circumstances being
different, other means and plans became necessary. Wars of
3
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conquest and occupation being those which at the present
moment interest us most, we will devote a few pages to
them, and see how they have been carried on at different
times by great captains.
Wars of Conquest, or Great Invasions.-The manner
of making war, or even of conducting great invasions, has
passed through various stages in the course of time.
Most of the wars recorded in ancient history were ~ars of ,
conquest, in which entire populations were launched against
others. Very early, however, we find the commencement of
military organization, and even standing armies. By-and-by
more and more complete systems were introduced. In the
classic times of Greece, those of Philip of Macedon, and of
his great son, Alexander, in the times when the Roman eagle
began to spread its powerful wings over the then known
world, the art of war attained to a perfection which has been
surpassed only in modern times; and even the great masters
of the art in later ages sought for wisdom and instruction
in the deeds of the illustrious captains of antiquity.
The degeneracy of the Roman empire, the immense emigration of uncivilized hordes, the overthrow of Roman
civilization, soon brought the art of war back to its childhood. In the time of the Crusades it is distinguished principally by the employment of large masses of combatants
and brute force, which sometimes attains success, though
void of art or skill .
.A.11 the great States of Europe, held py kings or emperors, were divided into a number of principalities, large or
small, governed by petty chieftains, on whose good-will
the chief rulers were more or less dependent. The conse-
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quence was, that all the governments of ~urope were so
much occupied in preserving internal order, ~hat great invasions became almost impossible.
The times of Charles V., Francis II., and Henry IV. revived the art of war, and we see great captains appearing
on the stage; but the political systems and circumstances of
Europe did not change. In the times of Louis XIV. and
Louis XV. we find wars, even by great captains, conducted
in a slow and methodical manner, whe~ce it was called
"methodic warfare." .Armies at that time lived in tents,
camped, had vast magazines around and near them, and
could not exist without an immense bakery close to their
heels.
This was the state of affairs at the commencement of the
French Revolution; but here the revolution made itself felt
also. Immense armies being created, for which scarcely the
necessary armament could be found, still less tents, camp
equipage, and provision trains, it became necessary to
quarter these armies in the towns and villages, in order to
shelter and nourish them, and subsist them on the inhabitants. Movement was not only rendered easier by this system, but became a necessity, as no district could nourish for
any length of time so great an accumulation of men. Consequently methodic warfare changed at once to rapid, daring
marches, and man am vres on a grand scale. The old indispensable bakery gave way to the famous Roman maxim,
"War must nourish war."
The adoption of this great principle changed, as by magic,
the entire system of warfare. Armies which had hitherto
marched only five or six miles a day, now marched twenty
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or twenty-five. Where small operations, such as the taking
of a fortress, or the conquest of a province, had satisfied the
ambition of a general, we now see armies made to traverse
hundreds of miles, and push right into the heart of an
enemy's country.
Campaigns became more extended and.more decisive. In
a word, the reins were loosed, and intelligenc_e, courage,
enterprise, youth, and vigor were launched, without restraint, against the enemy. · The system of quartering or
living on the inhabitants of the land forms the basis of all
great wars of conquest or invasion; unless it be adopted, it
is impossible to conquer an extensive country possessing
large and organized armies.
Let us draw a comparison between the efficiency of two
armies-the one acting according to the principles of methodic warfare, and being furnished continually from its base
of supply and its magazines,· the other acting according to
the principle, "War m~st nourish war."
In the first case, provisions for several days must always
be carried with the army; immense supply trains have to
follow it; bad roads-which would, however, have sufficed
for the passage of troops-become impassable, in consequence of the transit of the immense number of heavilyladen wagons. Everywhere there is stoppage in the advance and starting of troops, obstruction of roads, delay,
and disorder. .As soon as the provisions in the wagons are
consumed, or nearly so, the army halts. With immense
trouble and cost, a fresh supply of provisions is obtained after
a number of days; the army starts anew, but only to come
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to another halt as soon as its wagons are emptied-again.
But, then, another difficulty arises; the army is already so
far from its base that the supply by wagons becomes impossible; the number of days the wagons require to be en route
is too great; and in the mean time the army runs the risk
of perishing from hunger. The consequence is, that an
operation, whatever may be its strategic ad vantages, cannot
be carried out, if it does not offer extraordinary means of
communication with the base of supply; and it follows that,
instead of choosing the most advantageous strategic lines as
lines of operation, the most comfortable and convenient lines
of communication are selected as the principal strategic
direction to be given to the armies. In other words, the
quartermaster and the commissary are in reality the commanders. The army cannot march where they forbid, nor
can it move until they are ready or want to be so.
It is scarcely necessary to remark that, in consequence of
the slow marching and the frequent halts in order to maintain the supply of provisions, the enemy gains ample time
·to prevent the success of any plan of operation, not to men ..
tion the inducement which such large wagon trains offer for
cavalry raids in the rear of the army. Do away with this
system of feeding the troops, and movement will become a
necessity; the most advantageous strategic lines of operation
can be chosen; there is no stoppage, except by the enemy ;
but this resistance is, under such circumstances, such as a
general would desire. In other words, all that is impossible
when following the old system, becomes possible with the
new.

Where two men can plant their feet, an army can

3*
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march; and instead of months of operations, the campaign
will take only as many weeks, or perhaps days.
I do not wish to advocate here a system of great and
legally-organized robbery, which takes fro,n the countryman all he has without any indemnification. I advocate
only a reasonable and well-organized system of requisition,
paying liberally for all it obtains, but furnishing the
army with all the principal provisions from the country
through which it passes. The greater the distance an
army marches in one day, the more plentifully it may be
supplied .
.A.11 wars of invasion or conquest, from the earliest times
down to the most modern-from the Romans to Napoleonwere based upon, and rendered possible by, this principle
alone. Successful wars of conquest are therefore synonymous with rapid and energetic operations. Let us pass in
review some of the principal. .
Conquering a country, means successfully ftghting its defenders; subduing a country, means occupying it. Fighting means concentration, occupying means division of forces.
Here is evidently the difficulty of wars of conquest. .As
long as only the army of the invaded country takes part in
the struggle, an occupation is scarcely necessary till this
army is really destroyed; but the moment the war against
the invader becomes national, and the population takes part
in it, matters become different and more difficult. In this
latter case, the operating or field army should not be reduced
by detachments, but the troops necessary for the occupation should be sent from the base of operations.
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Three systems have been principally employed for the
conquest of a country. The first, is to march several
armies from the circumference into the center of a country;
the second, is to conquer it by subduing and occupying on~
province after another; the third, is by marching one large
force, on a single line of operation, right into the center of
a country, and when arrived there, spreading it out in all
. directions, like a fan, forming interior lines, dividing thereby
the enemy, and forcing him to act on exterior lines. It is
the very inverse of the first system.
The first system, viz., that of acting with several armies
from the circumference against the center of a country, has
been spoken of above in treating of offensive and defensive
operations. We have seen that, though each of the invading armies may be stronger than the one opposed to it, the
defense has the advantage; because it acts on interior lines,
and can unite its forces before the invading armies can
unite theirs on the exterior lines, on which they are obliged
to act.
The campaigns alt:eady mentioned of Frederick the Great
-those of 1793, of 1796 in Germany, and of 1814-show
to what disasters suc4 concentric operations may conduct.
However, it would be wrong to reject this system entirely;
there are several cases in which it may be used with advantage. There is no danger in having several lines of operations in the three following cases : 1st. When each of the
invading armies is equal in number to the whole defending
force. 2d. .When the invading armies are very large, so
that the whole of them could not operate on one line, as

28

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

was the case in 1813, in the campaign in Saxony against
Napoleon. 3d. When the power attacked has no regular
military system, and is not far advanced in the art of war.
The second syste·m, that of conquering one province after
another, is slow but sure. It was the great maxim followed
by the Roman republic, and is identical in principle with
that of dividing the enemy's forces and acting with the
whole of our force against every one of its divisions separately. The conquered province is organized, receives an
administration from the conqueror, and serv as a base of
operation against the next or adjacent province.
This system, however, is generally only possible against
States or people not well united, and suffering from internal dissensions. Napoleon made frequent use of it too;
his kingdoms of Westphalia and of Italy, and the organization of the Rhine Bund, were applications of the Roman
system of conquest, only executed in a much shorter time
than was usual with the Romans. The only defense against
such a system is the perfect -union of all parts of a nation,
and the full determination to resist the invader and every
infraction of the country's rights.
The third and last system is evidently the most scientific,
and best suited for rapid and decisive invasions. It was
used by Cesar in his Gallic war, and by Napoleon in most
of his co~tinental invasions. It consisted in concentrating
for the· battle and dividing after it, so as to destroy all
smaller resisting armies and complete the victory. The
following is the plan of operations : The army, in one compact mass, enters the enemy's conn-

~
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try, where it at first finds resistance. This, by the great
superiority of numbers, is overpowered; the road into the
heart of the invaded country is thrown open ; the victorious
army follows it with impetuosity; and, arrived in the center
of the theater of war, fills up the whole area by spreading
out in all directions. .A.11 local resistance is broken; the
smaller army corps of the invaded country, being pushed
back in all directions, and separated from each other by
the heavy mass of the. enemy's forces acting on interior
lines, cannot offer any resistance of moment; and thus a
country, rich in all kinds of !esources, may be obliged to
make an ignominious peace with an enemy more skillful,
but not stronger than itself.
The campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809, and also the
campaigns of 1808 in the Peninsular war, are models for
similar invasions. The ultimate success of those plans is
founded on a first great victory obtained by rapid and unexpected manreuvres. The defense against · an attack so
directed may be of two kinds, either of which may be
adopted according to circumstances. In both cases, the
grand necessity is to avoid a first disaster.
The campaign of 1812 is an example of one of t~ose cases
of defense. The defensive army retreats, being continually
reinforced; the invading army, by advancing, is proportionally weakened. When an equality or superiority of
force has been obtained, the defense passes to the offensive;
and the greater the effort of the invading army at firstthat is, the longer the line of operation, and consequently
its line of retreat-the surer will be its total destruction.
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_T he retreat from Moscow is a proof of this. In 1809 Napoleon, in the first onset, obtained but a partial successthat is, instead of destroying, he only defeated the armies
of the Archduke Charles in the battles of Landshut, Eckmiihl, and Ratisbon. The bloody check he receiv~d a short
time afterward at Esslingen was the consequence of this
imperfect success. · Had Napoleon, in the Russian campaign, been able to destroy the Russian army at first-and
he tried hard to do so-the disasters of Krasnoi and the
Beresina would not have happened.
All countries do not offer the facility of retreating indefinitely, like that possessed by Russia. Those that do
not, must have recourse to other means. The surest is an
extended system of fortifications similar to the famous .Austrian quadrilateral in Italy. Fortifications forming double
tetes-de-pont are points of strategic importance; and forming at the same time large intrenched camps, they cannot
be passed or taken in a hurry by an invading army. The
defending army, basing itself on one or other of these fortifications, can attack the front, flank, and rear of the invaders. Large corps of observation must be left before
these works, or a regular siege must be undertaken. Time
is gained, and this is what the defense principally requires,
in order to collect its means and to commence offensive
operations against the invading army, for which this system
of fortification, as well as the necessitated division of the
enemy, offers the best chance of success. As already said,
in operating on this plan, a first disaster must be avoided,
as well as in the case mentioned before.

WARS OF CONQUEST, OR GREAT INVASIONS.

31

All these invasive wars are, or ought to be, undertaken
by greatly superior armies. Brilliant manamvres, like those
of Jena and Ulm, were only executed with vastly superior
numbers. In general, there exists a relation between the
extent of a country, its geographical features, and the number of troops necessary to invade it, or, at least, to render
strategic operations successful. The larger and flatter a
country is, the less marked features it possesses; the greater
the number of roads passing through it in all directions,
the less applicability will the maxims of strategy have.
In his campaigns in Russia, we see Napoleon continually
baffled in his strenuous and repeated efforts to capture or
destroy even a part of the Russian army, though his army
was immense-not less than 450,000 men. The country
was still greater; Russian and French columns passed and
repassed each other without being informed of it till too
late. In Spain we find similar effects arising from similar
causes. In Italy, on the contrary, nearly every operation
was a success ; the reason being that the roads were comparatively few, the theater of operations limited, and the
strategic features of the country remarkable.
We might enumerate many campaigns whose failure is
attribl!table to the fact that the number of troops was insufficient for the extent of the theater of war. The Russian and Peninsular campaigns are of the number; so are
the campaigns of the English in .America.
The number of troops depends not only upon the extent
and the geography of the country, but also upon the more
or less warlike character of the population, political influ-
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ence, etc. As a general rule, I believe it may be laid down
that, for a great invasion, the front of operation should extend entirely over at least one zone of the theater of war;
and in this front, the different columns of march should be
at proper supporting distance from each other.-(See Logistics, p~ges 173-182, '' Summary of the .Art of War.")
.After having passed in review the geogi~aphical features
of the Southern Confederacy, we will apply the different
principles, maxims, and rules just laid down to the present
war; and thereby give a more exact idea of the mode in
which wars of conquest ought to be conducted.
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and its rivers. Those three elements combined generally
determine the direction of the principal lines of communication as well as the situation of the chief centers of population.
We have already seen that eyery country or theater of
war can be divide~ into three distinct zones-right, left,
and center. In most cases the natural lines of separation of
these three zones are strongly marked. One of them always
offers greater strategical advantages than the other two, and
we should, therefore, select it to carry on operations in.
Considering then this zone as a theater of war by itself,
it may in its turn be subdivia.ed into right, left, and center
zones. Let us in this way divide the Southern Confederacy
and see what we obtain.
Looking at it from north to south, we detect at once
some prominent features. To the right we see the Mississippi dividing it and separating a large part from the main
body of it. To the left we remark a long mountain chain
separating the country this side of the Mississippi into two
parts.
The country beyond the Mississippi, composed principally
of Missouri, .Arkansas, and Louisiana, forms the Right Zone
of the whole theater of war. The large river separating it
from the rest of the Confederacy renders communication
with this latter difficult, and may even interrupt military
operations entirely.
The country east of the above-mentioned mountain chains,
called the Blue Ridge and the .A.lleghanies, forms the Left
Zone. It is principally composed of Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

The mountains form the north-
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west boundary, the Potomac the northeast, the Savannah
the southwest, and the ocean the southeast boundary of
this zone.
Finally, the country between the right and the left zone
forms the Center Zone of the theater of war. It is composed of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida ; its boundaries are the Ohio, the
Mississippi, the Gulf of Mexico, the ocean, and the Savannah River.
We have to consider these three zones in detail.
Left Zone.-This zone forms a kind of quadrangle, two
sides of which are formed by the Savannah River and the
Potomac line from Harper's Ferry to Cape Hatteras. The
other two sides are formed, the one by the coast from Cape
Hatteras to the mouth of the Savannah, the_ other by the
mountains from Harper's F~rry to Pickens.
This zone is about 400 miles long, and about 250 wide.
The direction of the two long sides of the quadrangle,
that is of the coast and the mountains, is from northeast to
southwest.

ltountains.-The mountains which form the boundary of
this zone are part of the long mountain chain passing nearly
through the whole of the northern continent. Commencing
at Montreal and Quebec, they run in a nearly continuous
chain from northeast to southwest as far as the north of
Georgia; there they change their course, taking a direction
. from east to west, and falling gradually as they approach
the Mississippi.
The characteristic of this mountain chain is that it is
formed by a number of long and parallel ridges ; there are,
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comparatively, very few offshoots having a course at right
angles to the main direction.
These parallel ridg~s are very numerous in the north of
Virginia. Some of them form between them wide and fertile valleys. In the south .of Virginia and the east of Tennessee they become fewer and approach each other nearer,
forming thereby long and narrow valleys.
Most of these valleys are watered by rivers, nearly all of
which are rapid; many of them rapid and deep, as, for instance, the Shenandoah, the Upper James River, the Holston, etc. etc.
~he communications from one valley to ano~her, over the
mountains, are few, and generally difficult. There are, however, a number of roads by which one can pass from Western Virginia into Eastern Virginia or North Carolina.
The most important ·and most continuous of these ridges
is the chain which, under the name of Loudon Heights, Blue
Ridge, etc., runs nearly without interruption from one end
of the left zone to the other. West of this chain is a large
number of parallel chains; east of it is one range more,
commencing with the Kittoctan Mountains on the Potomac,
and having its termination in the Bull Run l\iiountains, Pig
Nut Mountains, Southwest }fountains, Carter's Mountains,
Buffalo Ridge, etc. etc.
The number of gaps in Blue Ridge Mountain is small ;
the principal ones are Vestal, Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas,
Chester, Thornton's, Swift Run, Simon's, Brown's, Rockfish,
White's, Ro benton's, Petit's, Bufford's, Daniel's Run, etc.
etc. The eastern ridge, being formed by the isolated hills
or ridges above named, has as many gaps as there are
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ridges. With the exception of Thoroughfare Gap, in Bull
Run Mountains, there is no other worth mentioning.
Of the valleys formed by these mountains three are of
great importance. First, the Shenandoah valley; then, the
valley formed by Blue Ridge and the Eastern Mountains,
commencing with Loudon valley and going down as far as
Lynchburg; and, thirdly, the valley in which the railroad
from Lynchburg to Chattanooga is laid down.
The greater portion of the country in this zone is hilly,
with the exception qf the districts near the sea-shore, where
large plains and swamps are to be found ..
Rivers.-Besides the Shenandoah, there are some smaller
streams situated in the valleys parallel to the Shenandoah
valley. Those in North Virginia are tributaries of the
Potomac; they are, with the exception of the Shenandoah,
of little importance. The upper p.art of the James River
runs for a certain length in the valleys behind Blue Ridge,
nd so does the higher part of the Roanoke. The rivers in
valleys of South Virginia take a southwesterly course;
re tributaries of the Tennessee River.
11 \he other rivers having their rise in the mountains
e a course more or less parallel to the Potomac ; that is
;y, running from the mountains nearly direct to the sea
i a direction parallel to the two smaller sides of the q~adgle forming the left zone. Most of these rivers form at
their months long and deep bays, some of them penetrating
for eighty or more miles into the interior of the country.
The Potomac, the Rappahannock, the York, and the James
Rivers, Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and Port Royal entrance, deserve to be mentioned. These bays offer to ships4*
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of-war and trans ports great facilities for penetrating into
the interior, and may be advantageously made use of in
military operations.
The principal rivers, beginning with the north, are1. The Potomac-navigable for the heaviest kinds of ships
'
as far as .Alexandria,
and for somewhat lighter ships up to
Washington.

Above Washington it is fordable in several

plaees. From Washington to Harper's Ferry the Potomac averages several hundred yards in width. The banks
are generally hilly.
2. Bull Run-already notorious in the history of this
war. This river is, in the dry season, passable in most
places, but it may, nevertheless, serve as a defensive line
against an enemy coming from the north, and has already
been used as such. It rises in the Bull Run Mountains,
and its whole course is about forty miles, but the lower ·
part assumes somewhat of the character of a bay, and is,
therefore, difficult to cross.
3. 'fhe Rappahannock takes its rise in the Blue Ridge
Mountains; it has a total length of about one hundred and
thirty miles, of which, however, about seventy are to be considered as a bay. The river is navigable up to Fredericksburg. Ten miles above it divides, and is called the Hedgeman River and the Rapidan; both are fordable at a great
many points, and trestle bridges may be constructed at
nearly any point without much difficulty.

The banks are

hilly, and at some parts are so even to the water's edge,
but in other parts leaving plains between the river and
the ascent.

Some excellent defensive positions are to be

fouad, as, for instance, those near Fredericksburg.
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9. The Roanoke, a considerable river, is formed by the
junction of the Dan and the Staunton Rivers, both rapid
mountain streams; the former rises in Blue Ridge, the latter in North Mountain. The entire course of the Roanoke
is about 800 miles ; it empties into Albemarle Sound, and
is navigable for Sound craft as far as thirty miles, and for
boats still farther up.
10. The Tar River empties into Pamlico Sound.
11. The Neuse River empties into Pamlico Sound,
has a length of about 180 miles. Navigable up to Newbern.
12. The Gape Fear River empties, near Wilmington,
into the ocean; the depth of water at the bar is from
twelve to fifteen feet. The length of its course is about
280 miles. Its course is much more southerly than that of
the James River.
13. The Great Pedee River empties, near Georgetown,
in Wingaw Bay. Its course is nearly north to south, and
its length about 380 miles. It is navigable by steam-boats
up to Cheraw; above this place there is a fall of fifteen feet
in eighteen miles.
14. The Santee River is formed by the Junction of the
Catawba and Congaree. The length of its course is about
400 miles. Steam-boats ascend as far as Camden and Columbia ; and by means of canal-boats navigation is carried
on up to the mountains. It has very swampy banks, and
empties, near the Great Pedee, into the ocean.
15. The Edisto River empties near Charleston. Its
length i~about 200 miles.
16. The Savannan empties into Tybee Sound. The
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2. Staunton to Gordonsville, 55 miles; and to Sexton J unction, 40 miles; total, 95 miles. 3. West Point to Richmond,
30 miles; to Lynchburg, 112 miles; and to Chattanooga,
420 miles, total, 562 miles. 4. Norfolk to Petersbu~g, 80
miles; and to Lynchburg, 110 miles; total, 19 0. 5. Norfolk to Suffolk, 20 miles ; to Weldon, 60 miles ; to Clarksville, 55 miles; and to Danville, 48 miles ; total, 17 3 miles.
6. Beaufort, N. C., to Goldsborough, 90 miles ; to Raleigh,
48 miles ; and to Greensborough, 75 miles ; total, 218 miles.
7. Wilmington to Columbia, 180 miles; and to Pickens,
140 miles; 820 miles. 8. Charleston to Augusta, 120
miles; to Chattanooga, 800 miles; total, 420 miles.
Besides these railroads, there is a great number of turnpikes and roads running in the same direction. . The greatt number of these 'roads have for their object the uniting
of the sea-ports with the interior of the country.
The number of railroads passing through the conn try in
a longitudinal direction is more restricted. We can only
name those from-· 1. Fredericksburg to Richmond, 60
miles ; and Wilmington, 240 miles ; total, 300 miles. 2.
Richmond to Salisbury, 220 miles; to Columbia, 140 miles;
and to Charleston, 125 miles ; total, 485 miles. 8. Wilmington to Florence, 100 miles; and to Charleston, 110
miles; total, 210 miles. 4. C~arleston to_Savannah, 100
miles. 5. Lynchburg to Chattanooga, 420 miles.
Also in this direction there is no want of turnpikes and
other roads. These roads, though bad and very different
from a French imperial turnpike, are, nevertheless, passable
by troops of all arms; and as there are
great number of
parallel roads-perhaps more than in any European conn-
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try of equal magnitude-large armies may be moved in
parallel columns with ease and celerity,· supposing, however, that the season is not too wet.
In the direction of the longitudinal roads t~ere is one
. ug worthy of remark, and of high strategic importance.
.
It is this : that most of these roads end at the sea-coast.
he direction of the Richmond and Wilmington, or Richd and Charleston Railroad line, for instance, is not parwith the mountain chain or the sea-coast, but cut diag:• auy across the country. The result is, that an army placed
r near Lynchburg would prevent, by marching straight
th, any Rebel ariny placed at Richmond and trying to
pe, from doing so. A.n army moving south from Lynchonld arrive at Georgetown or Charleston ; an army
ng south from Richmond would arrive at Wilmington.
th armies have moved with equal speed, the latter
efore find the enemy established on its line of
elf thrown back on the sea in case of defeat.
oo:serTation, it may be said here that the
sufficiently populous to sustain an
arch, if moved on parallel roads.
IMlllillftfet "th1rua passed this zone in review, let us ex0

or difficulties it offers to the operations
To facilitate this investigation, let us
theater in itself, and divide it accordingly
es-,.right, left, and center.
zones are strongly enough marked to be dist once. Blue Ridge Mountain, with its few
ctually separates the principal mountain district
t of the zone. All west of the Blue Ridge
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will therefore be the right zone of our restricted theater of
war. 'fhe more eastern ridge, formed by the Kittoctan,
Bull Run, and Southwest Mountains, separates the valley,
running from Berlin, on the Potomac, down to Lynchburg,
on the James River, from the eastern part of Virginia.
This valley therefore forms the center zone. Finally, all
east of the center zone will be contained in the left.
Now, an army can operate in one of these three zones
alone, or in two combined. An army operating in the
right zone can do so by taking the Potomac as a base of
operation, and advancing along the valleys; or, by t~king
the· Ohio as a base, and passing through Western Virginia or Eastern Tennessee over the mountains. An ~rmy
taking the Upper Potomac as a base of ·operation, and
..iltdvancing along the valleys, would proba~ly find little dif..
ficulty in doing
We have seen the whole Rebel army
marching from Martinsburg down these valleys, and maintaining itself there for a long while.
To use the position of this zone to advantage, the first
necessity is evidently to have continual control of the
mountain gaps leading into the center zone. .The mountains themselves are most of them steep, rugged, and
wooded, and can only be crossed by these ga.ps, which are
easily defensible. In all parts of these valleys an army
on a rapid march might find enough to subsist on.
An army marching from the Ohio, as a base of operation,
into Virginia or North or South Carolina, would find more
difficulties, as it would have to cross a number of parallel
ridges, as well as to pass through districts thinly inhabited,
and where provisions consequently are scarce. But even this
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might be accomplished with an army not too large, and composed of good material, considering that the main distance
over the mountains is not over seventy or eighty miles; and
ought, therefore, to be accomplished in from four to five
days.
An army operating in the center zone has still greater
facilitieR for moving than in the right. In this zone all the
rivers have their source, and are therefore inconsiderable,
and do not form obstacles of any importance to an advancing army. The possession of the gaps to the right, as well
s to the left, is of the utmost importan~e ; and remembering this,. it would appear that a combined movement in the
,
two zones-right and center-would be most advantageous,
considering that all the gaps would then easily fall.
The strategic importance of Lynchburg, at the end or
the valley forming this zone, we have already noticed, when
peaking of the lines of communication. .A.n army marching
o gh this zone may be maintained in it, if no long halts
any particular place. A number of parallel
the movement of a large army in marching
ns. The roads are of the character already
g t nd center zones offer difficulties the moment
· to be provisioned from its base of operations,
otomac; though even there arrangements may be
nd intermediary depots created which would facilits BUbsistence.

An army operating in the left zone can operate in two
ay · either by marching down from the Potomac-that is
to say, taking the Potomac as the base of operation;
by

or

5
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making use of the maritime facilities, and by disembarking
a large force at any point of the coast.
The first plan-that of marching from the Potomac down
to the Savannah in the left Z<?ne, which is near the sea-coasthas this disadvantage : it offers the enemy all strategical
and tactical advantages; the fifteen rivers to be crossed are
so many lines of defense. On the other hand, the deep and
large bays facilitating navigation in this zone, would facilitate the provisioning of an army.
The second plan-that of disembarking a large force on
any point of the coast-would experience, in a southerly or
northerly movement, the same tactical and strategical difficulties as an army moving from the Potomac, as a base of
operation, would, though the number of those difficulties
may be reduced ; but others, growing out of the very nature
of such a combined-that is to say, half naval and half military-operation, W?uld arise; and as a whole, the difficulties
would probably not qe less in the one case than in the
other. ·
There are other considerations rendering the use of this
zone less convenient than that of the two others ; they will
be explained in discussing the operations of the campaign.
We may remark here that an expedition may_ be accom-plished with comparative ease, considering the nature of the
~oast, and that the provisioning of troops would be greatly
facilitated by it.

Most, or nearly all, of the important

cities of the main left zone are on its left; even the capital
of the whole Confederacy is situated there.

These seem

great inducements for its choice as the principal zone of
operation.

How far this is correct, we shall see.
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Center Zone.-This zone is formed, as we have already
seen, by the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. The Big Sandy River,
Cumberland Mountains, Savannah River, and ocean are
the boundaries on the east ; the Gulf of Mexico on the
south; the Mississippi on the west; and the Oliio on the
north.

This zone has a peculiarity which must be noti~ed and
well understood; for the success of all military operations
depends upon it. It is, that this zone is divided into two
e tirely distinct parts by the Tennessee River, each part
forming a theater of war in ifs~lf. The upper part, comprising Kentucky, Tennessee, and a small portion of North .,
Alabama, is inclosed between the waters of the Tennessee
River, the Ohio, and the Big Sandy Rivers. The Tennessee
River nearly describes a semicircle. Where it rises, it runs
parallel with the mountains - that is, from northeast to
southmst. .At Chattanooga it changes direction, following
a clear westerly course; and at Florence it turns northward,
and keeps in this direction to its mouth. The country inclosed by it and by the Ohio, we will call the upper center
zone; and the country south of the Tennessee, or rather the
remainder of the center zone, we will call the lower center
zone. The lower center zone is ·principally distinguished
from the upper one by the course of its rivers, which all run
south ward and empty into the Gulf, instead of emptying
northward, as those of the upper center zone do. . Let us
consider these two parts. of the center zone separately.
Upper Center Zone. -If we give to this zone part of
Western Virginia, we form a kind of quadrangle, which, in
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a strategic point of view, presents great resemblance to the
main left zone. I_n fact, one of the long sides of the quadrangle is formed by a mountain chain, the same which we
have already encountered in the left zone; the other long or
parallel side is formed by the Ohio, which plays the same
part that the sea plays in the left zone.

It is a natural ob-

stacle to all movements of troops, except for the party having
entire control of it. The two smaller sides are formed by
the Lower Tennessee and the Big Sandy Rivers. The western part of this zone is very mountainous.
Mountains.-The Blue Ridge and its parallel ridges, on
entering this zone, take a course a little more westward than
in the north and west of Virginia. The Blue Ridge forms
still the ridge at the east; the other parallel ridges, forming
four main chains, are: Unaka, Great Smoky, Iron Mountain, Ray's Mountain, Clinch Mountain, and Cumberland
Mountain. West from Cumberland Gap, the Cumberland
Ridge becomes wider, and forms a kind of table-land. The
main ridge also takes a more southerly direction, and thereby encounters the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, where
the river breaks through it. South from the-Tennessee, the
mountains take a westerly direction, and lose themselves in
smaller hills ; forming, however, the separation between
rivers running north and south.
From the Cumberland Mountains a _number of offshoots
start at right angles to the direction of the main chain;
these advance far into Kentucky. Some of them form a
kind of table-land.

They give to the whole country -a

mountainous and rugged appearance; and they form par-
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Mountains, and has a course of about 120 miles. It runs
in a valley formed by offshoots of the Cumberland Mountains, having a direction southeast by south and northwest
by north. .A road leads from the Ohio to Marion or Abingdon, on the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.
2. Licking River empties opposite Cincinnati. It rises
in the Cumberland Mountains. Its course is somewhat more
westerly than that of the Bi Sandy River. It also runs in
a valley formed by offshoots from the Cumberland Mountains. Its whole course is about 180 miles. It is navigable
for boats for about 100 miles.
3. Kentucky River.-This is larger than the other two.
The upper part of its course runs nearly west, and the lower
nearly north. It rises in the Cumberland Mountains. The
length of its course is about 250 miles. It is a rapid stream,
in a deep, rocky bed, with steep banks. .At hig,h water it
is navigable with steam.boats- up to Frankfort, Ky., and
with boats some 80 miles higher up.
4. Rolling Fork and Salt River unite together, rise in
the middle of the State, carry a gre~t amount of water, and
are navigable for boats for about 100 miles.
5. Green River shapes its course according to that of the
Tennessee River. It rises in the middle of the State; has
very deep water. Steam-boats run up as far as Bowling
Green, and ~or boats it is navigable nearly to its springs.
Its entire length is about 225 miles.
6. Cumberland River rises in the Cumberland Mountains. Its course is shaped to ~hat of the Tennessee River,
the latter forming an exterior, and the Cumberland River
an interior arc. It empties into the Ohio near Smithland,
/

.
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about 15 miles from the mouth of the Tennessee. The
length of its course is about 600 to 700 miles. It is navigable for steam-boats as far as Nashville, or about 160 miles,
and in the wet season, with high water, as far as Burkesville. With boats it is navigable much higher up.
'1. Tennessee River is formed by the junction of the
01inch and Holston Rivers, rising in the Alleghany Mountains of Virginia.. Of its course we have already spoken .
•
I entire lene;th is about 700 to 800 miles. It is navigable
o Florence, which is about 200 miles, and by boats it
is navigable even up to the mountain district.
The principal towns areIn Xentucky.-Covington, Louisville, Frankfort, Lexington, Lebanon, Bowling Green, Burkesville, Hopkinsville.
In Tennessee.-Dover, Clarksville, Nash ville, Murfreesborough, Knoxville, Tazewell, Chattanooga.
I~ North Alapama.-Florence, Athens, Huntsville.
Principal Lines of Oommunication.-The principal lines
of communication, rm1ning from northeast to southwest,
are: 1. The Ohio. 2. The East Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad, or from Memphis to Chattanooga, 300 miles, and
from this place to Lynchburg, 420 miles; total, 720 miles.
Besides these two principal lines, there are smaller ones,
such as the r~ilr.oad from-1. Lexington to Louisvill~, , 5
miles. 2. Memphis J unetion to Dover, 90 miles. 3. McMinnville to Tullahoma, 40 miles. 4. Tracy City to Fayetteville,
45 miles.
Of communication from north to south, we have to mention, besides the lower course of all the tributaries of the
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Ohio, the following railroads: 1. Cincinnati to Lexington,
90 miles. 2. Louisville to Nashville, I 75 miles. 3. Henderson to Nashville, 130 miles. 4. Nashville to Decatur, on
the Tennessee, 110 miles. 5. Nash ville· to Stevenson, 100

miles.
A great number of turnpikes and other roads exist, traversing the country in all directions. Many of them run
parallel to the· different rivers, and therefore radiate in the
direction of Cumberland Gap, or even of Chattanooga.
This conformation renders these two points of great strategic interest.
.Among the principal turnpikes and ordinary roads are
those running along the valleys, and parallel to the Cumberland Mountains, besides the road _from Tazewell to Lexington, and all those crossing the mountain chain. These
roads are much the same as those of Virginia. The country in general is fertile, and in certain parts-for instance,
the Kentucky valley-is very much so. It is therefore
possible to maintain an army on its through march, if this
army makes no long stoppage in any particular place.
If we consider now this upper center zone as a theater ·of
war in itself, we should, in order to discuss the facilities of
moving troops, have to d";vide it into three zones, as we did for
the left main zone. Here, however, nature has not made the
divisions so marked as in the first zone. Nevertheless, we
can easily find such divisfons as will suit our purpose, viz. :
1. The country east from Kentucky River, besides the whole
mountain district, forms the left. 2. The country between
Kentucky and Green River forms the center. 3. The country between Green River·and Tennessee forms the right.
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Of these three zones, the latter or right is ev-idently the
most accessible or easy to pass through. Two rivers, navigable up to the end of this zone, besides the Henderson and
Nashville Railroad, form as many good lines of communication for an army having the Lower Ohio as a base of operation. In marching south into Tennessee, it is only necessary
to have control of the two rivers by means of gun-boats.
Large numbers of troops may be very rapidly transported
on these two rivers; and this is a great ad vantage, besides
the facility of being supplied by three roads which also join
the main road from the center zone, being the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad.
The center zone offers the same advantages for supplying
troops, except that in moving them forward they could not
be transported by water. This zone meeting the right zone,
could, for supplying the army, make use of the means of
transportation belonging to the latter.
By marching in the center z ne, however, a certain number of rivers would have to be crossed, which might serve a
retreating enemy as lines of defense; and, in fact, have already been used as such. Combined ·operations in the left
and center zones, however, would render this defense useless.
The most difficult to operate in, but probably the most
important, is evidently the left zone. Full of mountains,
rivers, without railroads, and only bad roads to march on,
this zone ~ffers, besides these disadvantages, a nearly impassable barrier, in the Cumberland Mountains, to an army
advancing from north to south; and an army marching from
Big Sandy River, parallel with the Cumberland Mountains,
in the direction of Nash ville, has a number of parallel
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ridges and rivers to cross. Could, however, such an army
penetrate into the parallel valleys, such as the Cumberland,
the Clinch, and the Holston, its advance would find no ( or
only small) difficulties, except, perhaps, in so far as provisioning is concerned.
The operations in this part of the up~er center zone
could only be carried on upon a limited number of roads;
but precisely, in consequence of this small number, they (the
operations) would be the more decisive. To pass from the
left to the right zone-that"is, from Chattanooga to Nashville, or the reverse-several roads may be found ; but the
Tenn·essee River, as well as several of the parallel chains,
must be passed.
The Lower Center Zone is composed of part of Tennessee and Kentucky, and the whole of Mississippi, .Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida. The Sava.nnah, .Atlantic, the Mexican Gulf, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Tennessee inclose it between their waters.
There are no mountains of importance in this zone, except in the north of Georgia, in which the end of the Blue
Ridge Mountains is to be found. From the highest point
of this zone the fall i_s in all directions., We also se_e the
principal rivers rise there, and take a southeasterly, southerly, southwesterly, and some, in their higher course, even
a nearly westerly direction. HilJy offshoots of the highest
part of this zone form the water-line between the Ohio and
the Gulf.
The country in the north of Georgia consists partly of
table-land, and the eastern ridge is still called the Blue
Ridge.

The remainder of the zone is partly undulating,
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tr. The Mobile River is formed, about 50 miles above the
Bay of Mobile, by the junction of the Alabama and Tombigbee.

This latter receives a large confluent, the Black

Warrior.

Steam-boats go up on the Black Warrior as far

as Tuscaloosa, 280 miles from its mouth ; and on the Tombigbee as far as Columbus, on the Missi~sippi, a distance of
300 miles.

The whole length of the Tombigbee is about

450 miles.

The .A..laba.ma is navigable for steam-boats as far

as Montgomery, about 300 miles.
8. The Pascagoula empties into the Mississippi Sound.
It is navigable for about 1()0 miles.

Its whole course ex-

tends over about 200 miles.
9. The Pearl River rises in the center of the State of
Mississippi. It has a course of about 300 miles, and empties into the outlet of Lake Pontchartrain.
10. The Mississippi forms the western boundary of the
zone.
Emptying into the Mississippi, and having partly a westward course, are11. The Homochitto River.
12. The Yazoo River, running, for a great distance, nearly
parallel with the l\Iississippi.
13. Big Black River.
14. Hatchie River.
15. Forked Deer River.

16. Obion River.
The principal towns are-

In Western Kentucky and Tennessee. - Columbus,
Paducah, Hickman, Paris, Huntingdon, Jackson, Bolivar,
and Memphis.

GEOGRArHY OF TIIE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

51

In Mississippi.-Jackson, Natchez, Vicksburg, Columbus, Aberdeen, Holly Springs, Jacinto,_Pearlington, Shieldsborough, Mississippi City, Biloxi, Pascagoula.
In Alabama.-Montgomery, Tuscaloosa, Mobile.
In Georgia.-Milledgeville, Augusta, Savannah, Columbus, Macon, .Athens, Atlanta, Griffin.
In Florida.-Pensacola, Tallahassee, Apalachicola, San
Augustine, Key West.

Principal Lines of Communication.-Most of the rivers
serve as lines of communication in a direction from north to
south. Besides these, there are railroads running in the
same direction :-1. Paducah to Union City, 55 miles. 2.
Cairo to Grand Junction, on the Memphis and Charleston
road, 135 miles. 3. Cairo to Corinth, 150 miles. 4. Cairo
to Memphis, 160 miles. 5. Memphis to New Orleans, 390
miles. 6. Grand Junction to Grenada, 90 miles. 1. Corinth
to Mobile, 320 miles. 8. Montgomery to Pensacola, 165
miles. 9. Chattanooga to Atlanta, 120 miles. 10. Atlanta to Montgomery, 150 miles. 11. .Atlanta to Savannah,
270 miles. 12. Macon to Albany, 100 miles. 13. Talladega to Selma, 90 miles. 14. .Augusta to Savannah, 120
miles.
Running in a direction from east to west, we find-1.
l\Iemphis to Chattanooga. 2. Vicksburg to Jackson, to
Marion, 130 miles. 3. Marion to Cahawba, 90 miles. 4.
Water communication from Cahawba to Montgomery, 70
miles. 5. Montgomery to Augusta, 800 miles. 6. Montgomery to Savannah, 360 miles. 7. Savannah to Chattahoochee, 300 miles. 8. Savannah to Tallahassee, 240 miles.
6
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9. Brunswick to Wares borough, 60 miles. 10. Jacksonville to Tallahassee, 17 0 miles. 11. Jackson ville to Cedar
Keys, 120 miles .
.A great number of turnpikes and other roads exist, passing through the country in all directions, and permitting
movement of troops, as well from north to south as from
east to west.
This zone has a great extent of coast. Possessing a number of bays and sounds, it is therefore admirably suited for
combined naval and military operations. In mentioning the
rivers, we have named the most important of these bays and
sounds. Be it, however, remarked that most of the bays in
the Gulf of Mexico are shallow, with sandy banks, and do
not admit vessels of great draught:

Movement of Troops in the Lower Center Zone.-Considerin g this as a theater of war by itself-and it is large
enough for that-we may, as we did before, subdivide it into
right, left, and center. But here the question arises, are we
to place ourselves on the Savannah as a base of operation,
or on the Tennessee? In the first case, the region along
the Tennessee would form the right, the coast district the
left, and the country between the two the center zone.
Taking the Tennessee for our base, the State of Mississippi would form the right, .Alabama the center, and Georgia the left. The marching of troops in the three last zones
from north to south would probably not find very great difficulties. The troops might, in most cases, follow the course
of the rivers; besides, simultaneously with a march from
north to south, gun-boats of light draught might penetrate
the rivers, and establish communications with the sea, thereby
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facilitating the provisioning of the army, and at the same
time the passage of the river.
The right zone seems particularly favorable for such oper ations, considering that the Memphis and New Orleans, and
the Corinth and New Orleans Railroad, the Mississippi, and
the Tombigbee may serve as so many lines of communication with the base on the Tennessee or the Ohio, as well as
with the sea.
But the center zone also offers facilities. Good roads exist
from Decatur to Columbia, a distance of only one hundred
miles, or six days' march; thence to Pensacola is railroad
communication, and to Mobile water communication.
Operating at the extreme right, though it would perhaps
be gr~atly facilitated by a flotilla in the Mississippi, might
encounter difficulties in the nlJ.mber of the tributaries of the
Mississippi which would have to be crossed. Operating at
the extreme left would be difficult, in consequence of the
swampy condition of the country.
It should be remarked, however, that little would be gained
by marching simply from north to south in this zone, considering its length and width-from the Upper Savannah to
the Mississippi about four hundred miles, and from the
Lower Savannah to the Mississippi about six hundred miles
-an army, after having marched south a certain distance,
would then have to march east or west, and would find
itself in the same position as an army taking the Savannah
as a base of operations.
An army marching from the Savanna.h to the west, might
march in the neighborhood of the Tennessee ; or, at all
events, as far north as possible. · The nearer the Tennessee,
>-
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the easier, probably, the movement. What renders a move-ment from east to west, or west to east, difficult in this zone,
is the number of large rivers which an army would have to
cross. The nearer to the springs of these rivers, therefore,
the movement takes place, the easier it will be executed.
An operation to the left-that is, near the sea-coast-would
only be possible when supported by a large flotilla; and
even then it would be slow, and productive of small results.
Operating in the center zone would offer as many difficulties as operating in the left. In marching, therefore, from
east to west, an army could only act to the right-that is,
near ~he Tennessee-or, perhaps, take a slanting direction,
starting from the extreme right, and marching diagonally
through the country-from Pickens, for instance, in the direction of New Orleans. Thus, only a comparatively small
number of rivers would have to be passed; and, besides, the
distance is reduced, and communication might soon be opened
with the sea as well as with the center of the base of operation-that is, the Savannah near .Augusta.
The Right Zone consists of the country west of the Mississippi, and is formed mainly by the States of Missouri,
Arkansas, and Louisiana. The main feature of this zone is
the great abundance of rivers. A mountain chain runs from
north to south, parallel to the Mississippi, from Helena,
near this river, up into Missouri. It is called Crowley's
Ridge. The country between this ridge and the Mississippi
is almost one large swamp. In fact, the abundance of water
in this zone creates a great number of swamps.
The principal direction of the course of the rivers is from
northwest to southeast. They are all the tributaries or
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confluents of the Mississippi. This zone being of comparatively little importance, we give only the principal features
· of it without many details.
The principal rivers are1. The Missouri River.

The White River.

4.

2. The Francis River. 3.
The Arkansas River. 5. The Red

River.
.An immense number of smaller rivers, or confluents of
the above named, or emptying direct into the Mississippi,
traverse the country in all directions. The lower portions
of this zone-Arkansas and Louisiana-are unhealthy,
in consequence of the many swamps. Its extent, from
north to south, is about seven hundred miles; and from
east to west, from two hundred and fifty to three hundred
.
.
miles.
The principal towns areIn Missouri.-St. Louis, Jefferson City, Hannibal, Palmyra, St. Charles, Booneville, Lexington, and Bloomington.
In Arkansas.-Little Rock and Van Buren.
In Louisiana.-Barataria, Bayou Sara, Carrollton. New
Orleans and Baton Rouge, though in Louisiana, belong, in
fact, to the center zone.

.

The principal lines of communication, besides the Mississippi, Missouri, Arkansas, and Red Rivers, are the railroads
from-I. Hannibal to St. Joseph. 2. Hudson to St. Charles.
8. St. Louis to Georgetown, from east to west. 4. St.
Louis to W ynesville, from east to west. 5. St. Louis to
Pilot Knob, from north to south. 6. Memphis to Little

6*
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Rock, only partly finished.

7. Vicksburg to Marshan, in

Texas, not en ti rely finished. 8. New Orleans to Franklin.
This zone possesses some continuous and parallel roads,
from Missouri south to Louisiana; and also a number of
roads from east to west.

.An army operating in it would

have to contend with many obstacles. In .Arkansas, a large
army, even if only on a rapid march through, would probably find difficulties in obtaining subsistence.

In marching

from north to south, it would have to cross a great number
of rivers, which afford many lines of defense to the enemy,
and render an advance against a vigilant foe nearly impossible. Only along the different navigable rivers would troops
be able to move with security and ease. Missouri, however,
must be excepted; it is already more populated than the
other two States. Louisiana, also, is probably easier to
pass through than .Arkansas.
It should be observed that this zone has no large center
of population, or large arsenals or manufactories.

More-

over, the total population being small, it will be seen that
no large army can n1aintain itself for any length of time
in this zone, unless based ·on the Mississippi or some of the
other navigable streams, by which it could be fully supplied
from the North, or any other place. In other words, a large
Rebel army, thrown into this zone, having no Ioi:iger control
over the Mississippi or center zone, could probably not subsist for a long period of time; or, at all events, it could not
carry out any campaign of importance. It would be obliged
. to disperse.
Having thus passed in review the different zones of which
the whole theater of war is _composed, there remain but a
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few words to say as to the connection of those zones with
each other.
The left zone and the upper center zone are contiguous.
They are linked together by the mountain chain. However, the communications are comparatively few. East
Tennessee and Virginia, and the Charleston and Chattanooga Railroad, and a restricted number of turnpikes or
ordinary roads, are all that join East Kentucky and Tennessee with Virginia and North and South Carolina.
The communications between the left and lower center
zone are better. The Charleston and .Augusta, and the
Charleston and Savannah Railroads, besides the river, may
be crossed at a great nnm her of P?ints.
The communication between the northern and southern
center zone is across the Tennessee. The party commanding the river may cross at any point from one zone into the
other. Chattanooga forms on the Tennessee a kind of
tete-de-pont; besides which, some roads over the mountains exist, joining North Georgia with East Tennessee
and Kentucky.
The communication between the center and the right
zone exists now only at Vicksburg, which thereby becomes
a point of great strategic importance. The Mississippi
River is much too large to be crossed in any other way
than by steam-boats; but the party possessing them may
cross at many points.
What has been said about the geography of the theater
of war is, I believe, sufficient to enable the reader to understand well the different operations carried on in it; and
which will be discussed in the following chapter.
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III.
APPLICATION OF THE MAXIMS LAID DOWN
IN CH.APTER I. TO THE THEATER OF WAR
CONSTITUTED BY THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.
be the causes of this great rebellion, we cannot but admit that, at the present moment, the war has lost
all resemblance to those wars which a government has
sometimes to undertake against its rebellious subjects. It
has entirely assumed the character of a war carried on
between two powerful neighbors. The military operations
must therefore be conducted like those which have for
their object the conquest and occupation of a large country possessh~.g great and disciplined armies.
We have said above that, according as the war is national, or merely governmental as regards the invaded country, so the operations, and especially the mode of occupying
the country, have to be different. In the present case,
though perhaps as regards the South the war may be called
· national, there is n.o danger of such effects or results as
generally attend national uprisings, because the whole male
population able to bear arms is already enrolled in the
regular armies, and the country, being thus stripped of its
defenders, is void of all material for resistance, except
where those armies happen to be. Occupation becomes,
WHATEVER
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The distance which the troops of Napoleon were generally obliged to march was from twenty to thirty miles a
day. The distance now adopted in European armies as
an ordinary day's march is seven leagues, or twenty-one
miles. These rapid military operations, by which alone
great successes are to be obtained, are, however, only possible when carried out on the plan that the invading army
shall subsist on the country invaded .
. I know that there is a great difference in this respect between this country and Europe. In Europe, at a distance
of every two or three miles, thickly populated villages are
to be found, where a sufficient stock of provisions is accumulated to nourish any army on its passage through .
.All marches are so arranged that the troops stop for the
night in some village or town in which they can be quartered, and where the citizens have to lodge and feed them.
No tents and camp equipage, and no provision wagons are
required; and it is evident that, under these circumstances,
rapid movements may be executed.
In this country, contiguous villages or towns are the exception; a _number of farms may be met with, but the quartering of troops on these farms or in towns is out of the question ;
therefore camping remains a necessity here. But in regard
to providing for the army, matters are different; the number
of farms, and the stock of cattle and other provisions accumulated in them, are sufficient to provide for an army corps,
if it only marches fifteen to twenty miles a day. It is probable that an army of 100,000 men, marching on one road
only, would, with difficulty, find sufficient provisions; but
marching in three or four columns, on three or four parallel
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roads, the thing con]d certainly be done. Nothing but a
good administration or organization for collecting the provisions and paying for them is required. Based on such a
system of living, and freed of part of its immense wagontrains, an army in this country may march on an average
from seventeen to eighteen miles with ease.
The difference between this country and Europe in the
difficulties of operations becomes more marked in the wet
and cold season. In Europe, operations never become impossible. The difficulties of marching may be greater in
the bad season, the sanitary state of the army may be less
satisfactory, still operations may be carried on; for after a
march, or after rain or cold, the soldier at all events finds
in the evening a dry, warm place, and something to eat.
This cannot be said of operations in the wet and cold season here. .After a march in the rain, wet to the skin, the
soldier arrives at his camping place; no fire can be made,
or is of any use, because to be near the fire is equivalent to
remaining in the rain. The soldiers in this state have to
pitch their small tents; for beds, they have to use the wet
ground; and for supper, a wet cracker.
There are few constitutions able to resist such treatment.
Marches in the snow and cold are nearly quite as bad, and
it is evident that such circumstances must produce sickness
and demoralization among the troops. Besides all this,
the roads in bad weather very soon become impassable.
On~ day's rain is sometimes sufficient to render useless
roads which are excellent when dry. Th'erefore, if any regard is entertained for our armies, winter campaigns ought
to be undertaken as little as possible in this country. All
energetic operations should be reserved for the dry season.
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Being convinced that none but grand strategic operations can finish this war in a speedy and brilliant manner,
and being also convinced that these operations cannot be
carried on without the adoption of a thorough and sound
system of requisition, I will assume, in the following application of principles to the theater of war, that the troops
have to move only under such favorable conditions.
We have seen that the theater of war is divided by natural lines into three or four zones, distinctly &eparated from
each other, and forming, in consequence of their great extent, theaters of war by themselves. To attack these three
zones at the same time with equal means, would evidently
lead to a great division of force. It is also easy to see that
these three zones are of very different political as well as
military importance, besides being of different extent.
Nothing good could therefore be expected from a plan
throwing equal forces into the most and the least important
of these zones. On the other hand,. the armies raised to
carry on this war are so large that it would be impossible
to use them all in one zone.

We must therefore adopt

several lines of operation, and act at least in two zones
simultaneously. But then we should do · what Napoleon
did in all his wars against Austria, where he had two lines
of operation -one in Italy and one in Germany. The
main force, the main effort, and the decisive operation were
always made in one zone, to which all that was done in the
other zone was subordinate.
In 1805 and 1809 Prince Eugene operated in Italy; but
his operations were secondary to those of Napoleon in the
valley of the Danube.
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These secondary lines of operation are great diversions;
the enemy opposes them, and engages thereby a force distant from the really decisive point.

The decisive blow is

struck, and those forces distantly engaged are very often
unable to take any further part in the struggle, so much are
they thrown out of the way.
We may, by acting in this manner, operate in the three ,
zones simultaneously ; and it remains to determine the
relative importance of these three zones, and the number
of troops -which, according to their importance, is to be
engaged in each· of them.
Of the three zones, it is easy to perceive that the right
one, formed by the country west of the Mississippi, is the
least important.

The entire population is small; the co~-

munications with the center zone are few; the country is in
great part unhealthy and difficult to operate in ; insufficient
lines of communication; insufficient means of provisioning;
few large towns containing manufactories. .All these defects
combined make its occupation of little value.

Moreover,

the distance from the two seats of government is too great.
Events and news having tq travel so far are stale when they
arrive.

Lastly, the war in the two other zones would in no

way be affected by the total occupation or conquest of this
zone.

To operate in it requires, therefore, only a com para-

tively small corps, the main object being to cover the frontier
of Illinois, and to keep the upper part-that is, Missouriclear of Rebels or guerrillas.
The left zone is the very reverse of the right one.

Most

of the largest towns in the North are near the left zone,
which itself contains the capital of the Rebels, and quite a

1
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number of their largest cities. Washington, Baltimore, and
Philadelphia ar·e contiguous or only a few days' march distant. Besides containing the seats of the two belligerent
governments, this zone acquires special interest and importance from entering higher into the Northern territory than
any of the other parts of the Southern Confederacy, and
thereby becoming more offensive than any of the others.
The center zone is, in importance, between the two. No
strategic, decisive point is there. The extent of it is very
great; and operations, with a complete result, could only be
c~rried on by very large armies. If, therefore, this zone be
chosen as the main theater of the war, the government would
be obliged to hold in the left zone a very lar~e army for its
own protection ; an army which would become entirely useless in the campaign, as it would have only a defensive
character.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that what has been said
is sufficient to establish the fact that the left zone is the
main zone for decisive operations, and we will endeavor to
show that its geographical formation is such that it is really
well adapted for carrying them out. The army operating in
the center zone will be secondary to that of the left zone,
and should only serve as a kind of diversion.
Comparing what has been said, under the head of "Base
of Operation, fig. 1, with the left zone, we shall find that it
exactly corresponds with the case stated there: _a b would
represent the Potomac; b d, the .Atlantic Ocean; a c, the
mountain chain, or the frontier of Western Virginia; and
c d, the Savannah. If we succeed in placing our army along

a c, we should be able to act or take hold at any moment of
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the communications of the army .A, which has for its only
retreat the line o d, or the Savannah. The very moment a
Rebel army permits a Union army to act from the mountain
, district against its communications, or, what is better, to take
hold of them, so as to force it to fight, forming its line of
battle .parallel with the sea, and facing the Blue Ridgethat is, forming its line of battle parallel with its natural
line of retreat to the Savannah-this Rebel army, in case
of defeat, will not only be beaten, but, by a rapid pursuit,
will be obliged to surrender, as it will be thrown back in the
•
direction of the ocean, an obstacle which soon stops all
further retreat.
The possession of the mountain district is therefore, for
the holding _of the left zone, a necessity; and still better,
it is a necessity for the possession of the whole theater of
war. In fact, this chain of mountains is like a wedge driven
from the North right into the very heart of. the theater of
war. It is the only elevated part of it, and dominates it in
all· directions. It is like a bulwark, or, better still, like the
citadel of a large fortress, of which the walls are formed by
the parallel ridges, the ditches by the rapid streams in the
valley, and the doors by the gaps.
Take the whole fortress-that is, the whole South-but
leave thi~ citadel untouched, and it will be the same as if
nothing had been taken. In these mountains the Southern
armies can rally, and, as by their occupation they maintain
a decidedly central position, combined with the facility of
debouching in any place, they can throw themselves, with
their whole force, on all the surrounding fragments of our
armies, and beat them in detail.

•
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Take this bulwark-this key of the whole Southern Confederacy-first, and the very reverse will take place. Our
armies are then in the central position, and are able to throw
themselves on the fragments of the Southern armies with
their united forces.
The conquest of the South, after the occupation of this
citadel, will not even be a matter of time. Resistance would
be useless, and surrender would be the natural consequence.,
Ought we not be able to carry this natural fortification,
with two sides backing our territory on the Potomac and
Western Virginia, and with an open door like the Shenan-:doah valley ?
Supposing, therefore-as it was at the commencement of
the war, or even of 1862-that the entire theater of war was
still intact, and that we had to start on the first campaign,
we should act in accordance with the importance of these
three zones. We should place only a small corps in the
right zone; in the center zone .we should concentrate a very
large army, disposed near the Ohio, between Louisville and
Cincinnati, and between this latter town and Burlington, at
the mouth of the Big Sandy River. On the Potomac, also,
we should concentrate a large army between Harper's Ferry
and Washington.
We should commence operations in the right zone to
attract attention there; and then we should push, at all
hazards, a sufficiently strong column from Louisville in the
direction of Nashville, with the positive order to carry any
obstacle in its advance. As soon as this movement was in
full execution, we should concentrate at Burlington, by rapid
movements, the bulk of the army placed near the Ohio, and
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march it, by forced marches, thence along the Big Sandy
River, in a straight direction, on the Chattanooga and
Lynchburg Railroad, so as to hit this road ·near Wytheville
and Liberty. .At the same moment this Ohio army started,
the Potomac army ought to start.
Some strong demonstrations ought to be made against
Centreville, a place where we suppose the Rebel army to be,
as, in fact, they were at the commencement of 1862. The
right wing of the Potomac army ought to move, by forced
marches, up the Shenandoah valley; and the center and
left wing should do the same in the par~llel valley, between
Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains.
From Berlin, on the Potomac, to Lynchburg and Liberty
is about ten days' march; and from Burlington, on the Ohio,
to Liberty is about the same distance. The marches of
these two armies ought to be arranged in columns similar
to those employed by Napoleon in his manoouvres of 1805
and 1806. (See "Summary of the .A.rt of War," pp. 179
and 180.)
'l,he object of this manoouvre is to gain the left flank of
the Rebel army; and it will .be seen, by measuring the distance, that if the Rebel army is induced to stay one day
longer after the start has commenced, in consequence of the
demonstrations against its front, its left flank will be gained
either immediately by the Potomac army, or somewhat later
by the Ohio army, which, in fact, arrives in its rear. In
both cases the Union a~mies must only keep pace with the
retreating Rebel army, and advance direct to the south, and
they will force the Rebel army to surrender near Wihnington, in consequence of the line of retreat of the Rebels end-
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ing there on the sea-coast, and the way westward being
closed by Union forces. (See Plate II.)
The double advance of these two armies-one on the left
flank and the other right against the base of operation of
the Rebel army-renders all resistance in Virginia useless,
and makes it even a military fault. The stopping a day to
give or receive battle from the army of the Potomac, would
carry the Ohio army one day's march in advance, and the
ruin of the Rebel Virginia . army would be certain ; for it
cannot afford to lose one day, as we have shown.
It must, however, be said that, in order to render this
manreuvre-that is, the adoption of two lines of operation
in one zone-a safe one, it is necessary that the Ohio and
the rotomac armies should each be strong enough singlehanded to accept battle from the whole Rebel army ; and
there would be no difficulty in that, considering that the
Ohio army, threatening by its position the center zone,
would have obliged the Rebels to keep a large army there.
Moreover, the United States fleet, by making repeated attacks and descents on different points of the coast, would
compel them, in order to protect their sea-coast towns, to
have sufficient forces distributed along them, which would
also have absorbed a large number of troops.
The instant one of the Union armies has gained the left
flank of the Rebel army, the lat_ter may be obliged at any
moment to fight a battle under conditions similar to those
imposed on the Prussians while at Jena-that is to say, defeat would be equivalent to destruction. On the other hand,
suppose the Union army is defeated, it would lose, perhaps,
a few thousand prisoners, and be thrown back on its base of
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operation; but the defeat would in no way be decisive, as it
would be if inflicted on the Southern army.
Evidently the Rebel army would try to avoid such a
catastrophe; and could only do so by retreating immediately to the Upper Savannah. The Union army, continuing
to push its right wing forward, is a few days afterward reinforced by the Ohio army, and it becomes apparent that this
one march along the right of the left zone will carry the
whole left zone in twenty or twenty-five days, even if it does
not accomplish the destruction of the Rebel army at first
contained in it.
How difficult the escape of the Rebel army would be,
may be imagined, when we consider the embarrassment
of the enemy in understaJ?-ding so gran~ an operation before it is fully developed, and of resolving at once upon a
counter-operation equally grand, leaving, perhaps, a wellfortified position, which their adversaries, to judge from
their demonstrations, seemed disposed to attack. The difficulty for the Rebel commander would be to distinguish,
amid the noise of battle, in the continually succeeding news
and dispatches, the true from the false. Melas, Mack, and
the Duke of Brunswick, all three in their day, s~owed that
the task was above their strength .
.After the junction of the two armies, they would march
on, al ways along the right of the left zone, one of the two
holding the mountains-that is to say, moving along the
valleys. By considering, now, the upper center zone, it will
be seen that this same march which carries the left zone,
carries also the upper center zone. In fact, of this zone,
which nearly forms a quadrangle, the Rebels bold, or did
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hold, only one side, and this is the side extending from
Florence to Lynchburg.
The Lower Cumberland and Tennessee could always be
passed by Union gun-boats, and a retreat by the Rebels
against the lower part of these two rivers would be impossible. Nor could the Ohio and the Big Sandy Rivers serve
as lines of retreat. .A. Rebel army in Kentucky or Tennessee,
in order to retreat, must therefore pass south, between
Nash ville and Cumberland Gap. This last side of the quadrangle the Union army is closing by its advance along the
valleys.
We have said that the small army pushed, by way of diversion, from Louisville in the direction of Nashville, should
advance at all hazards. This force should attack the main
Rebel army in Tennessee, having orders to fight any Rebel
force it might encounter. It would attack this army and be
beaten. The -Rebels would probably pursue it, which would
carry them farther north-that is,, to say, away from 'the decisi ve point, or only opening left for this retreat, and 'Yhich
the Union army is about to close."
In this zone it would therefore be, as in the left, one day
lost might w.itness the destruction of the whole Rebel force
of Kentucky and Tennessee. If the Rebel army has not
fallen back into Alabama before the Union army arrives at
Chattanooga, it will be forced to fight a battle, facing southward, against superior numbers; and in case of defeat, it will
be thrown against the Ohio or Lower Cumberland, where it
would finally be obliged to lay down its arms.
By measuring the distance, it will be found that . if the
Rebels would arrive before Louisville when the Ohio army
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arrives at Liberty, or, better still, Wytheville, on the Lynchburg and Chattanooga Railroad, this latter army can prevent their returning into .Alabama. The defeat of the secondary Union force left in Tennessee would thereby have
occasioned the destruction of the Rebels.
Plate II. will better explain the movement than all
that can be said about it. The same time-that is to say,
twenty to twenty-five days from the first start-would
therefore have sufficed to clear also the upper center
zone entirely of the enemy's army. There remain but the
operations against the lower center and against the right
zone.
The Union armies having arrived at the north of Georgia,
and occupying the table-land commanding the whole of the
lower center zone, would have to commence operations
against it; but here matters would be very different, according to the previous successes of the two Union armies. If
they should have succeeded in destroying one, or even both
Rebel armies, or in crippling them seriously, no difficulty
would be experienced in tlie lower center zone ; but if both
Rebel armies-that is, that of Kentucky and that of Virginia-should have succeeded in escaping intact, the matter
becomes very serious.
The best that could be expected, in the latter case, is a
campaign like the second half of the campaign of 1809, with
its bloody battles of Essling and Wagram -; and the worst
that might take place would be like that of 1812, with its
disasters of Krasnoi and the Beresina. Both these two
campaigns or invasions were based ·on the same principle
as that we are discussing. In the first, the enemy's army
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was only partly crippled at the onset ; in the second, it remained intact.
If the Rebel armiy should have been seriously crippled
or partly destroyed in the previous operation, its resistance
in the low~r center zone could only be of short duration and
without result. In fact, these retreating fragments of Rebel
· armies could only go in the direction of Florida or of the
Mississippi. In the first case, the best thing to do would
be to push them right into Florida, -a nd to let them perish
there: In the second case, one part of the Union ar~y
would follow the retreating Rebel army in the rear, the
other and larger part following on the flank by advancing
always in the more northerly region · of the lower center
zone. .All rivers which would serve as lines of defense
against the army following in ~he rear are carried, or,
better, tnrned by the army advancing on the flank; and
however strong a position of defense the Rebels would have
chosen, it would always be untenable, on account of being
continually outflanked. This army then would be obliged
to cross the Mississippi, and once in the right zone, the war
might be considered as virtually ended.
But if, on the contrary, the Rebel armies should have
escaped intact our rapid manreuvres, they would be able to
unite and to form a body of great strength. The Union
armie~, in their rapid ·advance, have been greatly diminished. Stragglers and sick have thinned their ranks; a
number of detachments, to occupy important towns, to secure and establish communications with.the sea., have made a
still larger reduction; and if these two armies have started
with a g~and total of 400,000 men, their ultimate number,
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after their three weeks' campaign, would probably not exceed 250,000 men, if even this number could be· brought
together. The Rebels, on the contrary, by taking up every
detachment, by uniting all fractions, might bring together a
much larger force; and if at this moment the Union army,
animated by its previous successes, were to go headlong
against the united Rebel army, the result might be a complete disaster, as no fresh base of operation, and no new
plan of refuge would have been secured. A pursuit over a
line of from 500 to 600 miles would ruin any regular army,
still more so a volunteer one; besides, most of the detachments which have been made would be lost.
The Union army should therefore come to a halt, to take
breath and to establish a new base of operation, or even
two ; one along the Savannah, and one along the Tennessee.
Gun-boats should enter the Savannah River, and command
it as far as .Augusta. This latter town should be partly
fortified to form a secure tete-de-pont. The passages over
the Tennessee River should be· secured, tetes-de-pont estab~ ..
lished, the railroad lines to the north reopened, and, finally,
stragglers and reinforcements brought in to replenish the
army. Then operations may be recommenced. The plan
would be the same here, where the united Union forces would
have to contend with the united Rebel armies, as in the left
zone, viz., to throw the Rebels back upon the sea. In a cam,, ·paign of this description, in which good generals would be
opposed to each other, as might be concluded from the previous movements of both parties, all would .depend on who
makes the first fault. However, the final result, if the two
temporary bases of operation are well secured, cannot be
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dubious. 'l'he superiority of numbers would be with the
North ; and each of the three States would fall, one after
the other-Georgia first; then, taking the Chattahoochee as
a fresh temporary base of operation, .Alabama could be
carried up to the Tombigbee, which river, in its turn, would
serve as a base of operation against Mississippi.
That the whole campaign we have here laid down is
really a correct application of the rules of strategy to the
geography of the theater of war, may be easily verified by
recapitulating them : 1. The principle of engaging the main force on the decisive point has been strictly followed. Two large armies,
two-thirds or more of the whole disposable force, were united
for the purpose of operating in one zone, which was at the
same time the decisive one.
2. The plan of the threatening of many and distant points
in the first disposition, and the formation of interior lines by
uniting quickly the different army corps, has also found its
application. The army of the Ohio threatened the whole
upper center zone ; its rapid movement to the east brought
it to a junction with the Potomac army, with which it held
interior lines, or a central position against the Rebel forces
in Virginia and Kentucky.
3. The formation of two lines of ·operation in one zone
was necessitated and according to . rules. It forced the
enemy also to the adoption of two lines, or a division of
force; besides, it would have been impossible to move the
whole army on one line; and as each of the two Union
armies was superior to the Rebel army both had to deal
with, and as, at the same time, the lines of operation con-
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ducted to a junction beyond the reach of the enemy, the
application of ~he principle must be considered safe and
justifiable.
4. The strategic direction of the line of operation, or the
choice of the base of operation for the left zone, was such
that the enemy was force~ to retreat, to leave an immense
territory in the hands of our armies, or to fight a battle in
which defeat was for him equivalent to destruction; whereas
defeat for us meant nothing more than the sacrifice of a few
thousand men and the loss of time-therefore the choice of
the line of operation was decisive against the enemy, but
not against us.
5. Finally, the strategic direction of the line of operation
in reference to the entire theater of war was such that it
conducted us right into the heart of the theater of war;
dividing the Rebel forces continually, and always holding a
crushing superiority in a central position.
In comparing this imaginary campaign with that of 1800,
devised by Napoleon for the invasion of Italy and Germany,
it will be found that the mountain region passing through
the South plays the same role in the former as Switzerland
did in the latter. By advancing to Shaffhausen, and there
crossing the Rhine, and by entering Italy through the .Alps,
of which he held the gaps, Napoleon took, in the rear, the
lines of Kray and Melas, in the valleys of the Danube and the
Po. The left zone would be, in our theater of war, what
the valley of the Danube was, and Kentucky and Tennessee
what the valley of the Po was in the campaign of 1800.
It is evident that such operations, aimed right at the destruction of the enemy's armies, are decisive; that all towns,
8

82

J.lRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

sea-ports, etc. fall as a matter of course; and · that, applied
to the South, from two to two and a half months would be
all that should be required to carry them through.
However, against every attack there is a defense, and
there are severa~ in the present case. Nearly all brilliant
manreuvres or successes in war are based
a blunder of
the enemy; on a slight fault in his position; on a slight
deficiency in his vigilance; neglect in the transmission of
dispatches; on the dull comprehension of a general; on
his natural slowness or rashness, etc.
Operations which might be undertaken with brilliant success against mediocre generals, would turn out disasters if
conducted against a master of his art. Therefore, supposing that at the outset of the campaign the left flank of the
Rebels could have been gained, is supposing that their first
position was faulty, as in fact it was on the plains of Manassas or Centreville; it is supposing that they lost time,
one or even two days, after the movement on the Upper
Potomac had begun, before they commenced their retrograde movement; it is supposing that they did not understand at once the meaning of the whole movement; that
they bad not studied their theater of war, nor the rules of
strategy; it is supposing many things more, which, after the
proof of their abilities that they gave us in 1862, we are
not permitted to suppose any longer.
The plan of defense worthy of the plan of attack, would
have been to dispose a large reserve army along the railroad, between Chattanooga and Lynchburg; to send out
from this great concentrated force two smaller armies, like
two feelers, one in the direction of Louisville or Cincinnati,
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the other in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. .At the
first movement of the Potomac or Ohio army, these two
armies retreat, closely defending, step for step, and forming,
finally, a junction with the main Rebel force. This main
army throws itself between the two Union armies, and, from
its central position, tries to defeat first one and then the
other.
The Union armies, in this case, should have followed a
similar course to that pursued by the allied armies in 1813, in
Saxony, acting on exterior lines against Napoleon, who was
forming interior lines. They always refused battle when
the main army under Napoleon advanced against them, but
advanced boldly the very moment this army had left and
nothing but the army of observation remained opposed to
them. They thereby so closely approached and wearied the
army on the interior lines, by the numerous counter-marches
nece 3sary, that at the battle of Leipsic those three armies,
acting on exterior lines, arrived in time, and took part in
the fight.
In this first case of defense, we have supposed that the
Rebels acted strictly on correct principles; that, from the
simple concentration of our troops, they guessed at once
the whole plan of operations, and took the necessary steps
to prevent its execution.
Had they not been so circumspect-that is, had they been
surprised in the first moment-but then, as soon as they understood the movement, taken the necessary steps to prevent
disasters, their defense would have presented another aspect.
Their first care would have been to reach intact the Upper
Savannah with one army, and Cumberl~nd Gap and Knox-
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Fig. 5.
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ville with the other, in order to form in those localities a
junction of all their disposable forces, and to act as we have
already described above, when speaking of the attack in ~ase
the Rebel armies escaped. It need be further remarked
only, that the Rebels should, after this, try to hold the tableland of North Georgia ; should try to prevent the establishing of temporary but secure bases of operation, on the
Savannah and Tennessee, by our troops; or should give
these latter no time to obtain reinforcements, etc.
The third and last mode of defense, and for a small force
perhaps the surest of success, would be a system of fortifications and of tetes-de-pont round Richmond. Such a system would quickly put a stop to all rapid operations; it
would prolong the war, and, perhaps, baflle the greatest
exertions of the attacking forces.
The James and Appomattox Rivers offer extensive facilities for the adoption of a similar plan. Fig. 5 will show
which of the places on those rivers would be the most advantageous to fortify. These fortifications would form a
system similar to the .Austrian quadrilateral in Italy. It
might be objected that for the def~nse of works so extensive, a great number of men would be required; and that
these being taken from the army, would diminish its efficiency. This is, to a certain extent, true; but here, as in
all similar cases, probably convalescents, recruits, or men
too old for active service, but not for the defense of a
fortification, would be made use of.
The main fortifications, as they all form tetes-de-pont,
should be strong; the guns in embrasures, and not en barbette; the corps-de-place should be surrounded by a nurn-
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ber of forts flanking each other, and able to contain,
camped between them·, a large army. The system of fortification, in one word, should be what is called the German
system.
Supposing now that both sides of Richmond, as well as
Petersburg, were fortified in this way, both forming double
tetes-de-pont and large camps, with a similar system of fortification existing on the .Appomattox, just above City Point,
and that this was joined to one on the James River, above
City Point, as shown in the figure ; that, finally, similar
works existed above Richmond, between Goochland C. H.
and the latter town, as well as on the Appomattox, where
the Richmond and Lynchburg Road crosses it. Supposing
all these works existing, and certainly part of them do
already exist, a large Rebel army might take shelter at any
moment in the middle of them ; and by basing itself now
on one, now on the other of the fortifications, ·it could take
any position, any front, without any possibility of being cut
from its base.
The defense of the fortifications should be conducted like
that of Sebastopol-that is, aggressive in itself to a certain
extent-and the field army should not leave the attacking
or invading army one instant in repose. The time the
Rebels would gain by a similar defense should be employed
in the concentration of their entire force, so as to drive the
Union army back.
It should also be remarked that this system would force
the Union army to leave the advantageous direction of its
line of operation, and to base itself on the James or Pamunkey Rivers, which is equivalent to giving up all decisive
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operations in the main left zone. The formation of a for ..
tified double tete-de-pont at Lynch burg might perhaps also
prove an advantage.
It would be impossible to discuss here the operations
which might take place in consequence of such a system of
defense ; we may remark that they might be brilliant, and
some of them, perhaps, entirely new. What can be done,
under similar circumstances, is shown by Radetzky's manceuvres, in 1848, in the .Austrian quadrilaterals.
Before closing this chapter, I wish to repeat once more,
that the whole of the above reasoning is only based on such
a knowledge of the theater of war as I could derive from
common maps. There may be several mistakes in the geography, or in the application of the principles laid down to
a geography which is not correct. The reader, in this case,
must be indulgent, and only consider that what has been
said is already more than sufficient to show, in its general
form, the application of the rules of grand war to the theater of operations formed by the Southern Confederacy.
We will now pass on to the campaign of 1862.
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IV_
CAMP.A.IGN OF 1862.
entering on the discussion of this campaign, I
will give a short and simple narrative of it. I have no other
sources of information at my disposal than the accounts
published by the press of the country, and hence some of ·
the details, as well as some of the dates and figures, may
have been incorrectly stated.
The reader must excuse such mistakes, if there are any;
the more so, as the description of the campaign is not intended for a history, but merely for the text of a strictly
military criticism. Besides, I design merely to discuss the
great movements, and not to enter into details of battles or
of smnller operations. It will therefore be of little or no
importance if some of the petty details should have been
omitted or inaccurately set down.
To render the ~iscussion more easily understood, and to
give a view of the whole of the past campaign, I have added
a map on which will be found the positions of the armies,
and the principal lines of operation of these armies during
the campaign of 1862.
1."he year 1861 had closed with enormous preparations
for this campaign. With ~recruiting, manufacturing of
arms, organi~ing regiments and armies, the latter ~onths of
1861 had passed away; and the new year found an immense
BEFORE

Pl. III.

\

I ',llon trrJo/JJ i11 tlu on·ms1·v, .
Hebds i11 thP tfpfi111slve
l'nio11 fl'OO/JS , rtltPr the R'dulK
lww l11/r.m tJ,,, 11l'fnts11•1• .
·- -·- liiiii He/Jds ltt ,;,,., offPIISil'e-.

- ·- -- -

Rail roaA,v
().

ir

L __
"1th

f P. 1.frov.,& S

L

"h1h •

E

X

I
- - - ~ - _j

90

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

close this river to any Union advance; and he then ascended the river as far as Florence.
In Missouri, the Union army, under General Curtis, advances against Springfield, a position held by the Rebel
General Price; another army, under General Pope, nears
New Madrid; General Grant advances with his troops in
the direction of Fort Donelson, along the peninsula formed
by the Cumberland and the Tennessee Rivers ; General
Buell pushes forward to encounter the Rebels at Bowling
Green; and smaller corps advance in the direction of Cumberland Gap.
The whole West, over a distance of 600 miles, is in
motion, and the . motto is everywhere " forward." Fort
Donelson, situated on the Cumberland River, below Dover,
is attacked by General Grant's army, and, after a severe
fight, and the escape of part of its garrison, it surrenders,
on the 16th of February, leaving 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners
and immense quantities of material of war in the hands of
the victors.
Pressed in front by General Buell, outflanked by tbe gunboats, and General Grant's army ascending the Cumberland
and the Tennessee Rivers, the Rebel troops in Kentucky
begin to fear for their communications; they evacuate Bowling Green, Clarksville, and even Nash ville, taking position
at Mnrfreesborough, under General Johnston, about twenty
miles south of Nash ville, which latter town is occupied by
General Buell and his army on the 24th.
General Grant proceeds to Savannah, on the Tennessee
River; the evacuation of Columbus, one of the strongest
barriers to the passage of the l\fississippi, becorn·es a neces-
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sity for the Rebels, if they do not wish to see their communications endangered. They accordingly retreat to Jackson, Tenn., on the 3d of March, where they form a junction

with the troops already assembled under General Beauregard.
New Madrid and Island No. 10 were the only obstructions left in the great river; but they soon fall.

New

Madrid is evacuated by the Confederates, and occupied by
General Pope's troops on the 13th of March; and Island
No. 10 surrenders to the same, after a long bombardment,
on the 7th of .April.

With it, the last barrier of the Upper

Mississippi is thrown down, and the higher part of this
river is reopened to Northern navigation.
In Missouri, in the mean time, events had occurred too;
Price receded before the advancing Union force into .Arkansas; Springfield is occupied by Federal troops, who
soon follow the Rebel general along the road to Fayettee But Price, being reinforced by .Arkansas and Texas
ops, and a body of Indians 5000 to 6000 strong, formtotal of a.bout 30,000 men, the whole under th~ comof General Van Dorn, does not remain any longer
the defensive, and advances from Fayetteville to encounte the Federal army under General Curtis, numbering from
30 000 to 40,000 men.
General Curtis is apprised of the advance of the Rebels,
and concentrates his force at Pea Ridge, near Sugar Creek.
The Rebels, on their march to this latter place, leave the
main road from Fayetteville to their right, and having
gained the same latitude as the Union army, they move to
the east, and thereby turn the position of the latter.

'l'hey
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form their line of battle in the rear of the Federal troops,
and force them to face northeast in the engagement which
ensued. On the 8th of March the battle is fought, and,
after a severe struggle, the Rebels are dislodged and obliged
to retreat, in consequence of a flank movement executed by
General Sigel. They manage, however, to escape, though
our army was on their line of retreat.
General Grant, in Tennessee, had moved his army to
the left bank of the Tennessee River, and encamped at
Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing. His force consisted of six
divisions, namely, Hurlbut, Prentiss, Sherman, McClernand, Smith, and W al1ace's. General Beauregard, meanwhile, being joined by the troops coming from Columbus,
under General Polk, anf· by a corps coming from Mobile,
under General Bragg, took a position near Corinth; and
concluded, with General Johnston at Murfreesborough, an
arrangement, according to which they were to form a junction of all their forces, and defeat General Grant before he
could be succored by General Buell from Nash ville.
This plan was put in execution by means of the Charleston and Memphis Railroad. Several unexpected incidents,
so frequent in war, besides bad weather, obliged the Rebel
leaders to postpone their attack for two ' or three days.
General Buell, meanwhile, was moving from Nashville toward Shiloh, to form, in his turn, a junction with General
Grant. Finally, on the 6th of .A. pril, the battle took place.
General Grant's troops were somewhat taken by surprise ·;
they rallied, however, very quickly, and were, only after a
resistance lasting nearly the whole day, and attended with
very heavy loss, obliged to seek shelter under their gunboarn.
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'l'he different delays in the attack had given General
Buell time to arrive ; not, however, early enough to gain
the battle fought on the 6th, but another battle, which was
to be fought on the 7th. After. a very severe engagement,
the Rebels were finally obliged to fall back, which they did
slowly and in good order, the loss and exhaustion on both
sides being such that no immediate pursuit took place. The
loss of the Rebels is stated to have been about 10,000; that
of the Union forces was heavier, including several thousand
prisoners.
General Beauregard retreated to Corinth, where he took
up a fortified position. To fight the army under his command, a jubction of the different Union armies, commanded
by Generals Pope, Grant, and Buell, became necessary, and
was also effected under the command-in-chief of General
Halleck. This large Union army slowly advanced against
Corinth, of which place a kind of siege was undertaken ;
but scarcely were the preparations for a determined attack
completed, when; on the 30th of May, the Rebels disappeared, leaving their intrenchments in the hands of the
Union troops.

They retreated toward Grenada, at which

place they took · up another position unmolested by the
Federal army.
The occupation of Corinth, Memphis, and all the territory between the Mississippi and Tennessee was the consequence of this retrograde movement. The occupation of
Memphis was hastened by gun-boat operations on the l\fississippi. Several naval engagements had taken place between Federal and Confederate gun-boats, when, on the
21th of April, Flag-officer Farragut commenced the bom9
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bardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, below New OrIeans, on the Lower Mississippi, and, by passing above these
fort , forced the City of New Orleans to surrender on the
28th of .April. The next day the forts followed the example of the city, and hauled down their colors.
After the occupation of Memphis, which took place in
J urie, only one obstruction to the navigation of the Mississippi rem~ined, and this was Vicksburg. · Great ac~ivity
reigned on the river; gu_n-boats ascended its different affluents searching ·for Rebel steamers, cutting off the com~unications of the Rebel armies, and exploring the country. .
Vicksburg also was attacked· by the fleet, but resisted
all attempts to capture it; and, after a bombardment last'
ing over a month, the siege was raised on the 25th of July.
After the raising of this siege, nothing of importance took
place in the West up to the invasion of Kentucky by Bragg.
A few attacks by small bands were made on the Union
forces at Baton Rouge, Murfreesborough, and several other
places; raids were executed by Rebel cavalry or guerrillas
in the interior of the already occupied territory of Missouri,
'rennessee, and Kentucky, and these kept the Union troops
alive.
The only incident worth mentioning is the retreat of
General Curtis, who had, after the battle of Pea Ridge,
penetrated into Arkansas, but found himself obliged to fall
back, and was followed by the Rebel Generals Hindman
and Rains. He reached Helena, on the Mississippi, on the
6th of July, and with it safety.
Such were the events of the Western campaign, which, at
least at its outset, may certainly be called brilliant. Everywhere the stars and bars had given way before the old fiag.
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In the East, at the beginning, matters were progressing
,,.

quite as satisfactorily.
General Burnside, as we have seen, sailed on the 12th of
January from Fortress Monroe.
at Cape Hatteras, N. 0.

He arrived on the 17th

On the 8th of February, he at-

tacked Roanoke Island, which surrendered after a sharp
fight, leaving 3000 prisoners in the hands of the victors.
From this point, as a base of operation, a number of expeditions are undertaken up the different rivers emptying into
Pamlico or Albemarle Sound.

On the 20th, Winton, on

the Chowan River, is taken; on the 14th of March, a fight
takes place at Newbern, on the Neuse River; on the 21st,
Washington, on Pamlico River, is occupied; and on the 23d,
Morehead is entered by Gen~ral Parks's troops.
Not less fruitful of success is the more Southern theater
of war in the beginning of the campaign. The force at
Port Royal, S. C., placed under the command of General
Hunter, attacked Fort Pulaski, which, after a bombardment,
surrendered to the batteries on Tybee Island on the 11th of

April.

Jacksonville, and, somewhat later, also Pensacola,

both in Florida, are occupied by Union troops.

.An attack

on Charleston, on the 19th of June, however, fails, in consequence of a fight on James Island, where the Federal
troops were repulsed with loss.

Soon after this event, part

of the troops in this section, consisting of General Stevens's
division, were embarked, and sailed for Fortress Monroe,
where they arrived on the 17th of July.
During the time when the events described above were
transpiring in the West and the South, the army of the
Potomac, under General McClellan, was not idle.

On tLe
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1th of February, Romney, in Western Virginia, is entered
by the Federal troops under General Lander ; and on the
24th of the same month, operations commence in the Shenandoah valley, with the occupation of Harper's Ferry by
General Banks. Charlestown, Martinsburg, and Bunker Hill
are occupied a few days later. On the 8th of March, Col.
Geary moves from Lovettsville to Leesburg ; and on the
12th, General Banks enters Winchester and Berryville.
These movements on their left flank, determine the Rebels
to abandon their fortified positions at Centreville and Manassas, which places are entered by the Union troops on
the I 0th and 12th. From these two places, cavalry is pushed
forward in the direction of .Aquia Creek and Warrenton;
they find the Rebels on the Rappahannock; Warrenton is
still held by their cavalry.
In the Shenandoah valley, the forward movement is continued. .After fighting a battle at Winchester with the
Rebels under General Jackson, in which the latter were
repulsed, the Federal troops enter Strasburg on the 23d of
March, and Woodstock on the 1st of .April. On the 11th
of March, another great movement was undertaken; the
embarkation of the main body of the army of the Potomac
for Fortress Monroe was commenced at Alexandria.
This movement was being executed, when at Fortress
Monroe, and in fact in the whole country, the greatest excitement existed in consequence of the appearance of the
Rebel steamer Merrimac in Hampton Roads. On the 8th of
March, this vessel, a large, old steam-frigate, which had only
been half destroyed when the Union authorities left Norfolk
at the outbreak of the rebellion, came out of Norfolk harbor
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transformed into an iron-clad war vessel. She entered
Hampton Roads, an_d pursued a course directly toward two
United States frigates-the Cumberland and the Congress
-anchored at the entrance of the James River.

Without

heeding the shower of bullets sent against her from the
two frigates, she runs into the Cumberland and sinks her.
The Congress, in her turn, is attacked, and, after a short,
heavy, gun action, takes fire and hauls down her colors.

In the evening of this eventful day, the Monitor, an ironclad steamer of the North, but of a different construction
from that of the Merrimac, arrives in Hampton Roads ; and
the next morning, when the Merrimac returns to complete
her work of destruction, she finds, at least, an ad versa.ry
worthy of her. After a long fight, in which neither of the
two vessels gained a decisive advantage over the other, the
Merrimac re-enters Norfolk harbor, and leaves the battlefield to her adversary.

Great preparations were then made at Fortress Monroe
fo the reception of the Rebel steamer Merrimac, shoukl
she appear once- more; but she did not come. Her presence, however, rendered all operations on the James River
impossible up to the moment of the evacuation of Norfolk
by the Rebels, and her subsequent destruction.

In the midst of the activity and excitement created by
the .~Ierrimac at Fortress l\iionroe, the army of the Potomac
began to arrive.

It took from the 17th of March to the

4th of April to transport the larger part of the army, which
numbered from 80,000 to _100,000 men, to its place of destination.
On the 5th of April, preparations had so far advanced as

9*
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to permit of a forward movement. General McCleilan had
arrived, and the troops were put in motion in the direction
of Yorktown. General Keyes, with three divisions, formed
the left, and advanced on the road to Lee's Mill. General
McClellan, with the remainder of the troops, marched to the
right. On the 7th, the army arrived in the neighborhood
of Yorktown, and found itself in front of a long range of
field-works, extending from York to James River, and
occupied by a Rebel army under the orders of General
Magruder.
Most of the field-works were nearly unapproachable, in
consequence of the swampy condition of the ground in
front. .An attempt near Lee's Mill to carry them failed.
~rhe navy, trying to invest Yorktown by water, found it so
well armed and provided that the object could not be
effected. General McDowell, who was expected to join the
army at Yorktown, to disembark near Gloucester, and, by
ascending York River, to turn the Rebel position on the
Peninsu1a, did not come, in consequence of an order of the
War Department, giving him an independent command between Blue Ridge and the Potomac. Finally, James River
being blockaded by the Merrimac, no alternative was left, in
order to advance, but to undertake the siege of Yorktown.
Preparations for this siege were immediately made. But
while the siege was going on, the troops left in the north of
Virginia were not idle. They had been divided into three
independent corps, of which General Fremont commanded
one, in the mountains west of the Shenandoah; General
Banks the next, in the Shenandoah valley ; and General
McDowell the third, in the country ea.st of Blue Ridge.

CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

99

Oil the 17th of April, ~Ionterey, Highland County, Va.,
is entered by General Milroy, from Fremont's command.
Mount Jackson is occupied by General Banks's troops,
and the Union columns push forward to New Market and
Sparta-Jackson, with his army, all the while retreating in
the direction of Stannardville and Gordonsville. General
McDowell, on his side, advances toward Fredericksburg;
he enters Falmouth, and, on the 19th, Fredericksburg surrenders, and is occupied by the Federal troops.
Meanwhile the siege of Yorktown had proceeded; batteries had been established, and all was ready for a final
blow, when, on the 4th of May, the town was reported to
be evacuated by the Rebels. In fac_t, they qad left their
intrenchments, and were in full retreat toward Williamsburg., The same day, the army of the Potomac started in
pursuit on two roads- one leading from Lee's Mi11, the
other from Yorktown to Williamsburg. _ On the 5th, a
strong Rebel rear guard was found in position; but, after
a severe engagement, was dislodged, in consequence of a
successful flank movement executed by General Hancock.
While part of the army followed the Rebels by land, a
body of troops, under command of General Franklin, was
transported by water from Yorktown to West Point, to act
on the communications of the Rebels still left on the Peninsula. This gave rise to another fight on the 7th, which the
Rebel~ had to sustain, in order to give their troops coming
from Williamsburg time to pass.
After a stay of several days at Williamsburg, the army
resumed its forward movement, and arrived, on the 16th of
May, at ~White House, on the Pamnnkey River, from which
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point, as a temporary base, the army started, and arrived at
the Chickahominy, at the place where the railroad crosses
the creek, and called Bottom Bridge.
These forward movements, as well as the proximity of
General Burnside, endangered the
communications of the
,
troops in and around Norfolk, the evacuation of which
place consequently became a necessity; it was effected on
the 12th of May, and as the town was nearly immediately
afterward occupied by Union troops, the Merrimac was left
without any place to go to, and was therefore blown up by
its commander. The navigation on the James River being
thus opened by the destruction of their powerful adversary,
the Federal gun-boats immediately entered and ascended the
river; but at a distance of about ten miles from Richmond,
they found themselves stopped by a barrier in the river and
a heavy battery at Fort Darling, both of which obstacles
united rendered all efforts at further advance useless.
Between the Chickahominy Creek and Richmond, the
Rebel army was encountered by the Federal troops; the
Confederates were strongly intrenching themselves, rendering further immediate advance difficult. Part of the army
passed the creek at Bottom Bridge ; four divisions were
established on the right bank, along the railroad-in echelon, one behind the other-the foremost near Fair Oaks.
These divisions formed the left wing of the army; the remainder, or right wing, was established from Bottom Bridge
up the creek, the higher part of which, however, remained
in possession of the Rebels. (See Fig. 6.)
In this position the army remained for some time, busily
engaged with establishing bridges over the creek, to secure
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the communication between the right and the left wing.
The construction of these bridges was a difficult task,
owing to the swampy condition of the river and its banks,
and it took a considerable length of time. The season was
exceedingly wet, and the bed of the river changed continually.
On the 26th and 21th of May, General Porter was sent
to Hanover C. H., to form a junction .with General McDowell. .An engagement took place with a Rebel division
under General Branch, in which the Federal troops remained victorious ; but the projected junction was not
effected-it was already ·too late. General McDowell, General Banks, and General Fremont, as well as the whole army
forming the garrison of Washington, had been thrown on
the defensive by an audacious movement of General Jackson ; and the terror in and around Washington was such,
that orders were even sent to burn the only bridges by
which a junction between General McClellan's and General
McDowell's army was possible. This is, however, how
matters happened : On the 8th of May, Generals Jackson and Johnston, having united their forces in the Shenandoah valley, marched
to attack General Milroy at Bull Pasture Mountain, Pendleton County, Va. .After an engagement, General Milroy
retreated to Franklin, where the remainder of General Fremont's corps was stationed. The Rebels, after some delay,
marched to Front Royal, where they arrived on the 23d,
and captured the small garrison, General Banks at the time
being stationed, with two brigades, at Strasburg. General
Jackson's force moved from Front Royal direct to Middle-
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town, a place between Strasburg and Winchester, thereby
seizing the communications of General Banks. Before,
however, Jackson had arrived there in force, General Banks
had commenced his retreat, and finding Middletown but
feebly occupied, opened his way through, and escaped with
the main body of his command. At Winchester, where a
short stay was made, he was attacked by the Rebels, and,
after a fight of several hours, obliged to retreat to Martinsburg, and thence across the Potomac, near Williamsport;
making, in all, nearly sixty miles in two days.
General Fremont was informed of General Jackson's
move on the 25th ; he struck camp the same day, and
marched first to Petersburg, and from there to Strasburg,
where Jackson had passed but a very short time before.
Nearly at the same time, the advance of General McDowell's corps arrived and joined in the pursuit. Jackson,
under continual skirmishing, retreated south, and on the
7th of June it was ascertained by a reconnoissance that he
had left Harrisonsburg to the right on his march, and was
crossing the Shenandoah at a place called Port Republic,
the only place where a bridge was to be found for a long
distance.
General Fremont, who had arrived meanwhile at Ha.r risonsburg, on receiving this intelligence moved his army
in the direction of Port Republic ; but was stopped at
Cross Keys, a. place about half way from his destination, by
the rear guard of the Rebels, about 5000 strong, drawn up
in line of battle, to cover the crossing of their train and
main body over the Shenandoah. General Fremont attacked
their position with his 20,000 men, but without ensembfo,
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and got beaten in detail. The next morning, when revenge
was to be taken for the affront of the preceding evening,
.
the
Rebel rear guard had disappeared, and was only refound on the other side of the Shenandoap ; but the bridge
over this river was burned.
While his rear guard was beating Fremont, Jackson, who
had already crossed with his main body, found himself op-

-

posed by General Tyler, of General Shields's division, who
was sent from Luray to W aynesborough, to intercept him
or prevent him crossing. General Tyler paid dearly for the
attempt; his brigade was nearly annihilated, and his artillery captured. General Jackson, freed from -his numerous
pursuers, retreated with his booty unmolested toward Gordonsville. General Shields's division belonged to General McDowell's corps, who had been ordered to join in
the pursuit of Jackson, and had left Fredericksburg at the
end of May.
In the mean time, while this daring movement of Jackson
was taking place, the Chickahominy became the theater of
more serious events. On the 31st of May and 1st of June,
the battle of Fair Oaks was fought by part of the army of
the Potomac. (Fig. 6.)
'l~he Rebels, seeing the exposed position of the left wing
of this army, resolved to attack it with their whole force.
A thunder-storm had been raging the day before, and the
rising of the Chickahominy was expected by them, and with
the rising they hoped that all communications would be cut
off between the right and left wings, and that the four divisions composing the left would be exposed to their blows,
while the right could do nothing but remain spectators.
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rl,he attack was made on the 31st of J\,Iay, and on the front
of the Union troops ; but, at the same time, a column moved
on its flank, with the intention of taking possession of Bottom Bridge, and thereby forcing the four Union divisions
into White Oak Swamp, where their destruction would have
been certain. The front attack had raged for a long while,
and the flanking column of the Rebels had nearly reached
~ts destination, when it was attacked on its own flank by
General Sumner's corps debouching over a bridge he had
succeeded in throwing across the creek, which had not yet
begun to rise.
This attack creates disorder among the
Rebels; their commander, General Johnston, in trying to
retrieve the day, is severely wounded, and leaves the field.
Night stopped the fighting, which, however, recommenced
on the 1st of June, but without ensemble and ordre by the
Rebels.
The attack, which had been a success at the· commencement of the first day, ended with the retreat of the Confederates. Some 6000 to 8000 killed and wounded on either
side, besides a few ca11non captured by the Rebels, were the
only result of this bloody battle. The remainder of the
Union forces could not participate in the engagement, as
at the moment the bridges over the Chickahominy were to
be thrown, the creek rose, and even carried away part of
General Sumner's bridge.
The time immediately following the battle was employed
by both armies in intrenching themselves, and by the Union
army, also, in building bridges, and thereby creating good
communications between its right and left wings. In this
w~y matters pa~~ed up to the 14th 1 when the uniformity
10
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of camp life was somewhat disturbed by the cavalry raid of
Colonel Lee, at the head of 1500 men, in the rear of the
Union army toward White House. This raid exposed at
once the precarious and open position of the rear and the
communications of the Federal army; and it would appear
that the commander of the Union troops, in consequence
thereof, took into consideration the change of base from the
Pamunkey to. the James River, which was open to his gunboats as far as Fort Darling; at least such may be inferred
from orders, which he g_ave at that time, for transports with
supplies to come up the James River.
While the armies were confronting each other near Richmond, the Confederate army at Corinth had retreated to
Grenada unmolested by General Halleck. It was then genera1ly and op·enly asserted that part of their force was coming East to join the army in front of their capital, and now
commanded by General L~e, in consequence of General
Johnston's wound. How far the reports respecting this
reinforcement are correct, it is difficult to say; and though
in the following battles the numbers of the Rebels were
stated to be very great, the forces actually engaged do not
by any means show such superiority.
In the north of Virginia, General Fremont found his
position at Mount Jackson too exposed, and so he retreated. General McDowell, after bis fruitless pursuit,
takes position at Manassas Junction, and sends the division
of General McCall, by way of Fortress Monroe, to the support of General Mc0Ie11an. On the 26th of June, by an
order of the War Department, the corps of Banks, l\IcDowell, and Fremont were consolidated, and placed under
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In consequence of this

order, General Fremont resigned, and the command of his
corps is taken by General Sigel.
The excitement created in the army of the Potomac by
Colonel Lee's daring raid had scarcely so.bsided, when an- ·
other mysterious movement was observed at Mechanicsville
Bridge.

It was also ascertained that Jackson, with his

force, was at Hanover C.H.
As in the following days, however, nothing of importance
transpired, a forward movement was arranged for the 25th,
and successfully executed.

After a heavy skirmish, the

~ederal troops had advanced about a mile and held their
ground.

But the next day matters changed; the enemy,

instead of attacking the Federal position in . front, had
crossed at Mechanicsville or Meadows Bridge, and were
advancing against the right wing of the Union army, under
General Fitz John Porter, consisting of two divisions and
the reserve of regulars. General l\fcCall being attacked,
resisted successfully on the first day.

In the night, Gen-

eral Porter's entire train was passed over the bridges on
the right bank of the Chickahominy.

General McCall re-

treated from his first position, and formed, with the divisions of General Morrill and General Sickles, a line of
battle in front of Gaines's Mills.

They were to pass the

bridge on the evening of the 27th, and to execute with the
army a grand mov:ement through White Oak Swamp toward
James River.
Early on the 27th the fight commenced, the Rebels pushi
ing forward with the utmost determination; the divisions of
Slocum and Richardson are sent to the support of the right
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wing; the fight becomes so intense, that all the reserves of
the right wing are successively engaged ; the enemy has the
last reserve to give out, and he carries the day and victory
with it. The left wing, formed by General McCall's troops,
is entirely broken, and the disorder reaches even the center.
Happily, night and two fresh brigades arrive_ those of
Meagher and French-which puts a stop to further pursuit.
In the night, the whole of the right wing passes the
bridges over the Chickahominy ; these bridges are destroyed, and the 28th finds the whole ],edera.l force on the
right of the creek. This same creek, which, on the 1st of
June, had nearly caused .the ruin of the army, proves this
time to be its salvation. On the 27th an attack was also
made on the left wing, to prevent this wing sending reinforcements to the right. This attack was, however, feebly
executed, and without much result. The 28th and 29th
were employed by the Federal army in passing its trains
through White Oak Swamp, and by the Rebels in trans.
ferring part of their forces back to the right bank of the
river. On the 29th, .however, they attacked the rear guard
of the army at Savage Station, but were repulsed. In the
night, the Federal army retreated, and on the 30th it had
passed through White Oak Swamp; and the advanced
guard, conducted by Keyes and Porter, arrived the same
day on James River .
.A rear guard was left on the south side of White Oak
Swamp, where several roads cross each other ; under its
protection, the trains arrively safely at Malvern Hill. This
rear guard was, however, attacked with vigor by the Con-
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federates; the Union troops fought with great bravery, and
effected their retreat, repulsing nearly every attack.

The

last attack was tried against the whole U nio!l force united
on Malvern Hill, and covered by 300 pieces of artillery;
the Rebels were obliged to retreat after having experienced
heavy loss.

From Malvern Hill, the army of the Potomac

moved to Harrison's Landing, where its repose was little
disturbed, except by occasional shelling from the other side
of the James River, where the Rebels had concentrated part
of their forces.
On the 11th of July, the Rebels had entirely di~ appeared
from the front of the Union army. A reconnoissa nee, made
by General Porter, found them, however, beyond Malvern
Hill, and on their guard.
The army of the Potomac had been greatly diminished
by the sword as well as by sickness, and the Rebel army
had taken the offensive. It became evident that the total
number of Union troops under arms was not sufficiently
large to subdue the rebellion. A call for 300,000 more
volunteers was made, and soon afterward another call for
300,000 militia men to be drafted for nine months. Stevens's
division was recalled from Port Royal, and Burnside was
withdrawn from North Carolina.

These troops arrived in

the course of July at Fortress Monroe.
At the commencement of August, some demonstrations
or reconnoissances are made by the Union army in the direction of Petersburg. Finally, on the 12th of .August, the
army of the Potomac, not being strong enough to retake the
offensive, commences its retreat by passing over the Chickahominy near its mouth. The march in the direction of

10*

I

110

PRINCIPLES OF STR1\ TEGY.

Yorktown, where it arrives on the 16th, is executed unmolested by the Rebels. At Yorktown, the army is reembarked, and transported, partly to Aquia Creek and
partly to Alexandria. General Burnside, with his corps,
had sailed before, and had already occupied Fredericksburg. ..After its return, the army of the Potomac did not
find much repose. It had scarcely arrived, when it encountered, in front of Washington, those same Rebel di visions
it had left in front of Richmond.
General Pope, when he took command of the army in
North Virginia, established his headquarters at Warrenton, where Banks and McDowell's corps were concentrated.
General Sigel, with his corps, was at Sperryville and Luray,
forming the right wing, and the troops at Fredericksburg
formed the utmost left. General Hatch was ordered to advance with a brigade from Warren ton to Gordonsville ; he
went as far as Cu_lpepper, pushing cavalry over the Rapidan
to Orange C. H. From Fredericksburg a small cavalry force
is also pushed southward to Beaver Dam, on the Richmond
and Gordonsville Railroad. General Jackson is reported in
force at Gordonsville, and consequently General Hatch retreated. On the I 0th of August, General Jackson advances
to Cedar Run, about six miles south of Culpepper C. H:
Here he is encountered by General Banks ; after a fight, in
which General Banks's corps sustains heavy loss, and could
only hold its ground when supported by fresh troops, General Jackson retreated, on the following day, over the
Rapidan.
Soon after the battle of Cedar Mountain, General Pope
is apprised that the Rebel army of Virginia is in motion
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against him. He commences, on the 20th of .August, his
retreat toward the Rappahannock to form a junction with
General McClellan's troops, then beginning to arrive from
the Peninsula. On the Rappahannock, the Rebels soon
appear in front of him, making feints to cross the river
above and below, while part of their forces in reality cross
at Waterloo Bridge. General Pope being apprised of the
fact, sends part of his force against the Rebels reported to
have crossed. 'rhese Federal troops find a large Confed-erate force near Waterloo, which occupies them in front ;
while a large part of the enemy under General Jackson,
having also a heavy force of cavalry with them, moves to
Salem, and from there through ~horoughfare Gap to Manassas Junction. Their cavalry penetrates to Centreville
and Falls Church; also up to the Potomac, in Loudon
County, and to Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley.
At Manassas Junction, where the Rebel armies arrive on
the 24th, they capture a large amount of government prop-erty. The fa.rce from Waterloo retreated toward Warrenton; and, on the 25th, when General Pope was apprised of
the Rebel movement in his rear, he, on the suggestion of
General Sigel, sent General McDowell and General Sigel to
Gainesville, with orders to intercept communications between General Jackson and General Lee, the latter being
still, with his main force, near Salem. General Reno, with
one division, was sent to Greenwich to support, if necessary,
General McDowell. General Hooker and General Fitz John
Porter, who had already arrived from General McClellan's
army, and who were stationed near Warrenton Junction,
were ordered to march to Manassas Junction. One di vi-
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sion was sent to occupy Thoroughfare Gap ; finding it only
feebly defended by the enemy, part of whose force were
about to cross, the gap was carried, and,. as the enemy soon
afterward retreated, and no sign of his presence being left,
this division quitted the gap to join in the fight in which
the remainder of the Union troops were engaged.
General Hooker, on his march from Warrenton Junction
toward Manassas Junction, encountered, on the 21th, the
Rebel General Ewell, with his division, at Bristow Station,
near Kettle Run, south of Manassas Junction. General
Ewell is attacked and thrown back toward Manassas, whence
he moves in the direction of Centreville. Another part of
Jackson's force, on the 28th, in the morning, encounters
General McDowell at Haymarket. This force is thrown
back and unites with Ewell, who had fought Hooker the
day before.
On the 29th, those Rebel troops take a position between
Centreville and Haymarket, partly parallel to, and partly
at right angles with, the Gainesville and Ceiureville Turnpike. In this position, they are attacked by the entire
Union army under General Pope, but without definite result. The battle lasts till dark. In the njgbt, the Rebels
are strongly reinforced through Thoroughfare Gap by the
remainder of General Lee's army. On the 30th, the fight
recommences early in the morning, but does not take a
decisive turn until the afternoon, when the leJt wing of the
Federal army, under General Fitz John Porter and General
McDowell, breaks, and the whole army is obliged to fall
back beyond Bull Run.
. puring the same night, General Pope retreats to Oen-
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treville, where General Franklin, with his corps, had already
arrived, General Sumner, with his corps, being still at Fairfax C. H. The loss in killed, wounded, and missing, as
well as in artillery, was heavy. The next day, General
Banks, who had marched from the Rappahannock to
Brentsville, arrived in safety at Centreville.
· The stay of General Pope at Centreville was not of long
duration. On Monday, the 1st of September, the Rebels
had turned his right flank once more, and pushed a column
as far as Fairfax C. H. Generals Reno and Kearney were
ordered to drive them thence; this was effected, but not
without loss, the death of General Kearney himself being
principally to be deplored.
The position at Centreville being too much exposed,
General Pope commences his retreat, and seeks shelter
under the guns of Washington. The sa_me day, General
Burnside was ordered to evacuate Fredericksburg, and to
join the army of the Potomac with bis corps.
Here ends this memorable campaign in Virginia, commenced by the Rebels on the defensive, and ended by a
brilliant offensive, throwing· the Union forces in disorder
back to their first base of operation. But not only in Virginia had the Rebels taken the offensive. No; on the
whole theater of war their armies proceeded offensively,
attacking everywhere the Union forces, and invading the
scarcely conquered States.
We left the Western armies after the evacuation of
Corinth, the surrender of New Orleans, etc. On the 19th
of July, General Halleck was called from the West to take
the command-in-chief of all the United States forces. .A.fter

'
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his departure, General Grant occupied, with his army and
that of General Pope, who was also called to the East,
Jackson, Bolivar, Memphis, and Corinth. General Buell,
with the army of the Ohio, moves back to South Tennessee
and North Alabama. Nash ville, Shelbyville, and Huntsville
are occupied by his men. Cumberland Gap and Tazewell
are held by General Morgan, with about 10,000 Federal
troops. The Rebels have troops, under Generals Van Dorn
and Price, near Holly Springs and Tupelo in Mississippi,
which they had transported there from Arkansas; under
Bragg, at Chattanooga, where he had arrived from Tupelo;
and under Kirby Smith, in Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee.
In order to take the offensive, the different Rebel armies
in Tennessee and Kentucky advance in several columns from
the Cumberland Mountains, as a base of operation, against
the communications of the Ohio army. On the 26th of August, they were reported, under Kirby Smith, in the neighborhood of Cumberland Gap, probably at Jacksborough.
From there they marched into Kentucky. On the 29th,
General Nelson is entirely routed by Kirby Smith near
Richmond, Ky. Nelson falls back to Lexington, followed
by the Rebels. From Lexington they push smaller bodies
in the direction of Louisville and Covington, threatening
thereby both those towns at the same time, and compelling
the Union f orce_s to divide for their defense; and in fact,
great preparations are ~ade in both places to repel an attack of the Confederate forces, which is hourly expected.
General Bragg, in his turn, is not idle. He moves to
Sparta, Tennessee, thereby threatening to cut General
Euell's communications with Nash ville.
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While those larger movements are being carried on, Western Virginia is scoured by Rebel cavalry and guerrillas,
and the valley of the Kanawha is overrun by them.

Some

cavalry attacks are also made against Grant's army, to hold
his force in check; and Washington, in North Carolina, is
attacked by the Rebel forces.
General Buell, in order to counteract General Bragg's
movement against his communications, concentrates his
troops near

Murfreesborongh and

McMinnsville, and

marches them, about the 11th of September, to Nashville;
but meanwhile General Bragg encounters this movement of
the Union army by his advance into Kentucky, where he
takes hold of General Buell's communications by his attack
on Mumfordsville, at which place he obliged the Union
forces, consisting of some 4000 infantry and several guns,
to surrender on the 19th of September.
In West Tennessee, the cavalry engagements with Grant's
army are followed by a more serious affair.

General Rose-

crans encountered General Price at Iuka, near Corinth, and,
after a sharp engagement on the 20th, forced him to retreat
to Tupelo ; thence General Price marched to Ripley, where
he forms a junction with General Van Dorn's forces.
In the utmost right zone the Rebels also operate offensively.

Generals Rains and Hindman leave Arkansas, and

march against Missouri.
General ·Buell, . in order to prevent his being cut entirely
from bis base, marches to Louisville, leaving a strong garrison, under General Negley, in N ashvilie, which is fortified.
The army of the Ohio begins to arrive, on the 24th of September, at Louisville, Bragg having, in the mean while,
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marched to Bardstown and Lawrenceburg. Humphrey
Marshall, with about 5000 men, is at raris, Ky., ready to
join Kirby Smith. The different Rebel corps are approaching to form a junction at the decisive moment.
Meanwhile Nash ville is invested by Rebel troops under
General Breckinridge ; they go so far as to demand the
surrender of the city; which, however, is refused. The
Rebel cavalry in Kentucky at the time performed many
raids, and thereby created the belief that their force was
larger than it really was. On the 28th, the~r cavalry entered .Augusta, Ky., on the Ohio.
On the 17th of September, Cumberland Gap is evacuated
by General Morgan, who retreats with his troops to Greenupsburg, on the Ohio, near Big Sandy River, where he
arrives on the 4th .of October, having been pursued all the
time by Stevenson's and John Morgan's cavalry.
General Buell organizes and reinforces his army at Louisville, and retakes the offensive against the Rebels. On the
1st of October, a fight took place at Shelbyville, between
troops from Louisville and those of General Buckner, whose
main body was reported at Bardstown.
'rhe different Rebel corps now begin their retreat, followed by General Buell. On the 8th of October, however,
General McCook being too much advanced, and pressing
the Rebels too closely, they make a stand, and defeat McCook at Perryville; but then resumed their retreat. At
Harrodsburg, on the 10th, Bragg, Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall united, and retreated to Camp Dick Robinson. On the 16th, Buell arrived at Crab Orchard, and the
Rebels at London.

On the 18th, Joh

.r organ, with hi

'1
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cavalry, accomplishes a raid which has its para11el only in
that executed by the Rebel General Stuart, between the
10th and 12th of the same month.

He entered Lexington

in the rear of Euell's army; marched to Versailles, Lawrenceburg, and Bardstown; captured several trains; made
the entire circuit of the Union army, and left Kentucky, by
way of Cumberland Ford, on the 29th of October.
In W estetn Tennessee, in the mean time, the Rebels
had again taken the offensive, but were once more thrown
on the defensive by General Rosecrans.

On the 2d of Oc-

tober, a battle was fought between this general, with four
divisions, and General Van Dorn's force, which we left at
Ripley, and which had marched to Pocahontas, and thence
to Corinth.

The Rebels say their force consisted only of

three divisions.

.After a desperate fight, lasting nearly ·

three days, the Rebels were driven back toward Pocahontas, where they encountered General Ord coming from
Bolivar. .After another fight, and after having experienced
great loss, they managed to · escape across the Hatchie
River, thence south to Holly Springs .
.At the end of October, General Buell was relieved from
his command, and replaced by General Rosecrans.

But the

Rebels under Bragg meanwhile have escaped through Cumberland Gap, and marched to Murfreesborough; and the
army of the Ohio, giving up the pursuit, marched toward
Nashville, where it be$"an to arrive on the 8th of N ovember.
13th.

General Rosecrans himself reached this place on the
Rebel cavalry occupied Somerset, in Kentucky.

Price and Van Dorn meanwhile were fully employed in
reorganizing their army at Holly Springs and Tupelo,
11
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where, on the 4th of November, General Grant commenced
an offensive operation against them by marching toward
Lagrange.
Before going further in the Western campaign, let us
return to the East, where the offensive campaign of the
Confederate army had not been of long duration, and ha-d
terminated in a similar way to that of the West .
.After having forced General Pope to return under the
guns of Washington, which retreat was executed in the
greatest disorder, the Rebels marched in the direction of
Leesburg, and, on the 5th of September, commenced crossing into Maryland. On the 7th, Frederick was occupied by
them, -and their cavalry pushed as far as Middlebrook and
Poolesville. General McClellan meantime had taken command of the whole army-that of Pope as well as his own
-and, on the 8th, commenced moving from Washington
northward to meet General Lee. General Sumner this day
occupied Darnestown.. On the 9th, skirmishing takes place
at Poolesville. On the 11th, Union troops occupy Sugar
Loaf Mountain, near Monocacy Creek. The same day, the
Rebels enter Hagerstown, and their columns have pressed
from all sides toward Harper's Ferry. On the 12th, Frederick is entered by Union troops, who now push forward
with great energy. On the 13th, the attack on Harper's
Ferry had commenced. On the 14th, the Union troops, in
their advance, encounter the Rebel rear guard at South
Mountain and Crampton Gap; the former is occupied by
General Longstreet, and the latter by General Jackson's
troops. Reno and Hooker carry the first, Franklin the
second-but too late.
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This engagement, entered into by the Rebels merely to
gain time for their operations against Harper's Ferry, has
fulfilled its object. Harper's Ferry surrenders on the 15th.
General ~rhite-who had occupied Winchester, and left it
at the commencement of September, in consequence of the
Rebels' advance, had marched to Martinsburg, but returned
thence to Harper's Ferry to assist Colonel Miles-was included in the surrender, which delivered some 12,000 pris ..
oners and great quantities of stores and ammunition into
the hands of the victors. General Jackson, however, did
not repose long on bis laurels. Scarcely had t~e prisoners
been paroled, when he resumed his march, and moved in the
direction of Shepherdstown to join General Lee, who was
posted near Sharpsburg, behind .Antietam Creek, and was
awaiting the Union army to give battle.
On the 16th, General McClellan's army arrived near the
creek, and formed in line of battle opposite the Rebels.
General Hooker, with his army corps, crossed the creek
during the afternoon of the 16th, and had a preliminary
engagement with the Rebels; and, on the 11th, the whole
army advanced to the attack. Generals Hooker, Sumner,
and Franklin, with their respective corps, successively attack the left wing of the Rebels, which, however, holds firm,
though at first it loses some ground. Their right wing is
assailed by General Burnside, who is thrown back to the
bridge from which he debouched at first. Night closes in,
and no decisive result has been gained on either side.
On the 18th, the two armies faced each other, without,
however, engaging, both being worn out by marches and
the previous day's fighting. The Union troops are rein-
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forced this day, and during the night of the 18th the
Rebels withdraw, in full order and great silence, over the
Potomac. An at.tempt to follow them on the 20th, and to
er oss right in front of their army, fails, part of the troops,
after having crossed, being repulsed with loss. After some
demonstrations made in the direction of Williamsport, the
Rebels retreat toward Winchester, taking position between
this place and Bunker Hill. The Federal army does not
molest them in this movement ; but occupies Harper's
Ferry, and encamps in Pleasant Valley, covering nearly the
whole front from Williamsport to Harper's Ferry.
Nothing disturbed the repose of the two armies at the
end of September or the commencement of October. Some
reconnoissances were pushed toward Warrenton by General
Si gel's corps; they found Rebel pickets there. Leesburg,
Aldie, and Thoroughfare Gap were also occupied by them.
On the 10th of October, the repose of the army of the
Potomac was somewhat disturbed by the news that the
Rebels had entered Pennsylvania, and occupied Chambers-burg. It turned out to be General Stuart on a cavalry
raid. He had, with 1800 men, crossed the Potomac at Coy's
Ferry, and moved to Chambersburg; this place he left to
march toward Fredericktown ; thence in the direction of the
mouth of the l\,fonocacy. Finding an infantry column there
he turned to the left and recrossed three miles below, at
White's Ford, carrying a great number of horses and other
goods with him. The Federal cavalry arrived at the ford
when the Rebels had passed ; they had marched eighty-three miles in one march, just in time to see the last Rebel
crossing.
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After this remarkable feat, everything became quiet
again ; the only fact of importance being a reconnoissance
toward Winchester, and the sending of some troops, under
General Cox, into the Kanawha valley, in Western Virginia, to drive out the Rebels.
Finally, at the end of October, signs of a general advance
became manifest; and in fact, the 1st of November saw the
whole army of the Potomac moving down Loudon valley,
leaving Harper's Ferry strongly occupied.

Tne cavalry

being continually in advance, had to fight its whole way
against Rebel cavalry.

On the 3d, the army reaches the

Manassas Gap Railroad, most of the gaps in coming down
the valley having been occupied.
On the 6th, Orleans and Warrenton are occupi_e d; and,
on the 8th, General McClellan is relieved of bis command,
and replaced by General Burnside. This change in the
command occasioned, probably, a change in the plan of
operation; and, at all events, some delay in the further advance.

The army was camped near Waterloo, Warrenton,

and the Rappahannock, guarding the fords from Waterloo

to Rappahannock Station.

Rebel cavalry was seen every-

where in front, flank, and rear of the Union arniy.
oughfare Gap was occupied by General Sigel.

Thor-

On the 14th of November, the army left its respective
camps and marched toward Fredericksburg. On the 17th,
it arrived at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, which
was already found occupied by the Rebels." The army went
into camp, forming a line of battle from Aquia Creek to
Falmouth. The pontoon-train had not yet arrived, and
therefore the passage could not be undertaken at once.
11*

122

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

What the movements of the Rebels were during this time,
is not very clear. It would, however, appear that part of
their army marched at first in front of the~U nion army, retreating before it, and then moving parul el with it on the
right bank of the Rappahannock; it arrived at Fredericksburg nearly at the same moment as the Union army; and
that another part of their army remained quietly in the
Shenandoah valley. This force appeared, on the 26th of
November, near Salem, and then moved south and eastward, joining the remainder of the Rebel army, which was
encamped, and extending itself on a range of hills, forming
a semicircle around Fredericksburg; which circle having
a radius of about 1½to 2 miles, was one of the strongest
positions for a large army that can be imagined. .At length
the pontoon-trains arrived, and, on the 12th of December,
the Federal army enforced the passage over the Rappahannock, tlirowing bridges opposite the town and three miles
below. The passage was only feebly opposed, just enough
to make a show of resistance.
The troops crossed, and, on the 13th, the main position
of the Rebels was attacked; but after several useless attempts to carry the hills, the army, after a loss of from
10,000 to 12,000 men, was obliged to retreat, and seek
shelter under its own guns. On the 13th, in the night, the
army moved back over the river, which was accomplished
without difficulty.
While this was going on in the north of Virginia, considerable activity existed at and near Suffolk, under orders
"Of Major-Generals Dix and Peck, for a movement in the
direction of Petersburg. .After some fruitless demonstra-
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tions, all became quiet again in these parts, and the movement was not carried out.
In North Carolina, General Foster advanced from Newbern, with 15,000 men, to Kingston, which he took after
little resistance ; thence he marched to Goldsborough, where
he destroyed the Wilmington and Petersburg Railroad, after
which he returned to Newbern.
General Banks, after great preparations at New York,
had sailed, on the 4th of December, for New Orleans, where
he arrived on the 14th, part of his force being destined for
an attack against Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

He super-

seded General Butler in the command at New Orleans.
In Mississippi we left General Grant taking the offensive.
He advanced with a large army, on the 3d of December, toward Holly Springs, the Rebels retreating southward, pursued by General Grant's whole force. General Hovey, with
20,000 men, moves from Helena toward Grenada to take the
retreating Rebel column in flank or rear; but the Confederates change their course to the southeast and escape. On
the 16th of December, after having moved ten miles south of
Grenada, a further pursuit of the Rebel army is judged impossible.

Hovey retreats to Helena, Sherman to Memphis,

and Grant to Bolivar.

The Rebels follow immediately, and

defeat and capture, at Holly Springs, a small rear guard of
several hundred men. On the 24th, General Sherman leaves
Memphis with a large number of troops, and moves to
Helena, from whence he embarks with his army to attack
Vicksburg. Vicksburg meanwhile had been reinforced by
troops from Arkansas, and Price and Van Dorn's columns
were within supporting distance.

When General Sherman
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therefore arrived,
he found the place strongly occupied.
,,
He, nevertheless, attacked it on the 1st and 2d of January ;
b ut was repulsed with great loss.

General Banks, from

1T cw Orleans, had not arrived, nor assisted with his troops
and gun-boats in the attack.
In Tennessee we left the army of the Ohio arriving at
Nashville, under the command of General Rosecrans.

The

Rebels meanwhile concentrated in the neighborhood of
Murfreesborough, under the command of General Bragg.
On the 6th of _D ecember, a Federal brigade is attacked in
this place, and obliged to surrender.~ Finally, after all kinds
of preparations and movements on both sides, General Rosecrans advanced, at the end of December, against Murfreesborough with about 50,000 men.

.An engagement ensued,

lasting several days, in which the Federal troops at first
experienced a severe check, but afterward recovered ; and
consequently, on the 3d of January, 1863, in the night, the
Rebels retreated, though in good order, and unmolested by
the Union troops, in the direction of Tullahoma.
Finally, in the utmost right zone, one more battle was
fought, on the 8th of December, between the Rebel General
Hindman and the Union Generals Blunt and Herron, near
Prairie Grove, Arkansas, in which the Rebels are defeated,
and obliged to retreat into th~ interior of the State.
Here ends the narrative of the campaign of 1862.

It is

more than probable that some mistakes will have occurred ;
and, considering the present state of affairs, it is scarcely
possible that it should be otherwise.

I have not access to

any official documents, except those published by the public

press. The whole campaign I had to put t?gether by search-
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in g the files of several newspapers. It is well known how
many false reports are published ; how incorrect dates are ;
how rumors are given as facts; and how incomplete most
of the statements are for the purposes of a work like mine.
There is, in most cases, no notice of the starting of a body
of troops, or of any movement, till fighting turns up somewhere, and then one has to find out where the troops came
from, etc. Of the movements of the Rebel armies scarcely
anything is published except rumors, and their numbers are
always so variably stated that _hardly any reliance can be
placed on the statements about them.
I hope, therefore, that the reader will excuse the mistakes, and the apparent want of connection in the above
sketch; the more so, as it is only the text of my disquisition. A.s the discussion of these facts is simply an abstract
and scientific one, the same lesson may be derived from a
wrongly-stated case as from a rightly-stated one, provided
only that the facts be rightly discussed.
The review of this campaign-a campaign so full of vicissitudes-is, perha.ps, one of the most profitable studies in
which an officer can engage, as nearly all the successes, and,
without eJception, all the great failures of both parties may
be assigned to the direct violation of the great rules of military science. In order to render the review, which we are
about to undertake, clear, we will commence with the plan
of the campaign, embracing the whole theater of war, and
then proceed to the discussion of the operations as they took
place in the three zones separately.
Let us refer to Map III: we find there the position of
the different Union armies at the time they were ready to
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start. Curtis and Pope in Missouri ; Grant and Buell in
Kentucky, besides some small forces in East Kentucky and
Western Virginia; Banks at Winchester; the army of the
Potomac at Washington; a large force at Fortress Monroe;
Burnside at Roanoke; Hunter at Port Royal; and Butler's
expedition getting ready for New Orleans. Thus, there
were not less than ten different armies, and as many different lines of operation, acting all in a more or less concentric direction toward the interior of the the~ter of war.
Not one of these armies was so strong that the Rebels
might not with ease have concentrated a stronger one
against it.
If we consider what has been said in Chapter I. in reference to great invasions, it will be remarked that this plan
of invading by a great number of lines of operatio!l, having
a concentric direction, has never been followed by the great
captains, either of ancient or of modern times ; and in fact
is entirely against the rules laid down in Chapter I. It is
a division of force, and it is acting on exterior lines.
The campaign, or rather the plan of the campaign, bad
some resemblance to the invasion of France in 1793. The
result was partly like that of this invasion, and would have
been still more so, had the Rebels taken a lesson from Carnot, and followed from the first his plan of defense.
As we have seen in Chapter I., a plan of invasion like
this is based on simultaneous action on many points ; the
defense, on the contrary, is based on successive action
against one point after another. To ·ma.ke such a plan
really successful, a simultaneous energetic advance of all
the Union forces should have taken place; and then, per-
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haps, full success would have been obtained, not because the
plan was good, but because the defense at first committed
the same mistakes as the attack, and even more.

But the

impossibility of such simultaneous action was soon made
manifest.
The importance of the various points being different, the
defense had made very different preparations in the three
zones; and thus it happened that, while some of the invading armies had conquered large tracts of country, others
had scarcely moved from their base of operation.
quently, the unity of action was entirely broken.

ConseScarcely

had the first operation taken place, when nearly all connection between the several lines of attack in the three zones
ceased, and each commander, on a separate line of operation, acted according to his own judgment.

There was no

unity in effort and purpose, and consequently no decisive
result.
We have said that the defense committed the same mistake as the attack did.

The number of fortified positions,

and the small bodies of troops, cl~arly showed the intention
to defend a front of operation of nearly 1500 miles on all
points.

These long lines of defense, though they cover

everything, may be pierced wherever we choose to attack
them ; and when broken on one point, the whole line is
obliged to fall back.

The correct defense would have been

to concentrate a sufficient force south of Nashville ; to oppose Grant, Buell, Pope, and Curtis only by small corps of
observation, retreating to the main body, which should fall
on Grant or Buell-according as which of the two should
present him8elf first-defeat him, and then the next one,
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and so on. And even if we take a still more extended view
of the question; if we consider that the Confederate government depends entirely on its army, and exists only so long
as this is successful, we may truly say that the real seat of
government of the Confederate States, their real capital, is
at the headquarters of their army, and not in any particular
town or place. If we take this view of the question, and
apply the principles of defense to the present case, all the
Union armies, including that of the Potomac, should only
have been opposed by small bodies of observation, and the
main army of the Rebels should have been in a position
between Knoxville and Lynchburg-that is, in the center of
the entire theater of war-whence they might have fallen
like an Alpine avalanche on any Union army invading their
territory. Finally, it will be observed that, in the general
plan of the campaign, as it is before us, the distribution of
troops was not in accordance with the importance of the
three zones. In fact, deducting the men in hospital, and
those still in the recruiting districts, probably the real number of men fit for duty at the opening of the campaign did
not exceed 450,000. Of these nearly 100,000 were in Missouri, and only about 150,000 men, forming a field army,
were in the left or decisive zone. A large proportion of
them was used up in the occupation of fortifications and
important points. The superiority· in the right and center
zones was great; consequently operations in these zones
advanced more quickly than in the left zone.
An inspection of the map, as well as what has been said
in Chapter II., will show -us that a Union army holding
Kentucky and Tennessee could be taken in flank by a Con-
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federate army moving from Lynchburg and debouching
+
through Cumperland Gap, and that tliis Union army could
be thrown back from South Tennessee to the Ohio by such
an offensive movement. By this we mean that, should Kentucky and Tennessee have been carried by Union troops,
but the Federal army in Virginia have experiern;ed a decisive disaster, one single . march of the Rebels from the
sp!ings of Big Sandy River toward Mumfordsville, Louisville, and Cincinnati would compel the Federal forces to
evacuate the conquered country. That this is true, the
march of Bragg and Kirby Smith has shown. Buell was
thrown back by this march from Huntsville and Florence,
in .Alabama, upon Louisville, in Kentucky, a distance of
not less than 300 miles.
In her wars with France, where Italy was the disputed
apple, .Austria always thought that the chief object was the
occupation, in force, of the country. She had to learn
more than once, to he_r cost, that Italy was more frequently
conquered in the valleys of the Rhine or the Danube than
on the banks of the Mincio or the Po.
In like manner, Kentucky and Tennessee will be conquered on the banks of the Potomac or James River, rather
than on tbose of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers,
and, until decisive results are gained near the James River,
advantages in the West will be more or less ephemeral.
To conclude, therefore, the discussion of the general plan,
we shall merely say that we miss in it the full understanding
of the great principles of wars of in;vasion. The invading
army should not care for towns or for occupation ; it should
have but one object-the finding and annihilating of the
12
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enemy's armies. We also miss the full understanding of the
theater of war and its great strategic features. In a word,
instead of one grand war or grand plan of operation, half
a dozen small wars or petty plans were substituted. Let it
be remark~d here, that the defense admirably profited by the ..
rude lesson it had received at Fort Donelson, and that from
this moment its action became more and more correct, and
in accordance with the rules: to concentrate the main force
always on the decisive point, and to act on interior lines.
Operations in the Right Zone. - The plan of campaign for this zone, framed separately, so far as may be
guessed from the operations, seems to have been very simple. General Curtis liad to clear Western Missouri of the
Rebels and to penetrate into Arkansas, and General Pope
had to move along the Mississippi and to .open this river
to the Federal gun-boats, which, by ascending the rivers
of .Arkansas, would divide this State into several parts, cut
the communications between the different Rebel corps, and
•
facilitate the operations of General Curtis, by furnishing
supplies and protection. There is nothing to be said
against this plan, as General Pope's as well as General
Curtis's army were both sufficiently large to fight singlehanded any force -the Rebels could bring against them in
those parts.
The operations in this zone are so few, and, compared to
the whole, so unimportant, that it is scarQely worth while
to mention them. rrhere are, however, two or three movements which deserve t be noticed. Price, we have seen,
retreated before a superior Federal force under General
Curtis; but immediately on entering .Arkansas, the Rebels
4
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proceeded to a concentration of their forces, and from the
defensive they passed to the offensive. General Van Dorn
executed a movement which reflects credit on him. With
his whole force he turned the Union army, seizing its communications, and forcing it to fight when cut off from its
base of operation. The battles of Marengo, Ulm, Jena,
and Auerstadt were fought under similar circumstances.
Only one objection-and it is an important one-is to be
made, viz., that it was not safe to execute this movement
against an army superior in men and armament. Van Dorn
was beaten ; and the only thing which is astonishing is,
that our army did not make better use of the advantage
it had when on the line of the communications of the
defeated army.
The n~xt" movement worthy of remark i's General Curtis's advance into .Arkansas, after the battle of Pea Ridge,
and his retreat to Helena, on the Mississippi. This movement, though a retreat, but to an accidental base of operation, had the character of an advance. General Curtis,
once in Arkansas, gave up his base of operation on the
Upper Mississippi, and his lines of operation connecting
him with it, to take up a base on the Lower Mississippi,
by way of an accidental line of operation.
Operations in the Center Zone.-The operations in this
zone are important and highly instructive. The Ohio, being
the only line separating this zone from Union territory, becomes evidently the base of operation for the Union army
or armies acting in it. Not less than three or four armies
invade it simultaneo.usly: General Pope, with his army, on
the utmost right, along the Mississippi ; General Grant,
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along the Tennessee River; General Bue11, along the Louisville and Nash ville Railroad; and finally, some smaller corps
in the direction of Cumberland Gap.
The plan of operation in this zone, to judge from the
movements the army and navy actually performed, was to
conquer I{entucky and Tennessee, and to open the Mississippi to Northern navigation, thereby separating the right
zone completely from the center zone ; and ~aving the Mississippi with its affluents under full control, operations could
be directed in the right or center zone with equal facility.
The Union forces being in possession of the line of the
Tennessee, the States of Mjssissippi, .Alabama, and Georgia found themselves pretty much in the condition treated
under the base of operation, Fig. 1, Chapter I.
Had the entire theater of war been composed only of
the center and right zones, this plan would have had great
merit. It is in fact based on a division of the enemy, and
- of a division which is complete. The party holding the
Mississippi could throw the superiority of forces into one,
and then into the other zone, without fear of the enemy
being reinforced, and his armies would then be successively
crushed.
But the ri gbt and center zones were not the entire theater of war; and this changes the question so completely,
that the plan which would have been a correct one under
the first supposition, becomes entirely incorrect according
to the real state of affairs. It is easy to show this.
Let us first suppose that the two zones we are speaking
of form the whole theater of war, and that the Savannah,
the ·clinch River, the Upper Tennessee, (as far as ChattaJ
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nooga,) and the Big Sandy River are boundaries toward a
neutral State. Considered as such, the natural line of invasion would evidently be the Cumberland or the Tenn~ssee,
which would play here the same part that the River Meuse
plays in Belgium, in a strategical point of view. Smithfield or Paducah would be the base of operation. Following
the course of these two rivers, a Union army would take
hold at once of the c~ommunications of a Rebel army stationed, for instance, near Louisville. This Rebel army
would have to retreat, by way of Nashville or Sparta, with
the utmost speed, or it would be obliged to fight a battle in
which it would have to face south. Should defeat be the
consequence, it would be thrown i~ the direction of the Ohio, with a certainty of destruction. We said it could .
only retreat by way of Nash ville or Sparta ; and in fact it
could not cross the Big Sandy River nor the Cumberland
Mountains, as these, according to our supposition, are
boundaries of a neutral country. ~n like manner, as the
line of the Tennessee River takes in reverse the whole of
Kentucky and Tennessee east of it, so it does with the
country west of it, and situated between itself and the Mississippi-that is, if the passage over the Mississippi is
interrupted for the Rebel army. The consequence is, that
if Clinch River were the boundary of a neutral country, the
march from Paducah to Florence, in Alabam·a, would carry
tae entire upper center zone, and the simple occup~tion of
Florence with a large army would be sufficient to maintain
it. Thus, with the aid of the gun-boat flotilla, expeditions
might be made to open the· whole course of the Mississippi,
leaving it to the vigilance of those gun-boats to render the

12*

134

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

separa.tion between the right and center zones effective. A
greatly superior force might now be thrown into the lower
center zone, so that the adoption of two lines of operatioµ .
would be justified. Acting, then, similar to what we have
already described in Chapter III., when speaking of the
invasion of this patt of the theater of war, the conquest of
this zone would offer no difficulty; there would be only the
difference, that the Savannah is replaced by the Mississippi,
and th~t, instead of making the invasion from east to west,.
it would be made from west to east. The Rebels, continually outflanked by the army coming from the Tennessee,
and pressed in ·front by that coming from the Mississippi,
would be obliged to leave Mississippi, then .Alabama, and
would finally be thrown into the east corner of Georgia or
into Florida.
This whole plan of operation is, however, changed by the
simple fact that the Clinch River is not the boundary of a
neutral country, but of the left zone, or the most vital part
of the entire theater of war. What before in our supposition
was impossible-the retreating of a Rebel army to and over
Clinch River-is now possible, and it will therefore be seen
that a Union army, marching along the Cumberland from
Smithland to Nash ville, does in no way cut a Rebel army in
Kentucky from its communications, and in general does in
no way clear Kentucky of the Rebels, as they ha'i'e always
their retreat open along Big Sandy River or to Cumberland
Gap; therefore, the Cumberland or the Tennessee line,
which was decisive according to our supposition, is no
more so in reality, though it is an advantageous line.
Be it no,y rcma.1~ked that, whatever the milit.arv opera.-
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tions in the center zone may be, Louisville and Cincinnati
are of sufficient importance to require an army for their protection and that of the country round them. If this army is
destined for active service, the most _natural line of operation-at least the easiest one, and that offering the greatest
facility for communications with the base-is evidently the
line from Louisville to Nash ville and Huntsville. Should
this line be adopted in consequence of the facilities it offers,
then another army and line of operation become necessarr
to act against Cumberland Gap or the mountain district in
general.
Therefore if, under the circumstances as they were when
the war broke out, the upper center zone is to be conquered
and occupied and the Mississippi to be opened, we are almost
necessarily led to the adoption of four lines of operation :
One along the Mississippi, to open the river to navigation ;
one along the Tennessee and Cumberland, to open these
rivers and to outflank the position which the enemy may
hold along the Mississippi or the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad; one along this railroad; and one from Louisville,
in the direction of Cumberland Gap.

To have four lines of

operation in so restricted a space is against all rules of military science; and as the plan of operation we have deduced
from the movements of the Union army, as they actually
took place, is scarcely to be executed otherwise-certainly
not with less than three lines-we conclude that the plan
is not sound, or not adapted to the circumstances and the
strategical features of the theater of war.
There is in the execution of this plan another fact which
fa worth mentioning~ and which 8trongly militates aga.inst ·
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its adoption. It is evident th~t the conquest and occupation of the upper center zone is only a preliminary measure
for the conquest of the lower one. It is the first object
· to be attained. Considering, then, the four lines of opera- tion with respect to the second object, the conquest of the
lower center zone, it will be remarked that t.he Louisville
and Huntsville Railroad is the most direct line from north
_to south, besides being the principal line of communication.
This line would, therefore, be chosen in preference to any
other for a southward movement, and also for the occupation of Kentucky, and of Tennessee itself. But this line is
nearly parallel with the Cumberland Modntains in its whole
length ; and as the Rebels may choose the Tennessee or
these mountains ( as they please) for a base to start from
for action in Kentucky and Tennessee, the Cumberland
Mountains will offer them the advantage of being able to
act against the communications of a Union army in North
.Alabama, at any moment they choose to do so. This is a
truth which has been proved by Bragg's invasion of Kentucky; and if another proof is wanted, it may be found in
the resemblance between the relative position of the base of
operation of the defense to the line of operation of an invading army in Kentucky and that of the French in the Peninsular war. In that war the line of operation of the French
armies extended from Bayonne to Burgos, Madrid, Cordova,
and Seville. The base of operation of the English army
was Portugal; first Lisbon alone, bl}.t after the capture ·ot
Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo by Wellington it was pushed
to the frontier. The line from Ciudad Rodrigo to Badajos
is parallel, or nearly so, to the line from Burgos to Seville.
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In all their offensive movements, the English acted directly
against this line of communication of the French. In 1808,
Moore, in his offensive movement, marched from Ciudad
Rodrigo toward Valladolid, Napoleon being with his whole
army at Madrid, an army nearly twice as large as that of
l\foore; besides, Napoleon was not the man to permit playing with his communications. He immediately threw himself on Moore's communications, and the disastrous retreat .
of the latter to Corunna was the consequence. In 1809,
Wellington also moved against this line of communication,
but the battle of Talavera having crippled him too much,
he was obliged to retreat; the more so, as Ney and Soult
were marching against his own line of operation.
Finally, in 1812, after having defeated Marmont in the
battle of Salamanca, Wellington adva~ced straight against
Burgos from Ciudad Rodrigo as a base, and this was decisive. Soult, who held Seville, was thrown back to Madrid,
and .Andalusia was conquered and cleared from French
occupation on the banks of the Douro.
This relative position of the base of operation for a Rebel
army and the line of operation of the invading Union army,
necessitates a strong occupation of the country, as it facilitates all kinds of raids and expeditions against the railroad
communications of the Union army.
Occupation is division of force, and the more occupation
is necessitated, the more chances an enemy will have to beat
the occupying army in detail. The rout of General Nelson
at Richmond, Ky.; the surrender of from 4000 to 5000 men
at Mumfordsville, on the Louisville and Nash ville Railroad; the capture of a brigade at Murfreesborough by

•
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John Morgan, are but too palpable proofs of the truth of
our reasoning.
Not only do Kentucky and Tennessee require a large
number of troops for occupation, but tQ.e Mississippi requires a still larger. This river once opened, all places
where main lines of communication arrive near it, connecting the right with the center zone, must be guarded by
large detachments; the consequence of which will be, that
the active or field army in these parts will be seriously
reduced ; and should the enemy, by conducting his defense
correctly, destroy this field army, the loss of all the detachments would probably e·nsue.
For these t:easons we conclude that the main plan of
operation was not based on sound principles and a thorough understanding of the country; that it was in its execution complicated ; and that it necessarily led to operations which were not correct. The defense at first made a
still greater mistake. It is, in . the _very nature of things,
that a country adopting the defensive is the weaker one,
and under such circumstances the right applica~ion of the
maxims of war becomes an imperative necessity. Here, on
the contrary, the defense opposes every advancing Union
army by a smaller but intrenched Rebel army. The long
line of defense is easily broken at Fort Donelson, and all
the trouble of fortifying Columbus, etc.· goes for nothing ;
besides, there cannot be any doubt that the Rebels did not
understand at first the advantage they might derive from
the strategical features of the country. Finally, the greatest blunder they committed was the omitting to take advantage of the errors or of the bad plan of operations of
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the Union army. Fort Donelson, however, taught them a •
lesson, and they profited afterward by it.
From the general plan, let us pass to the details of the
operations as they took place in this zone.
We have just said that Fort Donelson was a lesson to the
Rebels; in fact, immediately or very soon after its ·c apture
they evacuated their other strongholds, and commenced concentrating at Corinth. Grant, meanwhile, had pushed south
as far as Savannah, Tenn.,Buell was in Nashville, Pope still at
New Madrid. General Grant, with about 50,000 men, passed
the Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing, and encamped his army
at Shiloh, backed by the river. This is a favorable opportunity to destroy a Union army, and immediately the Rebel
commanders take the necessary steps for a concentration of
troops to profit by the occasion. Bragg from Mobile, Polk
from Columbus, Johnston from Murfreesborough, join Beauregard, who is already at Corinth. Grant is attacked and
defeated ; and had there been a little more of that iron
energy which usually distinguishes great commanders, the
un··on army would probably have been destroyed, notwithstanding the presence of the gun-boats and the arrival of
B e
B ell, informed perhaps of the great concentration
e Rebel forces, hastened, in turn, to a junction with
Grant. He arrived in time, not to retrieve the day on the
6th, but to win anbther battle on the 7th. The Rebels
were beaten on the second day by the application of the
very same principle which made them gain the first day's
battle. What would have happened had they been 15,000
men stronger, that is to say, had the disaster of Fort Donelson not occurred in consequence of their defective defense?
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What would have happened had their plan of operation fro-m
the very first been based on a similar concentration, so that
Grant might have been attacked several weeks sooner? We
do not wish to indulge in speculations, but it is easy to see
how much more the chances would have been in their favor.
'l'he consequences of the first mistake were felt throughout
the whole campaign. The plan of the battle and the conception of the whole manreuvre is creditable to the Rebel
generals who executed it. The concentration of troops,
and, still more, the immediate resumption of the offensive
after a disastrous battle, is highly creditable to the officers
and men of the Union army. The Rebels were, however,
not followed up after the second day's battle ; and this was
a great mistake-just as great a one as the Rebels committed in not pushing the battle on the 6th, and following it
up to the very utmost.
-1,

There are two kinds of battles in which the pursuit should
be very differently conducted. The first is, that in which
the battle is the consequence of a strategical manreuvre, by
which we have gained the communications of the enemy.
In such a battle, all that is _generally needed is simply to
repulse the enemy, and to operate or pursue him so that he
cannot escape either to the right or left. His whole army
will then finally be obliged to surrender. The second is,
that in which we encounter the enemy, both parties having
their lines of retreat free. In this case the pursuit must do
the principal work. Rear guards must be crippled, and
every effort made to break up the main army. To abandon
the pursuit is to give up the fruit gained by the v_ictory.
~ere, in our ·ase, the fault was aggravated by the whole
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Supposing that Buell and Grant were

too crippled after the battle to follow immediately, they
might have been reinforced within six days by General
Pope, who had New Madrid and Island No. 10 in his possession.

Then, from Shiloh to Corinth being only twenty

to thirty miles, the army might have been before Corinth
ten days after the battle of Shiloh.
There is no doubt that after this battle the Rebels were
quite as crippled as the Union army.

This latter, being

reinforced by Pope, would have had, therefore, a decided
superiority; and that, even later, it possessed this superiority after the Rebels had had time to be reinforced, is easily
perceived from the fact that had they been so sooner than
the Federal army was by Pope's arrival, they would have
moved once more to Shiloh, and refotight the battle of
the 6th.
Eight to ten days after the battle of Shiloh, the fortifications of Corinth were probably not very strong; and if they
were, a simple march or movement to Waterloo, Alabama,
and · thence to Jacinto and Dan ville, Mississippi, would
possibly have induced the Rebels at once to leave Corinth;
and then, by marching direct to Ripley and Holly Springs,
the Union army might probably have prevented the Rebeli
from retreating south, and have forced them to a disastrous
and decisive fight.
Instead of such rapid action and decisive direction of the
line of operation and of purs~it, the Union army advances
slowly against Corinth, which the enemy meanwhile strongly
fortifies. .The Federal troops besiege Corinth till the Rebels,
probably sorry to give them so much trouble, evacuate on

13
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the 30th of May. They retreat to Grenada ; and, as if the
occupa'tion of Corinth was the main object, the Union army
remains there 1 General· Pope alone undertakes the pursuit, as if he by himself could accomplish, against a not
defeated army, what he, united with Buell and Grant, could
not do!
The Rebels posted at Corinth were caught en flagrant
delit. A Union army was between them a11d their Eastern
armies; and. by acting with the left, the Union army might
have brought about a decisive, and, to the enemy, a disastrous battle. Neglecting to take ad vantage of an enemy's
faults is decidedly !:>lnndering, and here the fault was irreparable; for these very Rebel tr.oops were afterward transported East, and performed their share in inflicting the
disasters which befell the Union armies there. The con. sequences of one mistake are sometimes incalculable in war,
as well as in life in ge'neral. It is with them often as it is
"
with an .Alpine avalanche-growing, g,rowing, till they crush
everything under their enormous weight.
Aft~r the ~ccupation of Corinth, the main object of the
Wester~ campaign seemed to have been attained. General
Grant commenced the occupation of the country west of the
Tennessee, by placing his troops near Memphis, Corinth,
Bolivar, 3nd Jackson, in Tennessee, and Columbus, in Kentucky. General Bu.ell left, on the 10th of June, for South
Tennessee and North .Alab~m:,, moving from Corinth in the
direction of Chattanooga, a dist~nce of two hundred miles,
or ten to fifteen days' march. That it was the intention of
General Buell to go to Chattanooga, is difficult to say, as
he might have been there by the 25th of June. We only
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know that in July he was still in the neighborhood of
Hun ts ville.
In the Rebel army, General Bragg had superseded General Beauregard. After their retreat to Grenada or Tupelo,
the Rebels soon corrected their mistake of forming exterior
.lines with their Eastern armies, by moving as quickly as
possible from Tupelo to Chattanooga, this Badaj os of the
upper center zone. In fact, the position of Chattanooga,
in respect to Northern .Alabama, is nearly the same as that,
of Badajos in respect to Andalusia; the former being invaded by a Union, the latter by a French army.
Euell's line of retreat from Huntsville to ~ ash ville was
within the grasp of the Rebels concentrating or arriving at
Chattanooga; and the first use they made of their new com- bination was the surprise and capture of the Union troops
which were stationed at Murfreesborough, probably to guard
the communications of the Ohio army. This army, finding
its line of communication and retreat endangered, had only
the choice between two alternatives. Either to advance to
Chattanooga with all its force, or to retreat and take ~ position near Shelbyville or Mclfinnsville-that is, nearer to its
temporary base, which was Nash ville.
Whether Chattanooga was takable or not at that time, I
do not know. To attack it was certainly a risk, considering that the Ohio army would have had to move through a
mountainous country easily defended, and to go so much farther from its base. However, all depended on the strength
of this army. The very least that Bragg could concentrate
would probably have been something like 35,000 to 40,000
men; and certainly only a greatly superior force should have
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tried to dislodge them from the strong positions in the interior of these mountain regions, unless a previous defeat in
the open plain had taken place.
If, therefore, the strength of the Ohio army did not surpass 30,000 to 40,000 men in the field, or available for
operations, it would have been folly to march to Chattanooga ; and the only thing to be done was to concentrate
near Shelbyville or McMinnsville, and to offer battle there.
This latter expedient · was the one · General Buell chose.
The Rebels, however, declined fighting ; but, by moving
still to their right, they turned once more the positi~n o{
General Buell, and thereby forced him to retreat to Nashville, where he arrived on the 11th of September.
The whole configuration of the southern part of Tennessee is such that it is difficult for an army in the plain to take
the offensive, especially if not sufficiently strong ; but the
army holding the mountains has it entirely in its power to
pass from the defensive to the offensive. The inactivity of
the Ohio army is thus explained; not so that of the Rebel
army, which took nearly two and a half months to do what
it might have accomplished in three weeks.
By the force of circumstances, and the strategical formation of the country, the Ohio army was put on the defensive,
and followed, therefore, the impulse of the attack. The
attack was ·slow at first in the execution of its movements,
and the defense, occupying the enemy's country, was evidently in no hurry to give this up.
We must remember another thing here. The different
commanders of the Union forces were independent of each
other; every one acted in his own department as he liked,
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and cared very little as to what his neighbor was doing.
This was only the natural consequence of having half a
dozen lines of operation.
Troops had been left in Eastern Kentucky to hold Cumberland· Gap ; to defend Lexington, Louisville, Cincinnati,
.
etc. The Ohio army was as little affected by the fact that
General Rosecrans had been attacked at Corinth, as by the
fact that General Morgan or Nelson had been, or could be,
att_acked elsewhere. These generals bad to look out for
themselves, just ·as the Ohio army had to look after its own
safety. Very speedy action on the part of the Ohio army
against Kirby Smith, in Eastern Kentucky, could therefore
not be expected up to the moment that this Rebel general's
action would endanger its safety.
We conclude, therefore, that (the circumstances being
such as we have stated) the action of the Ohio army was
correct, or at least not incorrect, h;1 its movement from
Huntsville to Nashville. We say if the circumstances were
_ such as we have stated; because we found the greatest difficulty in tracing the lines and the movements of the contending armies in these parts from the newspaper reports.
A great number of details and facts which might materially
change the aspect of affairs, and -especially the c.riticism
thereon, are probably unknown to us.
There was, however, one decided mistake made in this
campaign; it was, that the Ohio army was not ordered to
march, or did not march, from Corinth to Chattanooga, by
forced marches, as soon as the Rebels had retreated from
the first of these two places, and the pursuit had been given ·
up. It might have been there by the 10th or 15th of June,
13*
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which was probably sooner than General Bragg's arrival
there. .After the arrival of this general with bis force, it
was too late.
Scarcely had General Buell commenced his retreat, when
the Rebels immediately pushed forward with their right .
.A. corps was left at Sparta, and the remainder moved to
M umfordsville, forcing from 4000 to 5000 Union troops to
surrender. The troops left at Sparta moved parallel with
General Buell as soon as he left Nashville.
Considering the position of the Ohio army at Nash ville,
we shall find that it had only the choice between two lines
of conduct. · Its real base of operation (Louisville) was
endangered, and its communications already seized. It had
therefore to do something to prevent being cut off entirely,
or of being left without supplies. The first expedient was
to retreat to Louisville wfth the main force, leaving Nashville fortified, and in the bands of an able commander, with
a small corps; the second was, to throw itself, with the
entire force, on the communications of the Rebel armies, by
marching to Carthage, Tennessee, and thence to Burkesville
and _Somerset, Kentucky .
.A. similar course was proposed by Soult to King Joseph,
after the battle of Salamanca. . Wellington was near Bur- ·
gos, and the king ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia, and
to join him south of Madrid. Soult, unwilling to give up
Andalusia, proposed to the king to unite his (the king's)
force and those of Sucbet with his own _troops, and to move
from Seville to Ciudad Rodrigo-that is to say, on W ellington's line of operation. The king refused, in consequence of the general state of affa.irs.
The campaign
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against Russia was a failure, and the French armies could
not be exposed to risk.
The circumstances were somewhat similar here. The
peninsular campaign against Richmond, as well as that of
Pope in Virginia, had been failures. The Rebels were in
Maryland. For General Buell to throw himself on the
communications of the enemy, would have been equivalent
to giving.up entirely his own. To be. defeated in such a posi-tion would have been ruin, and th~ battle would have had
a decisive influence on the whole war. Therefore, the most
prudent course was evidently to march to Louisville, leav-ing a sufficient garrison in Nashville. The very moment
General Buell thought it a risk to fight a battle with the
Rebels on his communicatio·ns, it would have been a mistake
to fight along his marcn; because, up to the time when
he really arrived at Louisville, he was continually so placed
that the Rebels might have thrown him back upon Nashville, or into the Ohio.
Both cases would have been equally disastrous. Therefore, taking into consideration the general state of affairs,
no reproach can be cast on the Ohio army for its retreat
to Louisville, so far as principle is concerned. Had opportunity occurred for beating the enemy in detail, and been
permitted to slip away, this would evidently have heel! a
mistake, and a most serious one too.
We have not been able to find any indication of the time
- the different marches and movements took, and are therefore entirely unable to discuss this part of the question,
though it is an important one.
Once arrived in Louisville, the Ohio army was largely rein-
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forced. It advanced against the Rebel armies, which then
united and retreated to Cumberland G~p. The pursuit was
carried only as far as London, Ky., probably in consequence
of the difficulty of maintaining the troops. The Ohio army
went back to Nash ville, and the Rebe}, army returned to
Chattanooga, thence to Murfreesborough. The operations
of the different Rebel armies all round rendered the position
at Cumberland Gap ·a precarious one, and it was consequently evacuated by General Morgan. Should· the fact be
correct that he had to fight his way to Green ups burg, and
that he los~ no cannon nor part of his train, then no doubt
this retreat would be creditable to him and his men, and
very little to the generals who permitted him to escape.
The plan of the invasion of Kentucky, as conceived and
executed by the Rebels, deserves great attention. Let us,
before entering on the consideration of it, say only, that if
Chattanooga holds a similar position to that of Badajos,
Cumberland Gap, in its turn, plays the part of Ciudad Rodrigo. Kirby Smith marched from Cumberland Gap, or the
neighborhood, direct to Lexington, arid Bragg advanced
from Chattanooga against General Euell's communications.
The Rebels form two lines of operation in this movement,
but they were very careful to maintain interior lines ; be. sides, Kirby Smith had no enemy of importance before him,
and his object was only to threaten. Under these circumstances two lines may be adopted. In this invasion the
Rebels made the best use of the direction of their base of
operations, relative to the line of operations of the Union
-army. i'he consequence was, that by one march they
cleared nearly the whole of Tennessee and Kentucky of the
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Union troops, and threw Buell from North Alabama back
on to the Ohio. So long as they had no strong enemy
before them, they divided to attack, to occupy, and to
threaten many points at the same time. As soon as a
Union army in force approaches, they unite their divisions
to avoid being beaten in detail. In their offensive movements, they capture or beat all smaller detachments stationed round for the occupation of the country. In their
retreat, as soon as they are pressed, they make an offensive
return at Perryville, defeat the Union advance guard, and
continue their retreat unmolested; Bragg, in this retreat,
changes his natural line of retreat to Chattanooga to an
accidental one, that of Lexington to Cumberland Gap.
Therefore, the direction of action and the action itself were
correct in this invasion, and the plan, as well as the -execution of it, so far reflect credit on the general or generals
. who originated and carried it out. There is only one remark
to be made, and it is an important one. The invasion of a
country must have al! object, and the object should be important enough to compensate for the risk the army runs
in making it. Here, in this invasion, the Rebels declined
fighting a decisive battle ; their sole object was, therefore,
merely the destruction of the small detachments of Union
troops and the provisioning of their own army ; fo~ they
could not expect to hold Kentucky and Tennessee witho~t
destroying at least the main army that occupied it. Had
they destroyed this main army, to commence with, then they
would have been able to hold the two States. In fact, it
was the Ohio army which formed the nucleus of the army
which drove them out of Eastern Kentucky; had it been
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destroyed at the very first, it could not have been reinforced
by Grant's di visions nor by innumerable old and new troops
which joined it at Louisville.

Therefore, to render the

invasion decisive, they ought to have commenced with a
sufficiently successful blow, and not with a raid ; and, considering the position of the different armies, we believe that
a first success could have been gained.
The army of the Ohio, when near Huntsville, probably
did not muster more than from 30,000 to 40,000 men ..
Bragg had perhaps some 25,000 to 30,000; Kirby Smith,
including Humphrey Marshall's and other small detachments, 15,000 to 20,000; finally, Price and Van Dorn, who
had come from .Arkansas, are said to have had at that time
38,000, which number, however, we believe to have been exaggerated.

Kirby Smith was at Cumberland Gap, about

150 miles distant; Price and Van Dorn at Tupelo, about
200 miles, or 10 days' march, distant.

Could these different

corps have been united without General Euell's becoming
aware of it, the Rebel army, about 60,000 to 70,000 strong,
might, in two forced marches, have moved to Manchester
and Shelbyville, taking hold of General Euell's communications, and forcing him to fight facing northward; if defeated,
(which would have been probable against such odds,) he
would have been thrown into the Tennessee by a vigorous
pursuit.

Here the first success would have been obtained,

and then, dividing in order to beat the smaller detachment_s,
threaten different points, invade, in fact, the whole country,
would not only have been correct, but of more lasting effect.
The only difficulty is to make a cmacentr.a tion without the
enemy becoming aware of it.

For this purpose several

•
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things are required; and we may learn much from Napo·1eon's conduct. First, the march of the different corps,
coming from different sides, must be so timed and calculated
that they shall all arrive on the same day, and the day afterward the offensive movement must commence. Secondly, all
movements-the preliminary march for the concentration as
•

well as the offensive movement itself.-should be executed
by forced marches of from 20 to 25 miles a day. Thirdly;
the troops should be kept in ignorance of their destination ;
the rumor of a different destination to the real one should
be spread among them. Finally, the principal generals of
the joining corps, at least those of well-known name-such,
for instance, as Kirby Smith or Price-f*10uld not leave
with their troops, but stay with a detachment of several
thousand, with which to make demonstrations and great
noise in a very different direction from that in which their
main body has moved, so as to show themselves in very distant regions, and then, a few days before the arriva of their
..
columns at the place of rendezvous, they should start, and,
by traveling 100 miles or so a day, arrive at the same time
as their men. By managing matters in this way, and telling
no generals, except the commanders of corps, of the plan,
a great concentration might be effected without the enemy
becoming aware of it until at the last moment, or when it
is too late to remedy.
Napoleon, when about to start for the invasion of Belgium against Bliicher and Wellington, gave the most brilli t feasts. In the night, in the middle of one of these
feasts, he disap eared, and started for the army by extra
post. This was so well managed that he was for two days
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with his army, and all his troops were in movement, before
Wellington could believe the fact, being informed by good
authority that Napoleon was still in Paris.

Part of the

English army was consequently surprised in its quarters,
and its junction would perhaps have become impossible, had

it not been for the double mistake of the 6th army corps,
which assisted neither Ney in the battle of Quartre Bras
nor Napoleon in that of Ligny.
Only after a concentration of his fore es with those of
Price and Kirby Smith, would General Bragg have been
justified, we think, in attacking General Buell.

With his

force alone, a battle would probably only have been detrimental to his cause, or a useless butchery, as he could not
have expected to gain any decisive result with an army inferior in strength to that of his enemy; but had such a concentration and action by the Rebels taken place, the final
result of the Western campaign would have been .probably
very different from what it really was.
The next movement we have to consider is the battle of
Corinth.

Price and Van Dorn unite to attack General

Grant's army, and to beat him in detail.

Their first march

from Ripley to Pocahontas is very correct; they take
thereby a central position between Bolivar and Corinth,
and prevent the junction of the Union troops stationed at
these places.

In the further execution of their plan, they

however made a mistake.

In movements of this kind, the

general rule is first to beat the corps or army which has its .
line of retreat open, while the corps which is cut from its
communications by the manreuvre is amused by a small
corps, just sufficient to force it to display.

By attacking
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Corinth in the rear, as ~hey did, without first beating the
troops at Bolivar, or even without masking them, they
exposed themselves to an attack in their rear by all the
troops at Bolivar, while they themselves were engaged in
front with those of Corinth, as in fact it happened. What
the reasons of their defeat at Corinth were, after they
had carried the fortifications, it is difficult to say; one
thing is certain, viz., that the defense of the place reflects
great credit on the Union general and men. Once beaten,
the Rebels retreated to Pocahontas ; but here they encountered General Ord, who had been sent to attack them
in the rear; they opposed this general, however, and thereby gained time to pass the Hatchie River. When the
last Rebels had disappeared, General Ord's column found
itself face to face with a column of Federal troops coming from Corinth ; the Rebels had just slipped off between the two ·columns. It would seem that, had General Rosecrans marched at the same time with his whole
force to Black's store, and thence to Nubbin's store, the
Rebels might perhaps have been entirely captured or destroyed. The position after the battle was such, that only
a small corps should have pursued in the rear, but the main
body should have pursued on the flank. Being more tothe
south than the Rebels, it might have continually prevented
the Repels retreating southward. They could only have
esc_aped by opening their way with the bayonet. This attempt might have been somewhat difficult, considering that
they had already been beaten, and that Ord's column was
coming close at their heels.
Finally, there is one more operation in this zone which
14
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deserves notice. It is the advance movement of the Mfasissippi army, under General Grant, to Grenada. With this
I
direct movement, a flank movement by General Hovey, with
20,000 men, was executed from Helena toward Grenada. I
ao not know bow many thousand men Price and yan Dorn
had under their orders, probably more than 20,000. Hovey
arrived first at Grenada, .and, therefore, the Rebels might
have beaten him before General Grant's army reached that
place; at all events, Grenada was within their reach, and
they could have prevented the junction. Hence this operation was wrong in principle ; it was the adoption of two
(
lines of operation, acting in the ~ttack in a concentric way,
one of the acting armies being weaker than the enemy, who
bolds a central position, and the point of junction being
within his reach. The Rebels made a blunder in. not taking
advantage of the fault committed by the Union commanders.

Operations in the Left Zone.-This zone is the most important of the three. Hence the operations in it were the
most important; and as in some respects they offer novel
features, they are highly interesting and instructive.
The question practically solved in the campaign which
we are going to pass in review is this: Is a country, having a large army of several hundred thousand men, but also
a very large navy, and being at war with its neighbor, with
which it has a common boundary of several hundred miles,
to be considered as a naval or as a continental power?that is, ought it to carry on the war according to the principles which an insular power like Great Britain would have
to follow, when making war on a continental power, or would
it have to follow the principles of great wars of invasion,
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as carried out by great continental powers when invading
their neighbors ?
To render the understanding of the proposition easy,~
suppose France and Germany engaged in a war. The
common boundary extends over some 400 to 500 miles.
'l,he French frontier is covered by a great number of fortresses. France possesses a very large navy, and great
means· of conveyance; Germany does not. France and
Germany each possesses armie.s of over 700,000 men strong.
The question at issue now is, would France, by invading
Germany, be justified in giving up the advantage of a frontier of 400 miles, to form a line of operatioQ. such as England would, based on the sea and on its ships? vVould she
be justified by taking, for instance, Stettin as a base, covered by a large fleet, and starting from that point an army
against Berlin, instead of starting it from the Rhine, and
at the same time that offensive operations are going on in
the east, leaving an army based on its fortresses on the
Rhine on the defensive ?
This was the experiment which was tried in the operations of the left zone. I believe the experiment might have
been dispensed with, for the following reasons : 1. To act on one point offensively, and on the other de-

or
fensively, is. evidently forming two lines of operation,
:,
dividing the army into two parts. Admitting the principle
to be a sound one, that whenever two lines of operation are
required, it is always better to act offensively, first on one
•point and then on the other, by transporting the mass of
troops from one to the other, and leaving the weaker always
on the defensive; admitting, I say, this principle to be
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sound when two lines are required, the only questions to
solve are, are two lines of operation rea11y required, one
being always preferable ? and if so, have they exterior or
interior lines of communication?
It is obvious that a country having several hundred miles
of boundary. in common with its neighbor, and its frontier
well covered with fortifications, so as to form a good base
of operation, has no need of forming two lines of operation
-one by land and one by sea. Besides, the very nature of
two such lines of operation renders them exterior in respect
to those held by the defending army. The consequence is,
that the defending army, by making use of the long frontiers, throws its whole mass into the interior of its enemy's
country, and beats him in detail, while his main army is
engaged ·on the coast disembarking material, troops, etc.
2. In great operations, speed and punctuality are two
main requirements. Therefore the more an operation, or
the machinery of an army, etc. can be simplified, the more
can be done with it. By making a combined operation
-that is to say, one in which the army and navy are
engaged- great difficulties immediately arise, and speed,
and still more, punctuality, become impossibilities. First,
the navy is under a different command, and then its supplies dep~nd on different quarter masters and commissaries. In its operations, the weather plays a great part.
Another difficulty is to find transports for a large number of troops. It is not only the men, but the horses,
wagons, cannon, provision~, stores ; all must be sent by
these transports. The expenses. are enormous ; the time
lost is generally very great; the means of transp~rt usually
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insufficient; unavoidable sources of delay are continually
arising ; disorder is, in most cases, the natural accompaniment <_:>f these· operations; _and speed and punctuality
are at an · end. For forming _ an idea of the immense
means of transport required for large armies, and the
whole way in which such movements should be prepared,
the study of Napoleon's preparations in 1805 will prove a
good school.
Most of these combined operations therefore infringe
upon the principal rules of military' science, especially when
they are executed against a bordering country. They are
based on a division of force; they involve the formation of
two or more line·s of operation, with exterior lines, against
an enemy holding a central position ; there is no certainty
in results, no punctuality, and no speed ; and there are
enormous costs, . wjthout adequate returns for the outlay;
they are therefore to be avoided when possible.
The principa~ plan of the campaign in the l~ft zone was
composed of one of these combined operations. In fact, as
far as we can judge from the operations, and from what has
been published on the subject, the general plan was to
fortify Washington strongly; to have it well garrisoned; to
hold Haiper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac by smaller
corps; and to transport the main army, by means of the
navy, to a point as near as possible to Richmond, the capital of tlie Confederate State~.
The point chosen for the debarkation was Fortress Monroe ; and the main direction for the line of operation was
the James River. It was probably thought that on this
line gun-boats might penetrate the river, and powerfu11y

14*
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assist in the capture of Richmond ; besides, York and James
Rivers, if once in the possession of the Federal navies, were
excellent lines for supplying the army. ·
Before entering upon the discussion of 'this plan of operation, let us say a few words about its object, which was
obviously the capture of Richmond.
The reasons for which wars are undertaken are manifold; and according to the real nature of the war, the
object to be attained greatly varies. If we wish only to
recapture a province ·taken from us in a previous war, we
may be satisfied with occupying the province, and maintaining it against the enemy's armies. In this case we
do not care so much to destroy the enemy, which always
requires a great effort, and is joined with risk to ourselves. We are satisfied to hold him off, and push him
back from the ground we have won. We capture the
fortified towns, and, after a time, the enemy, seeing his
efforts unavailable, and being . afraid of losii;ig more, makes
peace. Such, for instance, was the Crimean war. .A. great
war of invasion was out of the question; and all that was
desired WRS the capture of the Crimea, perhaps not even
th~t. Russia, after the reduction of Sebastopol, probably
afraid that the whole of the Crimea might be captured, made
peace. In such cases, the first and main object of a campaign is the capture of a place, a fortress, or a tract of land;
but in no way the conquest of a whole country, combined
with the destruction of all its parts capable of resistance.
Very different from wars of this kind are those which
have a greater object-the conquest of a whole country, for
instance. Conquest is only complete when all resistance has
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ceased. The first or the main object of the campaign (not
of the war) is therefore the utter destruction of all the
armed forces of the enemy, wherever they may be found.
This accomplished, the next or second object is the occupation of provinces and towns, and the capture of fortresses.
How little, for instance, the occupation of provinces, towns,
and even capitals interferes with real military powers, is
proved by history in many wars.
In the Seven Years' war, the Russians captured Berlin, .
but were obliged to relinquish it, and ·the war was in nowise
finished by the capture. 4fter the battle of Salamanca,
Wellington committed the extravagancy of entering Madrid in triumph, instead of falling on the different isolated
French corps. The consequence was, that he had to leave
it in his turn, and to retreat to Portugal. In 1805 and
1809, the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon would not
have finished the war, had it not been for his after victories
at Austerlitz and Wagram. Finally, in 1812, the occupation of Moscow, in the very heart of the Russian empire,
did not lead to peace, and did not prevent, but on the contrary hastened, the invading army's final destruction.
Richmond, the Confederate capital, is to be considered
as the sea~ of a real military power, whose very existence is
based solely on the success of its arms. Such a government
has a residence, but not a capital. In fact, no old traditions
make Richmond a place of importance. What matters it
if Richmond be in danger of being captured? The leaders
~f the rebellion go twenty or forty miles farther off, and all
is said. Their orders will not the less be executed, nor will
their armies fight the worse for it. In fact, they ougl1t
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never to have given any place even the appearance of a
capital.
It is very different with Washington. Washington is the
history of the Union; it is the seat of the loyal government, fighting for the suppression of the rebellion, and is
supposed to be doing so supported by the majority of the
whole country. Let Washington be taken, and the loyal
government be overthrown, the consequence would be, that
rebellion would become the legal authority, as it would have
the appearance of having the majority on its side; and the
North would have to acknowledge the independence of the
South, or to submit to be governed by it.
The difference in the relative importance of Washington
and Richmond is therefore great. The capture of Washington by the Rebels might finish the war; but the capture
of Richmond would probably not have more influence on
the ultimate result than the capture of Nashville, Memphis,
or New Orleans.
We conclude, therefore, from what we have just said
about the first object of a campaign in a war of conquest, ·
that in the plan of operation, such as was executed in the
left zone, a secondary object-the capture of Richmondwas made a main object; and tl~at consequently, whatever
the plan for the attainment of this object may have been,
no decisive result could have been gained by it, the object
remaining the same.
Let us now pass in review the plan of operation before
described.
The general principle of it is treated above when speaking of combined operations, and in· our case we will easily
I
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see that two lines of operation were formed when a single
one might have been chosen with f-aciJity; that, moreover,
these two lines bad exterior lines of communication, and
that a central position was held by the enemy; and finally,
that as far as speed and punct~ality were concerned,
scarcely anything worse could have been imagined. From
Washington to Richmond by land the distance is about 125
to 130 miles, or 6 to 7 days' march. From Fortress Monroe to Richmond it is 75 miles, or 4 days' march. The army
had advanced to Fairfax C. H. and Centreville, about 20
miles from Washington ; thence they had to return to Alexandria to get re-em barked, making some 30 to forty miles
marching before embarking, or 2 days' march, which, joined
to the 4 from Fortress Monroe, makes 6 days' march, or
about the entire ~ime required to march from Washington
to Richmond. The fact is, that in order to avoid 15 or 20
miles of marching, 100,000 men, with their immense material, were transported 180 miles by water, and to avoid this
I day's march, not less than 19 days were spent in embarking, transporting, and disembarking the army. Speed and
punctuality were evidently here entirely out of question.
Having considered the plan of attack in general, that is,
the correctness of forming several lines of operati on by a
combined operation of army and navy, we have now to consider the direction of those two lines.
One line had for its base Washington, with its fortifications; its natural direction was the straight line from the
Federal capital to the Confederate one. On this line the
defensive was chosen. The other line, the offensive one, was
that from Fortress Monroe to Richmond-that is to say,
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from the sea-coast into the interior of the country. In
Chapters I., II., and III. we have at some length proved
that operations made along the sea-coast, or generally to
the left of the main left zone, are far from being decisive,
for the very simple reason that the Rebel army can always
retreat, amd continually mai~1tain its interior lines of communication with the Western armies, by which it can be reinforced, and finally repulse the invading army. Besides,
the Union army, once really t~rown against one of the
large rivers or bays, might, if rightly attacked, even find
the protection of the gun-boats unavailable, and be obliged
to surrender-that is to say, the Union army voluntarily
places itself in positions into which the Rebel army ought
to be forced by grand manreuvres. Hence the operation is
in no way decisive for the Rebels, but might become so for
the Federal army, the very reverse of what ought to be.
Two lines of operation imply that two objects are to be
attained. rrhe object of the offensive operation is evidently
the main object; it is, in fact, the object of the campaign.
On the contrary, that of the defensive operation, or of the
operation of the defensive army, is secondary to this principal object, the main force being evidently employed for
the offensive operation, as the whole campaign is to be an
offensive one. .A.t the time this campaign was planned, the
Rebels were supposed to hav~ very nearly as large an army
as that of the Union, and their position, continually threatening Washington, was certainly far from being defensive.
How would it have been if the Rebels, basing themselves
on the difference of importance between Richmond and
Washington, had adopted for defense a plan of campaign
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similar to that of the attack ?" To be more clear-if the
Rebels had opposed the Potomac army coming from Fortress Monroe by a small corps, just sufficient to retard its
march, and force it to a continual display of force, and had
,.
in'~the mean time thrown themselves by forced marches with
their main force on the smaller corps in front of Washington; if then they had passed the Potomac, captured Harper's Ferry and Baltimore, and attacked Washington on
the left side of the Potomac, giving up, meanwhile, Richmond, and acting upon the simple truth, they could always
afford to lo~se Richmond if they capture Washington instead. This they might have done, and hence we conclude
th at the choice of the direction of the two lines of operation, as well as their importance, was not well considered at
the time this campaign was planned. The principles laid
down by the Archduke Charles, that in war we should
always act as if the enemy would do the very worst he
could do to us, was certainly not taken into account. Recapitulating,_therefore, all that has been said of this general
plan, we may come to the following conclusfons : 1. All main operations conducted to the left of the main

left zone, that is to say, along the sea-coast, will force the
Union armies to the adoption of two lines of operation, one
defensive and one offensive; or, in other words, to a division
of force, to protect Washington and to carry on offensive
operations, as the Rebels, by choosing a position on the
right flank of the Union army, threaten, without any danger
to themselves, Washington and the Union army.
2. All operations to the right of the main left zone do
not require this division of force. The garrison of Wash-
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ington might be reduced to a few thousand men, as the
Rebel army could not act against Washington with the ,
Union army on its ~eft flank, giving it thereby free access
to its line of retreat and its interior lines , of communication
with the Western armies. If it did, nevertheless, act against
Washington under such circumstances, the Union commanders could only congratulate themselves, as this action would
insure the destruction of the Rebel army by attacking its
left flank and throwing it into the Potomac.
3. The strategical direction of a line of operation in the
left portion of the main left zone can never be decisive ;
while, on the contrary, the strategical direction of a line of
operation along the right of the main left zone is decisive.
4. Combined operations of army and navy, being out of
the control of the Commander-in-Chief, are to be avoided, ·
as no speed nor punctuality can be accomplished by them;
besides, as above shown, the strategical direction of the line
of operation not being decisive, no adequate result is obtained for the immense cost of such expeditions.
5. From 1, 2, 3, and 4 we conclude that one line of operation· to the right of the main left zone would be correct
and preferable to the formation of more lines, which we
know to be incorrect, or which at least is in general to be
avoided.
Let us now pass to the actual details of the campaign.
The first movement is the expedition of General Burnside
to Roanoke Island. .As to its general fitness, the following
remarks will apply to all smaller ~imilar expeditions. They
are to be considered as detachments sent to the rear of a
stronger enemy, and consequently they are against the rules
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of grand war.

Whenever the enemy chooses to do so, he

may crush them; besides, they conduct only to a division
instead of to a concentration of force ; and the alleged
reason, that they are necessary to prevent foreign intervention or the running of the blockade, is simply ridiculous, for
this reason, that were the operations conducted rightly, with
the great superiority of men possessed by the North, the
war ought not to last longer than two gr three months, as
shown in Chapter III.; and in these two or three months
certainly foreign powers would not have much time to meddle, nor would many ships be able to run the blockade. For
more on the subject of expeditions, see "Summary of the

.A.rt of War," pp. 52 and 168.
As far as the execution of the operations against Roanoke
Island is concerned, nothing is to be said except that it
seems to have b.een carried out well and even brilliantly.
The operation~ of the army of the Potomac began with
General Banks's movement against Winchester.

Scarcely
,c

had the Union army advanced in this direction-that is to
say, on the right of the main left zone-than the Rebels

If this evacuation was the consequence of the above movement, and I really do believe that

evacuated Centreville.

it was, it would show that the Rebels understand fully the
importance of the different parts of the theater of war,
though at that time their other preparations for the defense
of their country were far from being good or correct.

Two

days after the retreat of the Rebels, the whole Union army
moved after them, but only as far as Fairfax ~nd Centreville, for no other purpose than to move back again, to
embark at .Alexandria.

15

166

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

The embarking of the Potomac army commenced on the
17th of March, and lasted until the 5th of April.

It took

not less than nineteen days to transport 80,000 to 100,000
men a distance of 180 miles, in which nineteen days the
army might have marched some 350 _miles, ~r very nearly
from the Potomac to the Savannah. The troops were
landed near Fortress Monroe.

By consulting the map, it

will be seen that Fortress Monroe is situated at the end of
a peninsula, which in some places is not over six to seven
miles wid~, and in all about fifty miles long. .A line of battle
six to seven miles long requires, according to the nature of
the ground, and to its being defensive or offensive, from
40,000 to 100,000 men.

(See "Summary of the .A.rt of

War," p. 76.)
The ground on the peninsula being extremely favorable
to the defense, 40,000 men could at any time have stopped
100,000 men for a long while, if the army would have had
to make the whole march from Fortress · lVIonroe to the
upper end of the peninsula-that is, if, by means of the
gun-boats and steamers, the York and the James Rivers
could not have been ascended, and thereby the Rebel arm1;
outflanked.
The James River, at the time the operation took place,
was closed by the Merrimac, and the York River by Yorktown and Gloucester.

The army therefore had to advance

from Fortress Monroe; and as the peninsula is so narrow
that no flanking movement could be made, all movements
had to be executed by the front, and every obstacle to be
carried by force.
One of the chief principles of grand war is to get posses-
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sion of the enemy's communications without exposing one's
own. Evidently the application of this principle was out
of the question in the position the Potomac army was
placed in. To suppose that by transporting the troops to
Fortress Monroe, and by acting thence against Richmond,
was seizing the communications of the Rebel army in Virginia-at Centreville, for instance-is to suppose that the
Rebels could neither see, nor think, nor march.
They were, at the time the first preparation was made, in
possession of the right bank of the Potomac, and could see
and count the transports going up to Alexandria. Even if
transportation for half of the army had been provided, it
would have taken five to six days to transport the whole of
it; and in six days the Rebels could have marched from
Centreville to Williamsburg, and encountered the Union
army in front again. These considerations alone should have
been sufficient to prevent the campaign on the peninsula.
While the Potomac army found itself imprisoned on the
small tract o~ land between the in trench men ts of Y 9rktown
and Fortress Monroe, the army for the defense of Washingon was divided into three independent commands : Fremont, in the mountains west of the Shenandoah; Banks, in
the Shenandoah valley; and ~IcDowell, east of the Blue
Ridge. Thus, including General Burnside's corps, not less
than five armies were operating on five different lines of
operation against Richmond. A curious spectacle-the
main army shut up in the peninsula, and these other four
small armies inviting the enemy to come and annihilate
them I The Rebels, however, were magnanimous I they
allowed this unique opportunity of striking a decisive blow
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(we might almost say, to finish the war) to slip. What an
occasion for a general ambitious of gaining the reputation
of a great commander t Jackson finally felt that cheap
.
laurels might be gained here, and he made the attempt,
though commanding but a small corps. He could not help
gaining some laurels, though not enough to enable him to
pass for a great captain.
These surrounding manreuvres, forming four or five lines
of operation converging all on one point, were favorite manreuvres in the good old times. In the Peninsular war, the
Spanish generals used them profusely. In the first war of
the French revolution, the .Austrian generals could not live
without them. In more modern times, however, they had
become scarce; till in our present day, the Virginia campaign saw them once more in full flower.
It is scarcely worth while to say ml.fflh about such dispositions; history has already pronounced judgment on them.

.

To form an idea as to how much they are against the rules,
and how · ridiculous they must be considered, if executed
against a stronger army in a central position, it is only
necessary to read military history; to study J omini, N apo- ~
·1eon, Cesar, and all those who have won a name in the
great art of war .
.After the evacuation of Yorktown, the army followed up
the Rebels, whose rear guard was found at Williamsburg.
Meanwhile General Franklin's division was transported to
West Point to act on the communications of the Rebels .
.A.t Williamsburg, the Rebels made a stand, and were only
forced to relinquish the position in consequence of a flank
movement executed by General Hancock. The whole move-
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ment, as well as the style in which it was executed, is highly
creditable to this general.
.After the retreat of the Rebels, the army remained for
several days at Williamsburg, which delay must be considered a fault. We must look at such a pursuit as was executed by Napoleon, after his great battles of Jena and
Wagram, or at the pursuit executed by Bliicher, after the
battle of Waterloo, to see what, under such circumstances,
can be and should be done.
Here was a rear guard of the enemy which ought to have
been crippled before arriving at the Chickahominy, and
not even trying to cripple it was certainly a fault. .A.dmttting that the roads were bad, they were quite as bad
for the retreating as for the pursuing troops. Besides, ·
Franklin's expedition to West Point could be of no avail, if
not supported immediately by the whole army coming from ·
Williamsburg. .A.s a general rule, detachments like that of
Franklin seldom do any good in the rear of a stronger
enemy, and,_when against great captains, nearly alwa~s
finish with disasters.
The defense was well conducted. The evacuation of
Yorktown, just as that of Centreville and of Corinth, was
executed in a masterly manner. The leaving of a rear
guard at Williamsburg was also right, and according to
the rules, in order to prevent the enemy following with too
much impetuosity, and to give the trains time to be brought
in safely. For similar reasons, the engaging of Franklin
was in its ·place.
The army took eleven days to move from Williani~hurg
to White House, a distance which it ought to have made
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in two or three days at the very utmost. These delays, and
this great slowness in a forward march, are fiital mistakes.
They give an enemy time to make his preparation; to recover from a fatiguing retreat ; to push in reinforcements;
to get over the demoralization which the retreat may have
occasioned among the troops; to restore discipline, etc. ;
_ and instead of a half-beaten enemy, we find a strong and
determined one in front of us.
These slow movements violate the greatest rules of grand
war, which are to use the utmost speed, and always to strike
an enemy before he is prepared. The movements of Cesar
and Napoleon, and some of the French marshals in the
Peninsular war, are well worth studying in respect to the
• use of time.
When the army arrived on the Chickahominy, it placed
one wing on the right and the other on the left bank of the
creek, connected with each other only by way of Bottom
Bridge. Very soon after its arrival, an attempt was made
to form a junction with General McDowell at Fredericksburg. -~his attempt was based on sound principle, and
would, in some degree, have corrected the defective position
of the Union armies ; though it is by no means proved that
had this junction taken place, it would have insured the
capture of Richmond. The Rebels could have prevented·
it by moving in force on Hanover C.H.; by beating Porter
and McDowell, and throwing them back to the north, and
then placing themselves between these two generals and
General McClellan's army • .
The disposition of the army in separate wings was a very
dangerous one, as is well proved by the two attempts the

'
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Rebels made to destroy these wings separately. The first
of these two attempts was made against the left wing, and
.
the battle of Fair Oaks was the consequence of it. The
left wing consisted of four di visions in echelons, one behind
the other along the York River Railroad. The Rebels fell
on these divisions in front, and at the same time moved a
strong column against Bottom Bridge to cut off all retreat,
and prevent any reinforcement arriving.
The conception of this plan was certainly sound. The
idea was not to defeat, but to destroy the left wing-that
· is, nearly one-half of the Union forces. To attack with
their concentrated force part only of the Union army before
they could be succored, is according to the rules of war.
The conception of the plan, and the applying of the rules
to the situation, reflect honor on the general who was the
author of it. The execution of the plan, however, was far
from being equal to the conception. This is probably, to
a certain extent, the consequence of the composition and
organization of the armies, which possess too few wellinstructed officers, and men not sufficiently drilled, to permit of very rapid or v_ery precise manreuvres.
The promptitude with which General Sumner marched
against the enemy in this battle is creditable to him ; and
here the old truth was once more verified, that he who flanks,
exposes his own flank. The flanking column of the Rebels
was attacked on its own flank by General Sumner; the disorder created thereby, occasioned in a great measure their
final repulse. The plan of defense in this battle was not
equal to the plan of attack.
With the exception of General Sumner's corps, the right
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wing did not succor the left wing; and though there were
difficulties to overcome, they ought to have been overcome
at all events, and at any price. When the battle commenced, some uncertainty was entertained about the real
place of attack. It might have been that the fight on the
left wing was only a feint, and that a main attack on the
right wing would take place. .All doubts were, -however,
soon dispelled. The reports from the battle-field, and an
reronautic reconnoissance, soon proved that the whole
Rebel army before Richmond was engaging the left wing.
As soon as this fact was ascertained, three kinds of measqres ought to have been taken at once. First, the immediate Qonstruction of bridges over the Chickahominy ; the
immediate marching of Sumner's troops to Bottom Bridge,
and thence to the battle-field; and the immediate concentration of the troops more to the right, near the bridge
constructed by the engineers of General Sumner's corps.
The right wing would have had only some eight miles to
march by acting so ; and by commencing the movement at
two o'clock, the whole army would have been by night on
the other side. Troops, on such occasions, cross the defile
in double quick, and the artillery is only brought on after
the main body of the troops has passed.
That such or a similar energetic action was required, a
simple reasoning proves. Three alternatives were possible.
Either the left wing gains a victory; or it is only able to
repulse the attack, and the result is a drawn game; or it is
defeated, and may be entirely destroyed. The first of these
three alternatives was out of question. It could not be
supposed that four divisions would gain a decisive victory

'""
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over the whole Rebel army. By not succoring the left
wing, the refore, only a drawn battle or a disaster could be
expected. By throwing five or six divisions to the support
of the four alre'ady engaged, a drawn battle would evidently
have been changed into a decisive victory, and a disaster
probably into a drawn battle. The only objection which
can be made to this reasoning is that, by throwing the whole
army over the Chickahominy, the whole army was exposed
to destruction. .Admitting the cogency of this argument,
we can only ask, how it happened that under such circumstances the left wing was placed on the right bank of the
creek at all? and why Sumner was sent over? which, according to the supposition, would only have increased th'e
disasters; and finally, why, if such a disaster was apprehended, the immediate retreat of the _left wing was not
ordered ? Therefore, it was decidedly a mistake that the
right wing did not succor the left wing; and that no
bridges were ready; cannot be accepted as an excuse, considering that General Sumner managed to have one, and
that, therefore, the other corps might have had bridges too.
The crossing of the right wing ought to have taken place,
even if no immediate advantage in the battle of the 31st of
May could have been expected from it; it ought to have
taken place, in order that the army might have taken the
offensive itself immediately after the repulse of the Rebels.
We can here only repeat what we have already said, of not
following up a victory, when speaking of the battle of Williamsburg. That immediate action after a battle, even in
this country, and with our present armies, is possible, is
proved by the Rebels in the seven days' fight and by their
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campaigns in Virginia and in Maryland, and by the energetic advance of the Union army after the fight at South
Mountain.
Jackson's offensive operation in the Shenandoah valley
was one of the most apropos movements executed during the
war; it prevented the junction between General McDowell's
and General McClellan's troops; it threw the whole army in
and around Washington on the defensive, and thereby prevented reinforcements being sent to the army of the Potomac, which was left to its own fate, and had finally to succumb under the blows its stronger adversary was about to
deal it. The strategical direction of Jackson's line of operations was a good one. General Banks's corps was not only
the weakest, but it was the center of the long line of defense
or attack formed by the three Northern armies. By breaking this center, by beating Banks, General Jackson found
himself at once in a central position, between the corps of
Fremont, McDowell, and Banks, and the only mistake the
Rebels made was to undertake this operation with about
15,000 men instead of 40,000 to 50,000.
It has been stated that General Jackson had 25,000 men.
I do not credit this statement. With 25,000 men there was
no reason to run away before General Fremont or before
General McDowell, who came presenting themselves to his
blows from two different sides, with only 15,000 to 20,000
·· men each. If Jackson had really been as strong as was
stated, he ought, a~ter driving General Banks over the Potomae, to have marched to the encounter of Fremont, beaten
him, and then, turning against McDowell, driven him right
under the guns of Washington. That with 25,000 men such
~
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action would have been possible, is sufficiently proved by
Napoleon's campaign of 1196. Therefore, . admitting that
General Jackson had 25,000 men, is admitting that a blunder was committed in sending Fremont and McDowell on
converging lines of operation against him ; it was exposing
them uselessly to be defeated separately, as in fact happened
to them at Cross Keys and Port .Republic, though Jackson
had, all told, probably not more than 15,000; which may
also partly be inferred from the fact that in t~ese two engagements he had only 5000 opposed to Fremont and 8000
_opposed to Tyler, making a total of 13,000.
In his advance, General Jackson did not march straight
against Strasburg, but to Front Royal, whence he could
act, and in fact did act, on General Banks's communications~ But from Front Royal he did not choose the best
line he might have chosen ; he moved to Middletown, which
is from Strasburg only half the distance from Front Royal ;
therefore Banks could sooner be there than Jackson. There
are two other roads-one to Newtown and one to Winchester-from Front Royal, and the distance on these two roads
is the same as from Strasburg to~ ewtown or Winchester.
Starting, therefore, at the same time as General Banks,
Jackson, by moving on one of these two roads, might have
prevented the former from going farther north, and have
forced him to fight a battle, the result of which would
scarcely have been doubtful. .A. ifew cavalry thrown out
toward Middletown, to disturb or even seriously attack
General Banks's train, would probably have retarded this
latter sufficiently to give Jackson time to be first on one of
the two decisive points named above. On reading over
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the details of this operation, it seems, however, as though
either Generai Jackson's force ha~ not entirely arrived at
Front Royal when the capture of the Union forces took
place there, or else precious time was lost by him at this
place, and the Union forces at Strasburg thereby enabled
to make good their retreat.
The quickness with which General Banks understood the
positio·n and decided to retreat is creditable to him; but, as
no further danger for his . communications existed the moment he had reached Winchester, the retreat from this place
farther north might have been conducted with more firmness and in a more soldier-like manner. What may be
done under such circumstances, is well illustrated by Gen-.
eral Sigel's retreat previous to the battle of Pea Ridge.
In his case the superiority of the enemy was far greater than
that of Jackson over General Banks, who had probably
never to deal with more than 5000 to 6000 Rebels-that is
to say, with the advance of their columns-his own command consisting of two brigades.
General Jackson's retreat from Winchester to Stannardsville was, as far as we can judge, executed in a masterly
manner. His two engagements at Cross Keys and Port
Republic show firmness and understanding of the art of
war. The action at Qros~ Keys is highly creditable· to the
Rebel general and to bis men who fought it. The general,
on the contrary, who lets slip the opportunity of crushing
5000 men with 20,000, and, what is worse, who permitted
himself to be beaten under such circumstances, has certainly
b.ut very few claims to the title of "general."
The direction chosen by the corps of Fremont and Mc-
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Dowell, for the intercepting of Jackson, was a wrong one.
To march to the place where Jackson had only been heard
of, according to the last accounts, was evidently coming too
late. To effect the object, a very simple exercise of arithmetic would have shown where to march to. From Winchester, where Jackson was on the 25th, to Harrisonsburg, in
the Shenandoah. valley, is three days' march; from Franklin,
where Fremont was, two; and from Falmouth, where McDowell's corps camped, three forced or four ordinary days' march.
Both Union generals might have gained certainly one, and
McDowell easily two days'· march on Jackson, who could
not have been immediately informed of their movements.
Hence, if General McDow~ll had marched to Stannardsville,
and thence through Swift Run Gap to Luray, occupying
Chester Gap and the road to New Market, Jackson could not
have hindered him from doing so; jf at the same time he had
pushed a column from Warrenton to Manassas Gap, which
could easily have been occupied · and held by a small force,
,,,

he might have been in those places on the fourth day, and
formed by his left wing a junction with General Fremont,
marching from Franklin to Harrisonsburg, and moving thence
upon Broad way and New ~{ark et. Both generals, pushing
rapidly forward and throwing out cavalry to the right and
the left near the gaps, to remain well informed of Jackson's
movements, might have been in this position on the fourth
day; and, supposing they had gained only one day on Jackson, he could n_ot have prevented them. It will be seen that,
by acting in this way, they might with their main force ha~e
continually prevented Jackson returning south, whatever

16
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course he might take, as they could always reach the decisive point before him. That point would have been evidently the spot to the right or left, where Jackson tried to
pass them. That they would have gained several marches
on him, is well proved by the fact that at the commencement of June he was still at Strasburg, and on the 7th only
at Port Republic, at which place, or somewhat below, the
two Union generals might have been by the 29th of May.
While J a;ckson was retreating, leaving the armies of the
North out of breath with their useless run, the army of the
Potomac remained inactive, permitting the enemy to recover from his repulse at Fair Oaks, to reorganize his army,
to draw reinforcements from the West, and finally to proceed to a junction with Jackson, and to the execution of a
grand plan, which was calculated to deal a decisive blow to
the main Union army.
In the middle of June the Rebel cavalry had made a reconnoissance in the rear of the Federal army; and toward
the end of this month, when solid bridges over the Chickahominy had been constructed, an advance was determined
on; but scarcely had it begun by the Union troops of the
left wing, · when the Rebels, consi5ting of Jackson, Hill,
and Longstreet's corps, under General Lee, appeared on
the
right flank of the right wing of the Federal army, and
.,,.
proceeded immediately to the attack.
Taking the map in hand, it will be seen that by this
movement the Rebels took hold at once of the communi. .
cations of the Federal army, and that the right wing, once
beaten, would be thrown against the Chickahominy with its
swamps; while the left wing, shut up betwee~ Richmond
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and the Chickahominy, had scarcely any other chance than
to surrender. The defeat of the right wing, th~r~fore, would
decide the destruction of the entire army of the Potomac.
The conception of this plan was good, and worthy of a great
general. The Union army, separated, and the most important wing exposed to the blows of a greatly superior force,
seemed to be lost. This time, however, the defense was
equal to the attack. James River was open to the Federal
gun-boats, and by marching straight to it, on the right bank
of the Chickahominy, leaving the main Rebel army on the
left bank, the ·army might be saved. The Chickahominy
was difficult to cross. The Rebels had passed over a bridge
some IO miles above the utmost right of the Union troops;
if, the refore, the Federal army crosses on its own bridges,
and destroys those behind it, the Rebels have to return by
their bridge, and lose one day in useless marching, and this
might be enough. Once near James River, the army could
take shelter under the gun-boats. As soon, therefore, as the
Rebels appear on the right flank, the right wing is ordered
to oppose them, while the train is sent over the bridges to
join the left wing. .A.t the end of the second day the right
wing was beaten, but the . train had crossed, and, night
coming on, a rout of the Union forces was prevented. The
troops of the beaten wing then followed their train, crossed
the creek, and destroyed the bridges behind _them. The junction of the right and left wings took place, and the retreat
toward James River was immediately commenced. This
plan of defense reflects the highest credit and honor on the
general who conceived and carried it out; and the entire
operation o.f the defense, as well as of the attack, must be
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looked upon as two of the finest movements executed during
the war.
History presents an example of a similar operation to
that executed in the seven days' fight. In 167 4, Montecuculi crossed the Rhine to attack Turenne on French soil;
Turenne avoided the attack by himself crossing that river,
and entering on German ground. Montecuculi was thereby
forced to retreat, and recross the Rhine to defend his own
country.
The fight at Gaines's Mill took place on the 27th, and on
the 29th the Rebels had come back to the right bank and
commenced the attack. The retreat was, nevertheless, continued, the Rebels following the retreating troops with the
utmost determination. .A. rear guard, left after the crossing
of White Oak Swamp, was attacked by them with great
energy, and at Malvern Hill a final attempt was made to
throw the whole army of the Potomac into James River.
This determined pursuit was correct, and would pro bal>ly
have produced greater results had the distance been only
one or two marches longer. The Potomac army had suffered severely in the retreat, and was greatly disorganized
. on its arrival at Malvern Hill and Harrison's Landing.
The only fault which seems to have been committed on
the side of the Rebels was, that the attacks on the Union
rear guards were not executed in sufficient force. How far
they were adapted to the topography of the country, we are
unable to judge. At Malvern ·Hill, for instance, it W<?uld
• appear that the dispositions for the attack were not in
accordance with the ground, and were far from having
been correct.
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After the failure at Malvern Hill, the Rebels could not
expect that another attack would succeed; and both armies
being exhausted, a pause occurred in the operations.

The

position at Harrison's Landing threatened Richmond on
both sides of the James River, as the Union army, by means
of its gun-boats, commanded the river, and could cross it
at will.

This position of affairs obliged the Rebel army to

retreat to the neighborhood of Richmond, so as to be able
to act on either side, using Richmond as a double tete-de-

pont, and acting against the Union army from whatever
side it would advance.
After the troubles created by Jackson's offensive movement against General Banks, the armies of Generals 1\1:cDowell, Fremont, and Banks were consolidated ; General
Burnside, with his troops, was called from Roanoke Island,
and General Stevens's division from Port Royal.
troops were then ordered to Fredericksburg.
July passed without any event of importance.

These
Jackson

had moved to Gordonsville; and it was the 12th of .August
before the army of the Potomac, by commencing its retreat,
gave the signal for another offensive movement on the part
of the Rebels, not against this army, but in a northward
direction, against the army of Virginia, then under command of General Pope.

-

Before passing this campaign in review, we must be permitted to say a few words on the previous inaction of the
Rebels, which lasted from the commencement of July to the
12th of .August.
In operations where an army holds a central position

16*
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between two hostile armies, the main chance of success lies
in attacking one after the other, before they can unite, or
hefore they can arrive so near as to make a simultaneous
attack on the main body holding the central position.

Great

speed and immediate action are therefore necessary to obtain great results, and it is evident that the best moment to

attack one of the two armies acting on exterior lines, is
immediately after the defeat of the other, for the simple
reason that the defeated army is not in a position, morally
or physically, to take up the offensive for some time; besides,

the enemy has no time to bring his armies to a junction or
to reinforce or withdraw them; and finally, the moral effect
of two victories, one gained directly after the other, is very
great. In the present case, therefore, the Rebels, immediately after the Malvern Hill fight, ought to have moved
north, leaving only 20,000 to 30,000 men at Richmond.
Supposing they had taken three to four days to repose and
reorganize their army, th~y might have been on the eighth
or ninth day at Warrenton. Attacking the forces there with
impetuosity, they would have beaten them, and, pursuing
them from Warrenton to Washington in the same style
they had pursued the Union army from the Chickahominy
to J a.mes River, little doubt can be ~ntertained that they
would have completely _routed them. Passing the Potomac a
few miles above Washington, the capture of one or two forts
on the left side of the river would have insured the capture
of the town, and there would have been but few troops to
oppose the Rebels in their attempt The Potomac army, in
its condition when at Harrison's Landing, could not and did
not take the offensive dnrin the first fortnight after its re-
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treat; and the Rebel army once before Washington, it
would have been· very soon recalled to the defense of the
Federal capital.
Several considerations may have influenced the long inactivity of the Rebels : one~ that they thought the climate of
Harrison's L·a nding would finish what the sword had commenced, and greatly reduce or destroy the Potomac army,
without their doing anything for it; or they felt not strong
enough to undertake this movement. This last reason, however, we cannot admit, for afterward they attacked the two
·Union armies united ; besides, their strength may be computed about as follows: It has been stated that they had from
150,000 to 200,000 men engaged in the seven days' fight.
This is certainly a great mistake. The main army under
Lee, attacking the Federal right wing, numbered, according
to the estimation and reports of Union generals, 60,000 men,
which means that probably it amounted to not more than
50,000. The other part of the Rebel army was left on the
defensive, or at least was not commanded by any general of
renown. The Rebel army before Richmond had no other
task than to defend that place and hold the U 1:1ion left wing
in check. This army, having a secondary part to ·play, was
certainly not stronger than the main army. . The whole,
therefor~, probably did not exceed 100,000 to 110,000 men.
Of these, 15,000 to 20,000 were disabled in the seven days'
fight; 20,000 were required for the defense of Richmond;
hence 60,000 were left for the offensive movement; and this
was fully sufficient, considering the strength of the army at
Warrenton. If the presence of the army of the Potomac _
really did prevent the Rebels following a course similar to
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the one described above, then their inaction must be consid- ·,
ered as a grave military fault, which probably was the first
cause of their losing the campaign at the end .
.As we have already stated, the departure of the army of
the Potomac became the signal for an offensive movement
against the army under General Pope, who had advanced to
Culpepper, General Burnside's corps remaining meanw bile
at Fredericksburg. On the 10th of August Ge~rnral Jackson
had already encountered General Banks; but it was not till
about the 20th that the advance of the whole Rebel army
was felt; and then General Pope commenced his retreat.
The Rebels, however, had delayed their movement too long.
On the 20th of August General McClellan's army commenced disembarking at .Aquia Creek to join Pope near
Warrenton. On the 27th these troops were ordered to
Manassas Junction to attack General Jackson, who had
turned the right flank of the Union army, and had passed
through Thoroughfare Gap, in the rear of the Federal
troops. Generals Sigel and McDowell were ordered to
Gainesville, to intercept communication between Jackson
and Lee, but were subsequently sent to Manassas J unction. On the 28th and 29th the fight becomes general;
the Federal army is defeated, retreats, is outflanked once ·
more at Centreville, and takes shelter behind the fortifications of W asbington on the 2d of September.
Let us consider first the attack. The object of the attack
was evidently to defeat Pop~ before General McClellan's
army could effect a junction with him. This was only possible by leaving Richmond before the army of the Potomac
left Harrison's Landing. By not doing so, the object could
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evidently not be carried out; and the long inaction of the
Rebel army was therefore, as already said, a fault.
The direction they gave to their line of operation was a
sound and good one. Pope's front of operation was perpendicular to the Potomac; it was therefore the wing
opposite the river which was to be attacked, and the
whole army thrown against it. It is a general rule, that
an army pointing with one wing to an unsurmountable obstacle and having the other wing in the air, is always to be
attacked on this last wing, and to be pressed against the
obstacle-a river, a swamp, a mountain, the sea, or whatever it may be-where it will be forced to surrender. This
rule is one of the elementary rules of strategy; and the
course the Confederate armies would take could therefore
not be one moment doubtful. It was obvious that they
would attack and turn the right wing of the Union army,
and, after the slightest success was gained on this wing,
they would push the army in the direction of the Potomac,
and force it to surrender there. This was in fact the course
followed by the Rebels, and they thereby rapidly conducted
the Federal troops from the Rapidan to Washington .
.As far as the details of the operation are concerned, we
must confess that we know too little about them to form
any precise opinion.

One thing, however, seems clear, viz.,

that a division of the Confederate forces took place; and
that while one part of them was amusing the Union army
in front, another part marched in its rear. This division
was evidently a mistake, and would have been paid for
dearly by them had the first direction of Sigel's and McDowell's corps been followed up.

We must, nevertheless,
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admit that the direction taken by Jackson's corps was admirably chosen, in complete harmony with the rules of
strategy and with the natural features of the country; and
the only objection we have to make is, that it was executed
with part only, instead of with the entire force of the
Rebels. If the simultaneous march of the whole Rebel
army was impossible, it would perhaps have been more
correct to fall ·on General Si gel's ·c orps, which was near
Waterloo, unsupported, in front of the Rebel army, and
therefore exposed to their blows.
The way the flank movement was executed by the Rebels
certainly deserves cr~dit, if it is considered that it became
known only when Jackson was already through Thoroughfare Gap-that is to say, entirely in the rear of the Union
army. Besides the loss of time and the division of force,
one more reproach may be made to the attack.

It is, that

the pursuit, after the battle, was not nearly so energetic as
in tbs seven days' fight; and thereby the whole fruit of the
victory was lost.
Though the attack, as we have seen, was not entirely
correct, the defense was still less so. No advantage was
taken of the mistakes of the Rebels; and in fact it was a
series of the most serious military errors, as will be shown
in the following dicussion.
When General Pope commenced his retreat, it was known
that the whole Rebel army was moving against him. Only
an immediate concentration of all the Union forces then in
North Virginia, and those of .McClellan's army coming from
Yorktown, could save General Pope either from a defeat, or,
at a11 events, from an inglorious retreat.

Instead of such a
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concentration, we see General Pope at Culpepper; part of
the Potomac army arriving at Aquia Creek, and marching
toward Warrenton Junction ; another part of the army of
the Potomac transported to .Alexandria, and remaining
there; and finally, General Burnside staying with his corps
at Fredericksburg. This looks very little like a concentration; and in fact General Pope was only joined by those
corps which had moved from .Aquia Creek to Warrenton
Junction.
General Burnside's corps remained at Fredericksburg.
What for, is more than difficult, it is impossible to say.
Of what use was or could be the occupation of Fredericksburg? None. In fact, either the Rebels were victorious
against Pope, then as a matter of_ course Frede_ricksburg
could not have been held, as the troops there would have
been certainly exposed to destruction; or the Rebels were
beaten and thrown back south. In that case, Fredericksburg might have been at any moment occupied by the
Union forces ; and therefore there was no need of holding
it, and depriving the Union troops of the succor of a whole
corps.
By throwing into the scale, in the fights of the 29th and

30th, this and Banks's corps, which also did not participate,
who knows but that these battles might have been won?
At all events, a battle is so serious an affair that all chances
should be calculated, and all possible efforts made to win it.
To leave General Burnside's army on an utterly useless post,
instead of engaging it on the decisive point, is violating the
principal maxim of war, which is to concentrate the troops
at the decisive moment and on the decisive point. This,
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however, is not all. Not only was this corps, against all
rules, not engaged, but, against all rules, it was a detachment on an isolated post, where, exposed to the blows of
a stronger enemy, it might at any moment have been
crushed.
One reason only, for this, we believe, is alleged, at least
such was the only reason presented to the Senate for the
inaction of Burnside's corps, viz., that Fredericksburg was
expected to serve as a base for some operations to be made
afterward. It is not necessary to comment on such reasoning; it only proves, what we have already advanced on the
subject, that the strategic importance of the different parts
of the theater of war was very far from being understood.
We have shown, in Chapters I., II., and III., that operations executed to the left of the main left zone cannot be
decisive.
General Pope might, nevertheless, have obtained great
results had this non-concentration been the only mistake;
but another, perhaps quite as great a one, was made in the
choice of the line of retreat. Once at Culpepper, and pressed
by the Rebel army, General Pope had two lines of retreat
open-one along the Culpepper and Manassas Railroad
toward Alexandria, and the other from Culpepper to Markham, and thence to Knoxville and Berlin, on the Potomac.
Two reasons recommended the choice of the latter line of
retreat. The first is, that, as we have already said, the
attack against the Union troops would be directed against
their right wing, in ob~dience to elementary rules of strategy;
and that the natural counter-movement would be, to move
to the right to prevent being outflanked.

Therefore, by ·
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moving to a position between Markham and Salem, the
Union army would have avoided being outflanked, and
would continually have presented its front instead of its
flank to the attack. The next reason is, that by taking a
position there, Washington was more effectually protected
than by moving in a direct line to that place.
We will prove this. .An army having to defend a certain
point-an important town, for instance-may do so in two
ways. One, by placing itself square before it, which is
meanly defensive, and has, besides, the disadvantage that ~f
the defending army is beaten, it is thrown pell-mell into the
town with the pursuers; and consequently, instead of keep. ing the enemy off, this kind of defense really draws him to
the object to be defended.
The other way to defend a point of importance is to take
a flank position, i.e. such a position that the enemy, in
order to attack the town, is obliged to offer his flank to the
defending army. This way of defending is evidently offensive, and the only one a good general would choose, if the
geography of the country allows it. In fact, the attacking
army has, in this case, three lines of conduct open. Either
to march straight to the object without heeding the defending army: this no general, of course, would dare to do, considering that he would offer his flank and rear to the defending
army, which would avail itself of the occasion, and deal him
a serious blow. Or to divide the army, masking with. one
part the defending army, and attacking the town with the
other: this would give the defending army the chance of
beating the attacking one in detail. Or finally, which is the
only reasonable course, to march with the w~ole attacking

11
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army against the defending one. This, if not strong enough
to accept battle, retreats, but marching away from the point
of importance to defend, and thereby drawing the enemy
away too, who cannot undertake anything against the town
before having gained a decisive advantage over the defending army.
.Applying this to our case, it will be seen, by taking the
map in hand, that there are few cases where such a flanking
position could have been more efficacious than in Eastern
Virginia. If, for instance, the Federal army had taken a
position along the Thoroughfare and. Manassas Gap Railroad, and between these two places, holding Thoroughfare
Gap, it would have been very soon in the flank and rear of
any Re~el army advancing from the Rappahannock toward
Washington, and this without any risk for its own communications.
If the Rebel army had, for example, advanced as far as
Centreville, the ] 1 ederal army, by debouching through
Thoroughfare and Aldie Gaps, would have been on the
flank, and on the communications of the Rebel army,
which, jf attacked and. beaten, would have been thrown
into the Potomac. To suppose that the Rebels would,
nevertheless, choose so hazardous and wrong a course,
would evidently be supposing that their generals were
ignorant of the commonest rules of strategy ; and this
could scarcely be supposed, considering the signal proofs
to the contrary they had already given.
Hence the correct line of retreat for General Pope's army
would have been to Markham, Piedmont, etc., and if not
strong enough to await an attack there, it ought to have
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continued its retreat and placed the Potomac between itself
and the Rebels. The junction with the remainder of General McClellan's troops might have taken place at Knoxville and Berlin. Had this course been followed, what could
the Rebels have done? .Attack Washington on the right .
· bank, with its thirty-five fortresses, and with General Pope's
army on their left flank? Certainly not. Or cross the Potomac between Pope and Washington? Still more unlikely;
utter destruction might have been the consequence. Or
force the passage in front of General Pope ? This would
· probably have been too difficult a ta.sk. There would,
therefore, have been only one alternative left; this was to
try to cross above General Pope by acting al ways to their
left. This·the Union army might have prevented by acting
continually to the right. At all events, this course would
have prevented the invasion of Maryland, the surrender of
Harper's Ferry, and the useless butchery of .Antietam.
The Rebel army, in order
do anything, could only have
acted in the direction opposite to Washington, and would
thereby have receded from it, instead of nearing it or threat-

to

ening it in the rear.
The retreat toward Washington was therefore a grave
military fault, and it was aggravated by other mistakes,
which were partly of a strategical, partly of a more taqtical
character; the accounts are, however, still so little cleared
up, that we do not think it proper to enter into any further
discussion of the subject. Let us merely notice two facts.
The order sending Generals McDowell and Sigel to Gainesville to mask Thoroughfare Gap, and interpose between
Jackson and Lee's forces, is certainly a luminous point in
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the ensuing chaos. But this order ought to have been followed up. by pushing all the other troops to the same point,
and by advancing Sigel and McDowell on the Gainesville
and .Aldie Gap road. Instead of this, all the troops are
drawn to the right, and the first manreuvre of the two generals became entirely useless, by marching them afterward
to Manassas Junction and to Grovestown. To act correctly,
Hooker, Kearney, and Porter ought to have been sent to
Gainesville. Jackson would then have been really outflanked, and by moving the whole army rapidly forward in
a northeasterly direction, he would finally have been thrown
against Alexandria, where he would have been obliged to
surrender. In the battle it would appear that the left wing
was parellel to the Gainesville and Centreville Turnpike,
pointing toward Thoroughfare Gap; evidently this wing
was in the air, and exposed to the blows of reinforcements
coming through the Gap, and, therefore, could not avoi~
being beaten. Another mistake committed in the battle, is
the absence of General Banks's corps, whose movements or
whereabouts are difficult to understand.
The next fact worthy of remark is the stay which the army
made at Centreville, instead of retreating without delay to
Washington, and moving thence immediately to Point of
Rocks. Let us explain this somewhat more. The Rebels
had driven General Pope at the point of the bayonet rapidly
and violently from the Rapidan to Centreville. It could
not be supposed that, after their victory at Manassas, they
would remain idle ; and the very simple question arises,
what would or what could they do? Pope's army being at
Centreville, they could attack him once more; if the posi-
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tion was too strong in front of the Union troops, the Rebels
might outflank it again-as. in fact they did.

This latter

being the safest and most decisive course the Rebels c.o uld
adopt, no doubt could for an instant exist that they would
adopt it.

Staying at Centreville, therefore, was exposing

the army to disaster, besides losing valuable time.

Once

outflanked at Centreville, the army had to come back at all
events, and must be considered very lucky in being able to
do so. After this retreat to Washington, what was the next
thing the Rebels could do?

To attack the thirty-five forts

on the right bank of the Potomac, we have already said,
would have been simply foolish; it was therefore out of the
question.

That they would remain idle, could not be sup-

posed either ; the only course left to them was to pass the
Potomac, and the only question difficult to answer would
seem to be-Where ?

Taking the map in hand, it will be

seen that by crossing this river above Washington, the
Rebels might at any time have prevented the Union armr
from retreating north, and would have shut it up in the
Federal capi~al, cutting off all communications by land
with the. Northern States, and having only the communication by sea open.

This manceuvre would, therefore,

be a decisive one, if in the battle which would surely
follow, the Union army should be thrown back into the
town.

What we advance evidently implies that the Union

army is on the Potomac below where the Rebel army
crosses-that is, between this ·army and the· Chesapeake
Bay.

The very moment the Rebel army would cross, hav-

ing the Union army above it, the manceuvre would become destructive to them, as they would, in case of defeat, be

17*
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thrown against the fortifications of Washington or Chesapeake Bay, where they would obviously be obliged to surrender. Hence the Rebels could cross only above the Federal army; and this latter, by marching immediately from
Manassas to Point of Rocks, the principal point where the
roads from Manassas and Centreville lead to, the crossing
of the Rebel army would have been hindered. It seems
easy to reason in this way after the facts have transpired,
and to stigmatize as a great military fault the non-execution of a manamvre which, it might be said, was difficult
to foretell. Such an objection would not, however, be applicable to me ; those who will take the trouble to read the
first chapter of my" Summary of the .A.rt of War," written
at the end of December, 1861,-that is to say, eight months
before the events,-will find the very same remarks, only
more fully developed ; they will also find it expressly laid
down, that after the defeat of the Union troops in Northern
Virginia, Point of Rocks becomes the decisive point. Events
having so clearly proved the truth of my reasoning of a
year since, I am now certainly justified in calling the not
sending of troops to Point of Rocks, to prevent the passage
of the Rebels, a military fault.
We have said above, that after this successful Virginia
campaign no other alternative was left to the Rebels but
to invade Maryland. But here difficulties and considerations arose which it is interesting to investigate somewhat
more closely. ..A.n invasion must have an object, and what
could be the object of the Maryland campaign ? From a
really military point of view only one answer seems possible, viz., to gain possession of the communications of the
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Union army at Washington, and to fight the decisive battle
of the war-decisive for the North, an~ accompanied with
little risk to themselves. If this was the object, and it was
grand enough to justify the attempt, the Rebel army, instead
of crossing at Point of Rocks, ought to have crossed between
Rushville and Coon's Ferry, at which place they might have
been by the first of September, in the evening, at the same
instant that part of their troops attacked Pope in the rear
near Fairfax C. H. On the morning of the second-that is
to say, before even Pope was back at Alexandria-part of
their forces might have been before Washington, on the left
bank of the Potomac, and made a bold attempt to carry by
surprise and escalade one or two of the forts on the left
side. Had this coup-de-main been crowned with success,
the way to Washington would have been laid wide open.
Little danger accompanied such an attempt. Pope's army
was at that time too disorganized to act offensively against
the communications of the Rebels; besides, the terror in
Washington would have been such that nobody would have
thought of it ; and at the very worst, the Rebels might
have retreated to Point of Rocks or Sharpsburg. This
course would probably have been the only admissible one,
had Pope's army experienced a more serious defeat, amounting almost to destruction. Under the circumstances, it was
probably thought that such an operation would be too adventurous and too risky; the consequence was, that a kind
of middle course was followed, which leaves on the mind the
impression of indecision, and which certainly was the cause
of their losing the campaign. It is therefore difficult to say
whether they intended first to fight the decisive battle on the
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Monocacy, whether they only afterward determined on the
operation against Harper's Ferry, or whether, as a general
thing, they did not feel strong enough to fight the battle
offensively, and preferred to fight it defensively with offensive return on ground chosen by them. There was a certain
delay and wavering in their operations, which indicate indecision, and which lasted until finally the rapidly changing
circumstances enforced a decision which was probably not
the best they might have chosen. In short, the operations
seem to indicate that at the moment the Rebels ·entered
Maryland, they had no thoroughly studied plan of action,
and no definite object in view; at least no one which was
worth the risking of their main army for. Subsequently
the defeated Union army had time to reorganize, to recover,
to reinforce, and to reassume the offensive in a few days.
The great maxim, "strike an enemy before he is prepared,''
was certa.inly left out of sight by the Rebels in this part of
their offensive operation.
To show that what we advance is a fact, we need only
follow the operations after the 1st _o f September. On the
5th the Rebels crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, and
marched to Fredericktown. Thence to Hagerstown is one
or two days' march. The investment on the south and west
side of Harper's Ferry could be made from Leesburg by
marching through Vestal's Gap, or about one day's march;
taking two marches more to make a junction, by way of
Martinsburg or Shepherdstown, between the forces coming
from Hagerstown and those from Vestal's Gap, the investing
of Harper's Ferry might have been completed on the 8th or
the 9th, and, by an ~nergetic action, the surrender might
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have been forced on the 10th or the 11th; instead of which
four or five days are lost, for Harper's Ferry surrendered
only on the 15th. This delay forced the Rebel army, on
the 14th, to the two fight~ at Crampton's Gap and South
Mountain, in order to gain time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry. These engagements cost a large number of
men, and certainly must have somewhat demora.lized their
troops. Having finished their operations against Harper's
Ferry, they immediately offer battle; but the circumstances
and the strategical position of the army were already so
changed that this battle could no longer have bad the effect
of a battle fought near the Monocacy or near Washington;
and as one object-viz., the surrender of Harper's Ferry and
the capture of 12,000 men-was accomplished, they might
have dispensed with the battle, the more so as the field they
chose for the battle-ground was only adapted for a defensive
battle, and could not possibly be used for an offensive on~.
The result of defensive battles is in most cases but an insufficient one, as it can only have for effect the repulse, but
never the total defeat and destruction of the enemy's army.
The energy that both parties displayed during the last days
of the l\!laryland campaign, and the determination with which
they fought in the battle of .Antietam, is highly creditable to
both of them. I believe, however, it would have been more
correct for the Rebels to cross the Potomac and fight the
battle on the other side, the more so, as their position at
Sharpsburg was a very dangerous one. Once defeated, disasters would certainly have been the consequence, having, as
they bad, the Potomac behind them. Their withdrawal from
the left bank, in the night of t11e °I8th, was well managed.
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The defense, or, as it afterward turned out to be, the
attack, in this campaign was somewhat better; at least it
had a definite object-the driving of the Rebels out of Maryland, wherever they were to be found. This object was attained. Nevertheless, more might have been gained had
it not been for some mistakes. The army of the Potomac
took seven days to march from Washington to Fredericktown, a distance of 40 miles, or, at the outside, two days'
march. . This slowness evidently gave the Rebels the necessary time to complete their operations against Harper's
Ferry. From Fredericktown the movement was conducted
with more energy. The figlits of South Mountain and
Crampton Gap are creditable to the victors. The battle
of .Antietam was fought, and, though at one time a drawn
battle, it be~ame a victory in the result. The partial attempt to cross the river in pursuit of the Rebels was evidently a blunder, as it was plainly their intention to renew
the battle at once, if it could only be done on their own
terms-that is to say, in a position more advantageous to
them than that of Sharpsburg, with tne Potomac in their
rear.
The inaction of the Federal army after the battle must
also be considered as a fault. ".rhis army ought to have at
once operated by way of Harper's Ferry, so as to act on the
communications of the Rebels and force them to another
fight, which might have been disastrous to them. The lesson
the Rebels had given to the Federals in their Virginia campaign might have been made available against them, instead
of letting them quietly retreat to Winchester.
The great and main fault committed in this short cam-
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paign was, however, the exposing of the troops at Harper's
Ferry to capture. We have had repeated occasion to giv~
our opinion on sending detachments to the rear of a stronger
enemy. We have stated that they ·are against the rules of
grand warfare, and th at in most cases they turn out badly
for those who make them, instead of for those against whom
they are intended. Here is one of those cases.· What was
the use of holding Harper's Ferry the moment the Rebels
were in Maryland and occupied Fredericktown? The place
in itself has no importance. .As a strategic point, it was only
of importance against an enemy coming from Winchester,
serving in this case as a kind of tete-de-pont for Union troops
to debouch in the Shenandoah valley; besides, the garrison
was sufficiently strong to prevent smaller corps of the enemy
from crossing above and making raids into Maryland. By
holding it, the Rebels could not be prevented from returning into Virginia, as in fact their main army did not return
this way. The roads to Sharpsburg and Hagerstown were
open, and no obsta~le existed to prevent a recrossing near
Berlin and Knoxville. Was it to save a few rounds of
ammunition and cannon, that orders were given to hold the
place? Why it was, we are at a loss to guess, unless it
was that one of those schemes, which were such favorites
with the old Spanish generals, was based upon it: that it
was supposed that the men of Pennsylvanip, would occupy
Williamsport, that Miles would hold Harper's Ferry, and
that McClellan would push in the rear; perhaps the road by
way of Sharpsburg was overlooked, and it was supposed
that the Rebels would not do othet·wise than surrender.
Harper's Ferry, as we have said, being of no importance
I
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the moment the Rebels entered Maryland, the co_rps of l\iiles
ought to have been ordered to retreat immediately by way
of Sharpsburg and Williamsport, or Sharpsburg, Shepherdstown, Marti-nsburg, Hancock, or any other northeasterly
route, unless the place was fortified and really defensible for
a certain length of time against an army investing it on all
sides.

If the place was not defensible against an enemy
~

coming from Maryland, the leaving of this detachment at
Harper's Ferry must be considered as the most wanton and
· unmilitary sacrifice of men that was made during the cam"'

paign.

We are going to show that the place was not de-

fensible, and that nothing but utter ignorance of the topography of the country or of the rules of grand tactics can
assert that it was.
The opposite cut gives the main features of the topography of the country. It will be seen by it that :Maryland and
Loudon Heights are two long mountain chains, which are
prolongations of the Blue Ridge Mountains, separated from
each other by the Potomac; both fall nearly vertically upon
the river, leaving only space for a road on each side.

The

Shenandoah passes along Loudon - Heights, and separates
them from the town of Harper's Ferry and a kind of bluff
called Bolivar Heights. The inclination of this bluff toward
Harper's Ferry is gentle, but against the Virg~nia side very
steep; Loudon and Maryland Heights overlook it considerably. .rrhe Potomac, about a mile or a mile and a half
above Harper's Ferry, turns to the north, and the space
between Maryland Heights and the river is filled up by a
kind of table-land overlooking tbe incline of Bolivar Heights,
and falling also vertically, or very nearly so, toward the Po-
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tomac. The camp of the garrison was on the incline of
Bolivar Heights, at U. From Loudon Heights this space
could be battered directly; and from Maryland Heights, or
the table-land on the Maryland side, it could be enfiladed .
Maryland and Loudon Heights were wooded, and on a small, •
open space on the table-land at O was placed a battery of a
few heavy pieces, pointing toward Bolivar Heights. No
intrenchments of any description could be discovered on
Maryland or Loudon Heights. From this sketch it will
be understood that the party holding these two mountain
chains was evidently master of the battery, and consequently
of Harper's Ferry and Bolivar Heights.
Col. Miles's orders were, I believe, to hold Harper's Ferry,
by occupying Maryland Heights in force. Now, considering
the topography of the country, he could occupy Maryland
Heights only by forming a line of battle like A 13, or like
A' B'. Both positions are so entirely against al1 military
rules, that no general would ever attempt to fight a battle in a
similar array, as in both cases his defeat would be inevitable,
and accompanied with the most severe loss, with no benefit
whatever to the cause he is fighting for. The reason is easy
to perceive. .An army ( A B) along the mountain crest has
one wing leaning against a precipice; the other wing would
be attacked by an army formed in oblique line of battle, like
ab; and as the attack would evidently dispose of more men,
AB would be thrown over the precipice. The army A' B'
bas the precipice in its rear, and therefore the slightest advantage gained against any point of its position would be
the ruin of the whole corps.
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It is useless to say much about such positions. Those
who are willing to read from authorities what we have just
advanced, may take up J omini, Baron de Ternay, or any
good work on grand tactics. A battle fought under such
circumstances would last five or six hours, and terminate
with the destruction of the whole corps.
What could the commander of _Harper's Ferry do under
similar circumstances ? To act according to his orders and
fight a battle on Maryland or Loudon Heights was sacrificing a large number of men without an object; to stay at
Bolivar Heights was impossible. Only two courses were,
therefore, left open : either to surrender, or to open a way
with the bayonet in the direction of Martinsburg. The
latter course was evidently the more honorable, and the
only one becoming a true soldier; if repulsed, there was
always time to surrender, and the honor of the flag would
have been saved.
Before passing in review the last part of the campaign,
we will say a few words respecting the offensive operations
or the Rebels on the whole theater of war, considered as
one great plan of attack.
Simultaneously with the movement against Pope, those
against Biiell and Grant were executed. The entire plan
was based on an action on interior lines of all the Rebel
armies, and the direction of all the movements was sound
and good. The only mistake ( and it was a great one) was,
that all these operations were simultaneous, instead of being
consecutive; 50,000 more ,.men in the East, or 50,000 more
in the West, would have obtained decisive results. The
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campaign of 1800 was studied, but not thoroughly. N apoleon, in that campaign, only invaded Italy after Moreau had
obtained decisive results on the Rhine, and could send him
a reinforcement of 15,000 men.
•
We have seen that after the battle of Antietam another
long pause in the operations took place. The Rebels bad
retreated to Winchester; had been reinforced, and reorganized and recovered themselves there; and being on the defensive, quietly awaited the uext movement of the Union army.
This movement finally took place at the commencement of
November. The Union army marched down Loudon valley,
and went in this direction as far as Waterloo a d Warrenton.
There General McClellan was relieved; and with the change
of command, probably a change in the plan of operation took
place ; for after a stay of eight days at or near Warrenton,
the army marched to Fredericksburg. There it gave the
enemy full time to prepare and concentrate. On the 12th
of December it crossed the river; on the 13th it attacked
the Rebel position, and, being repulsed with loss, recrossed
to the other side.
We do not know, and can only with difficulty surmise, the
object of this campaign. Probably it was the remote, final
capture of Richmond. The object was certainly not to beat
or to destroy the Rebel army, as the Federal army advanced
without paying the slightest attention to this army stationed at Winchester, which, in fact, had to run after the
Union army to get a fight out of it at Fredericksburg.
We have already said that the main object of the Union
army ought to be the destruction of the Rebel army, and
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not the capture of a town, or a small tract of land. The
object which evidently forme_d the basis of the whole plan
of operation being not well considered, the plan itself could
not be well studied, or be according to the maxims of war.
What was this plan of operation ? Was it to move down
the army to Gordonsvi11e, and thence to Richmond, stealing
itself between· this town and the Rebel army, and snatching
the long-coveted prize away from the latter? By going
to Fredericksburg, was the idea the same, but the route
changed ? And this, all the time with the Rebel army in
the flank or rear! But -perhaps it was thought this army
would stay idle at Winchester ! Doubtless, Dumourier's
invasion of Ho,land in 1'193, and Pichegru's movement in
Belgium in 1 '194, must have served as models for this cam- .
pa.ign. I prefer referring to J omini's '' Summary of_the
Art of War," and his "Wars of the Revolution." The
reader will find there the question more thoroughly treated
than I am able to treat it; and as J omini is a great military
authority, his judg~ent on the case will have more weight
than mine.
Once at Fredericksburg, the Rappahannock was to be
crossed, in order to move forward. This river, which near
Waterloo ( where the army was before moving to Fredericksburg) did not measure more than ten yards in width,
is a considerable stream near Fredericksburg, and consequently the first difficulties ensued. It took a considerable
time to procure pontoons. Meanwhile the Rebels, as if
entirely sure that they would be attacked in front, made all
necessary arrangements to repulse such an attack.
18*
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To understand this battle fully, the reader may suppose
a plain, about a mile to a mile and a half wide, bordered on
each side by a range of .bills, about one hundred feet high.
The northern range of hills was occupied by the Union
army, and close to the foot of these hills is the Rappahannock. The southern range of hills was occupied by the
Southern army. .A.bout two miles above Fredericksburg,
the southern range of hills forms a large curve, and comes
close to the river, forming thereby a kind 0£ semicircle
around the town. The plain between the two armies was
commanded by the guns of either army; and Fredericksburg being close to the river, was evidently commanded entirely by Northern guns. Consequently the crossing would
be attended with no serious difficulty; and for the same
reason, the recrossing or w_ithdrawing of the army could be
done without danger.
~ither of the two armies entering the plain between the
two ranges of hill~ would be destroyed by the artillery of
the opposite party. The Union army attempted it, and
paid dearly for it. Had the Rebels tried to follow up their
victory, they would have experienced the same fate that the
Federal army did in attempting the attack.
Considering this state of affairs, it was obviously a mistake to cross in front; the more so, as the simple crossing
a few miles above would have carried the position. .And
had this operation been well and ·secretly conducted, as it
ought to be done in similar cases, the Rebels would have
been obliged to sacrifice a rear guard, in order to save their
army. In fact, the Rebel right wing pointed toward the
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Potomac or York River. The elementary rule of strategy,
already mentioned several times, wills therefore that the
attack should have been directed against the Rebel left
wing.
With the battle of Fredericksburg the campaign ends,
and we wish only to say a few words by way of conclusion.
In the Union plan of invasion, the first and main object
of the campaign was misunderstood. Occupation was taken
for this object, instead of the beating and destroying of the
Rebel armies. The consequence of this mistake was the
formation of a great number of lines of operation. Hence
division of force; hence defeats and retreats.
The facilities offered by the navy-by sea and river gnnboats-hp,d the most deteriorating effect on the operations. It was almost taken for granted that without them operations were impossible, and with them irresistible. The consequence of this gun-boat mania was, and is still, that the
best lines of communication, but the least decisive lines of
operation, were in variably chosen. The large rivers on the
sea-coast attracted the Union generals like magnets. If
ever a circumstance conducts them into the interior of the
country, immediately these rivers, and the thought of safety
and gun-boats, draw them back.
As far as gun-boats are concerned, they ought to play a
very secondary part-merely to serve as a kind of diversion,
but never to intrust large operations to, or confine to their
guns the safety of a large army, as was done at Shiloh and
Harrison's Landing. Of how little use gun-boats are. in
really grand operations, may be seen from the fact that, as

208

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

a general rule, the Rebels had none, and nevertheless were
able to defeat us in several campaigns, though we had
many.
The Rebel operations, looked at as a whole, were much
sounder, and more according to the maxims of grand war.
The direction of their lines of operation was, in most cases,
decisive ; but accidents, or the defective organization of
volunteer armies, deprived them of the full results. The
only reproach that can be made to their defense is, that it
might. have been somewhat grander-by giving up more on
one side, but gaining more on the other-i.e. by concentrating still more to gain more decisive results.
The study of the campaign of 1796, wherein Napoleon
gave up his whole siege-park, in order to regain it afterward, and the study of the campaign of 1800, had not been
made thoroughly.
We close here our review of the campaign of 1862. We
!llust repeat once more that we do not wish to have it considered as a historical, and still less, as a kind of political
review. We have simply taken facts, belonging already to
the public, as we found them, and have formed from them
the text of a purely military treatise. Should we have committed errors in the narration of the facts, it must be excused. The object of this work is a purely scientific one,
and the fault in the narration is of no importance, if the
discussion of the wrongly-stated fact, as we give it, be but
correct.
Finally, we must say that we do not at all wish this discussion to be considered personal, or directed against any
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one general in particular. Such an idea is foreign to our
purpose; · the more so, as the views we have set forth in
this treatise are far from being generally adopted. English,
French, and German writers, for instance, differ widely on
. the subject; and the question, how different wars ought
best to be conducted, is still a mooted question. Besides,
many things in the present war have been entirely new, or
different from what takes place in Europe. The entire
absence of a highly-educated general staff corps; the
organization of volunteer armies; the want of correct and
good maps; the difficulty of obtaining information; and
the scarcity of provisions in many districts, are so many
excuses for movements which, viewed merely from the
atand-point of science, would be co~sidered as mistakes~
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CAMP .AIGN OF 1863.

IN passing in review the campaign of 1862, we have seen
how a wrong general plan, a division of force, a choice of
indecisive lines of operation, led to insignificant results, and
even reverses. The campaign of 1863 opens for the Union
forces without any change in the general plan of operation;
it is but the continuation of the campaign of 1862. The
capture of Richmond and the opening of the Mississippi
seem still to be the main objects to be obtained by the
Eastern and Western Union armies.
A wrong general plan of operation will lead to bad or
insignificant results even if the counter-plan be correct, whatever the minor or detailed operations may be. In the plan
of 1863, probably these latter will be different from those
of 1862; but nevertheless the result ought to be the same.
A long study of military history has led me to the conviction that great decisive results can only be obtained by
a thoroughly correct action, especially in a case like ours,
where the adversary is a skillful one, and understands the
great rules of war himself, and, what is of more importance,
knows how to apply them.
We have shown, in Chapters I., II., and IV., that great
wars of conquest or invasion, conducted on a num her of lines
of operation, concentric toward the interior of the country,
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are against the rules laid down for such wars. The cam ..
paign of 1862 as well as that of 1863 are conducted on a
great number of lines of operation, and consequently on
wrong principles. Moreover, the general plan of operation
being wrong, the objects which are to be attained by the
different armies are such that, even were the plan of operation right, nothing decisive could be achieved.
Similar assertions are generally answered by the arguments, that in this country the distances are too great; that
the extent of territory is too vast, and consequently war of
conq nest is out of the question ; that peace can only be enforced by occupying all the principal towns of the South,
and by opening all t~e rivers; that th~ Confederate States
will meanwhile exhaust themselves, and _are already very
much exhausted; that nearly all their means are used up;
that the North possesses now an irresistible superiority;
and that a few large battles more, even if not decisive, will
so weaken the Southern armies that they will not be able to
do much more mischief.
It may be that all this is true; and that, in fact, the whole
rebellion will break down quite as suddenly as it rose up.
Considered, however, from a purely military point of view,
I entertain some doubts as to the soundness of the above
reasoning. By closely examining the theater of war, the
strength and position of the two contending armies, and by
drawing the correct defense according to the rules of grand
war, it will be seen that the South, by making a last effort,
might come victorious out of a struggle which should have
lasted but a short time, were the intrinsic strength of both
parties alone to be considered. I will draw this correct
defense as well as I am able ; and the reader may then
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judge for himself if my doubts of the above-mentioned reasoning are justified or not.
I have added a map, showing the approximative posttion
of the contending armies, and giving also the principal lines
of operation, for our imaginary campaign. The following
table exhibits the strength of the two contending parties respectively, as well as I could judge from the different newspaper reports. Very likely these figures are not entirely
correc~, or r~ther most of them are probably incorrect.
This is, however, of little importance, as it does in no way
alter the principle in the matter; and I shall therefore sup·
pose them to be correct:)

UNION FORCES.

Army of the Potomac ..............••......••...••.• 140,000
Washington ....••................•........• 60,000
"
Baltimo1"'e ........•.....••••.•••••••.•..•••• 15,000
"
Harper's Ferry, Mary-}
"
land, and Potomac
··•· •·••···•• IO,OOO
" Winchester ................................. . 5,000
Fortress l\Ionroe .........•••.....•.....•.• 10,000
Yorktown, Suffolk, and Norfolk .••... ·20,000
"
Newbern ..•..•...•...................•.....• 50,000
"
Port Royal ........•.........•..•...••..•..• 20,000
"
New Orleans and Baton Rouge ..••••• 20,000
"
Vicksburg ................................. . 60,000
"
5,000
Helena ...•...••....•......•....•.....•...•.•
"
l\lemphis •..•...............•...••.......•.• 10,000
"
" Corinth ....•........•...•...........•....... 20,000
Bolivar •.••••...••••••.••...••.••.•••.••..••• 15,000
"
Jackson ...• ., •..............•.............•.
5,000
"
Colu"IDbus .••••••.••.••••...•.•..••••••.••••
5,000
"
Missouri
and
Arkansas
................
.
50,000
",,
Nash ville ....•.......................•...... 10,000
l\Iurfreesborough ...............•.•.....• 40,000
"
Kentucky .................................. . 40,000
"
Detachments, etc ........ ;-.....................•...... 40,000

Grand total ................................ . 650,000

men.
"
"

"
"
"
"
,,
"
"
"
,,
"
,,
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
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CONFEDERATE FORCES .

•

.Army of Virginia ....................•............... 120,000 men.
Richmond .................•......•......... 20,000 "
"
Petersburg
..........................•......
5,000 "
"
Blackwater
................................
.
5,000
"
"
Newbern ..•••.•..•...•.•..••...••.••••...•. .
5,000 "
"
Charleston ....... , ...............•......... 15,000 "
"
Savannah ...............................•..• 15,000 "
"
Tullahoma ......•.........•••..•.•......... 50,000 "
"
Vicksburg ................................ . 50,000 ,,
"
l\iobile ..... ......................... ........ . 10,000 "
"
A1"" kansas ...........................•...... 15,000 "
"
Detachments, etc ......... ~ •.........................• 20,000 "
Grand total...... . . . . .. . . . . . .... .. . .. .• . . •.. 330,000

"

'rhe disparity of forces is enormous, according to these
two tables; perhaps, in fact, it is not so great. This would,
however, in our case, only aggravate the matter, as then the
defense would have evidently still greater advantage.
The above numbers are such that obviously the South
cannot afford to make blunders ; and were their system of
defense based on as vicious a plan as our attack, the war
would evidently be soon finished, as in such a case the mere
numbers would tell.
Those who have made a special study of military history
will have found that a gr.e at difference exists even between
plans considered correct. A plan of attack or defense may
be correct without being grand; more or less knowfedge,
more or less genius, may be shown in it. Who, for instance,
would doubt that a Napoleon would have dealt differently
with Jourdan and Moreau in 1196, had he been in the place
of the .Archduke Charles, though the latter's campaign
against the two French generals was not only correct, but

19
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is even considered as a model of a defensive campaign ?
Who could blame the general for refusing to fight a battle
under exactly the same circumstances Napoleon did at
Rivoli? He might have retreated, and it would have been
correct; but to fight the battle was both correct and grand.
In a similar way, the defense of the South might be correct, without being grand or displaying genius; and though
they would, in such a case, probably obtain sufficient results,
I believe that the whole nature of the contest requires a
somewhat greater effort than strict correctness. A kind of
methodic war would drag on in length, and this the South
will certainly have to avoid.
Correct, but aud3=cious, and perhaps even somewhat adventurous, operations alone can obtain brilliant successes ;
and the war, as we understand it, for the South is that of
Napoleon's campaign in 17 96, only on a larger scale.
Giving up everything, except the place where the army
stands; concentrating their entire force on the decisive
point ; being victorious there ; and gaining, by a few welldirected blows, not only what has been lost, but more too,
is the lesson we may derive from this admirable campaign .
•
It is based on such reflections, and on the conviction
that really decisive results on one point can only be obtained by a large superiority of force, that I shall sketch
the defense. Besides, as the Confederate States have, like
. Europe, adopted the system of conscription, I will suppose
that they have also introduced the system of keeping always
the cadres of regiments or brigades ·run by new recruits.

By supposing this, I avoid the necessity of making a reduction of numbers after every one of our imaginary battles.

CAMPAIGN OF 1863.

215

Moreover, I shall be obliged, in some of the operations, to
give a great number of details concerning the concentration
of troops _: first, to show how, as a general matter, such concentration should be executed; and secondly, to justify to a
certain extent my reasoning, which, without these details,
might appear in some cases extravagant.
The object of the South in making war is to repel invasion, and to enforce peace and their recognition.

These

objects can only be attained by destroying some of the principal Union armies and by taking the Federal capital; then
making peace with the Federal Government, or with the
different States separately, by threatening them with invasion.

The first object, or the main object of the campaign,

is t~erefore the destrn:ction of the Union armies, or part of
them.
Taking the map in hand, it will be seen1. That the Union forces are scattered over a large tract
of land.
2. That they are acting on exterior lines.
3. That the Rebel forces are acting on interior lines.
Consequently the natural plan of operation, in such a
state of things, is to concentrate on the different points successively, and to defeat the Union troops successively and in
detail, i.e. before they can unite. In campaigns of this description, the principle is to make a break, generally in the
center of the long front of operation, thereby preventing the
junction of the two wings, and then to defeat these separately. In our present case it is difficult to say where the
center of the front of operation is, considering that the Union
forces have a front of operation from Port Royal to Wash-
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ington, another from Washington to Memphis, and another
from Memphis to New Orleans. At any point, therefore,
where the Rebels attack the Union forces, they could make
a breach, except on the two extremities, New Orleans
and Port Royal. Now, evidently the points where they
might break through are of very differeJ.1t relative importance. We have already contended that the left zone is the
most important and the most decisive : the main blow ought,
therefore, to be struck there. The principal Union armies are,
however, of such strength in it, that it would require a concentration of nearly the whole Confederate forces to obtain
decisive results against those armies. Having, in consequence of such a concentration, no Rebel armies opposed
to them, the Federal armies in the West could destroy too
much property-just now of great value to the Rebels-and
cou Id, besides, send immediate and enormous reinforcements
to the East; and in this case, the whole advantage which
~

the present position of the Union armies offers to the Confederate forces WQuld be lost. It is therefore clear that,
before attacking the main Union army in the left zone-that
is, before coming to the last decisive struggle-the road
ought to be well prepared by crushing all the smaller armies
in the East and those in the Northwest-that is to say, by
destroying the Union forces in Kentucky and Tennessee,
and thereby breaking the connecting link between East and
West.

This would place all the Western Union armies on

the defensive, and would give the Confederate forces time
to prepare for the main or decisive campaign in the left
zone.
Looking at the map, it will be seen that two armies-one
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in the East, the Union army at Newbern, and one in the
West, the Union army at Murfreesborough-are excellently
posted for the Rebels to open the campaign by two decisive blows. The army at ·Newbern especially ought to be
attacked: first, because it is a large detachment greatly
exposed; and secondly, because it threatens continually one
of the principal lines of communication of the South between
the East and West.
. To make successful attacks, concentration of troops is
requisite, and to strike decisive blows, those concentrations
should be so directed that the enemy shall not be apprised of them till it is too late. To concentrate troops
slowly, vis-a-vis to an enemy, is always . a great mistake. He has time to reinforce himself, or to take other
steps to prevent disasters. We can only point, in order to
show how concentrations ought to be_effected, to the miraculous concentrations executed by Na pole on in his campaign
of 1806, near Bamberg; in 1812, in Russia; and in. 1815,
near Charleroi, in Belgium. His columns, coming from all
directions, marching 25 miles a day, arrived on one and the
same day at the designated spot of rendezvous. It was
always at this day of concentration, and never sooner, that
Napoleon himself joined the army, and immediately put it
in motion against the enemy. In 1806, the concentration
and forward movement of Napoleon had been so rapid, that
the Prussian commanders could scarcely credit the fact till
they found themselves in front of his army. Just as great
a mistake would it be to send a commander of reputation to
effect a junction with another army, and that he should
arrive before his troops did. His name is generally suffi-

19*
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cient to give ample proof that his corps is following; therefore, commanders of corps as well as the commander-in-chief
should arrive only on the same day-that is to say, the day
when the whole army concentrates, coming from all side~ to
the rendezvous. It is obvious that the offensive operations
have to commence at once, and to be carried out with the
utmost rapidity.

Without this, the effect gained by this

sudden concentration would be entirely l~st.
The Union army at Newbern we have supposed t.o be
50,000 men strong.

The concentration of Confederate

forces to destroy them might be conducted in the following way:Already near Newbern..............................
From Savannah .............................•..........
'' Charleston ...................•...................
'' Richmond .......•••..•••••.....••...••••••••....•
" Army of Virginia................... . . . . . . . . . ..
'' Blackwater •..•.......••••......•.•..•...•.••.•..
'' Petersburg.......................................

5,000 men.
10,000 ''
10,000 ''
15,000 ''
33,000 "
3,000 ''
4,000 ''

Total ...........•.........••.....•..•... 80,000

''

These troops start from their respective whereabouts, and
arrive all on one and the same day at Goldsborough.

To

render the understanding of the movements easy, we will
commence counting with the 1st of month 1, and go on
counting month 2, 8, etc.
For the movement of the above troops railroads may be
used to a great extent.

I suppose that generally those

roads are able to convey 2500 men a day, with the exception of the shorter distances-from Fredericksburg to Richmond, for instance, or from Richmond to Petersburg. The
fo]]owing t~ hle~ will Ahow the ~omplete movement.:-.

~
~

G-1

I

Men.

I : Start by railroad from-

For-

Month 1.

Arrive at-

.I
Month 1.

~

c,-5
\0
00
~

~

0

z

0
;-c

-<
P-1
::s

<

0

11,000
11,000
11,000
5,000
6,000
·5,000
6,000
5,000
6,000
10,000

Fredericksburg .....•.•
Fredericksburg ........
Fredericksburg ........
Richmond ...............
Richmond .....•....•....
Richmond ...............
Richmond ...............
Richmond ..............•
Richmond ...............
Savannah .....••.•••.••.

2,500
2,500
2,500
2,500
2,500
2,5()0
2,500
2,500

Charleston ....•.........
Charleston ...............
Charleston ......•....•..
Charleston ..............
Charleston ..............
Charleston ...•...•......
Charleston ..............
Charleston .........•....

1st.
Richmond ...••...••••......
2d.
Richmond ..................
3d.
Richmond ....•............ ,
2d.
Burkesville .•.........•.....
2d.
Peter.sburg ....•.•....•.....
3d.
Richmond C.H ............
3d.
Hicl{sford ............ ......
4th.
4th ............ Richmond C. H ............
4th.
Weldon ...................... 4th ............ Weldon ......................
Charleston, by lots of 2d, 3d, 4th, Charleston ...•.••.•.•......• 2d, 3d, 4th,
I
and 5th.
and 5th.
2500.
t
Cheraw ..................... 2d ............ Cheraw ....................
2d.
Whitesville ................. 3d .....•...... Whitesville .................
3d.
Wilmington ................ 4th ............ Wilmington .............•..
4th.
Washington, N. C......... 5th ........... Washington, N. C.........
5th.
Hillsborough ............•. 2d ............ Hills borough ..........•...
3d.
4th.
Raleigh ........•........•... 3d ............ Raleigh ........•..•.........
Smithfield .................. 4th ............ Smithfield ...•..............
5th.
Smithfield .................. 5th ............ Smithfield ................ :.
6th.
Richmond ...........•..•...
Richmond ...........•......
Richmond ...••.••.•...•....
Burkesville.....••.••.......
Petersburg .......•...•....
Richmond C. H ...•.....•..
Hicksford ........•.........
Richmond C. H ...•........

1st ............

2d
3d
2d
2d
3d
3d

............
............
............
............
............
.......... ..

~

b::)

0

Men.

5,000
6,000
5,000
6,000
5,000
6,000
15,000
2,500
2,500
2,500
2,500
5,000
2,500
2,500
5,000

March from-

Burkesville ...•....•.•.
Petersburg ............
Richmond C. H . ......
Hicksford ...........•..
Richmond C.H .......
Weldon .................
Richmond ....•.••...•..
Cheraw .........••••....
Hillsborough ..........
Whitesville .••.•....•..
Raleigh .................
Smithfield .....•••.•••..
Wilmington ............
Washington, N. C ...
At Goldsborough.

Month 1.

3d •.....
3d ......
4th ....•.
4th ......
5th ...•..
5th ••....
1st ...••.
3d ......
4th ....•.
4th ......
5th ..•...
8th ......
5th ......
6th ......

Time.

For~

Goldsborough .•••....
Goldsborough .........
Goldsborough ......•..
Goldsborough .........
Goldsborough .........
Golds borough .........
Goldsborough ....•....
Goldsborough~ ........
Goldsborough .........
Goldsborough .........
Goldsborough ....•••..
Goldsborough .........
Golds borough .........
Goldsborough ...•..•.•

Arrive at-

Month 1.

7 days'march Goldsborough ............
7
6
6
5
5
9

days ......•..
days ..••••.••
small do .....
forced do* ..
small do .....
days ........•
6 days .........
5 days .........
5 days ..•.....•
4 small do .....
1 day ...........
4 days ..•......
3 days ••.•..••.

Goldsborough ...•........
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ............
Golds borough ............
Goldsborough ......•..•..
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ............
Goldsborough ...•..•.•...
Goldsborough .......•.•..

............ ····························· .................... ..••••.....•.•.................. ...

9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.'
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
9th.
,,

........

80,000

* These troops should

arrive in the night, from 4th to 5th, at Richmond C. H., so as to enable them to march
on the 5th, when 'they will have 6 days, instead of 5.

l-t1
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On one and the same day 80,000 men would therefore
march into Goldsborough; a~d if also the Union commander would be informed of the fact that reinforcements
have arrived there, he would never know how many, and
could arrive at the
would certainly never think that 80,000
,,
same moment.
This operation is evidently a main operation, and ought
therefore to be conducted by the general-in-chief himself
of the Rebel army. Starting in the night of the 8th or
9th from Fredericksburg or Richmond, he would arrive at
the same time with the army, a.nd could prepare everything
for the offensive movement to be commenced on the 10th.
On the 10th, the whole army would march in parallel
columns to the neighborhood of Kingston, and on the 11th,
to the neighborhood of Newbern. On the 12th, the battle
would take place ; and, as it is fought under particular circumstances, a few words of explanation are necessary.
The 1arge concentration of troops, and the offensive oper-ations immediately following, would ·result in a certain sur-prise of the Union army; and it is obvious that, in a fight
so prepared, no time should be left to an enemy to recover
from his surprise, and to take preparatory dispositions.
The attack shouk! therefore be executed in the same style
as the whole offensive movement. ·
In tbe present case, there is another reason for a very
energetic attack. The Union army is backed by a river;
and in fact, its· safety in such a position are its gun-boats,
under the cover of which it is thought no disaster can
happen to the troops. I am very far from sharing this
opinion, and believe that whenever the attack is well prepared, and rightly executed, disaster must occur to an army
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so backed by a river, and protected only by gun-boats.
Gun - boats are, after all, noth_ing but a few batteries o{
heavy guns, but batteries which are excessively vulnerable.
In European navies perc~ssion shells, containing (besides
the bursting charge) incendiary composition, are used against
• such wooden batteries. The shell is sure to burst within the
ship, and the combustible m.a tters are thrown in different
directions ; the smoke of the bursting shell preventing at
first their discovery till it is too late. Those who wish to
form an idea as to the effect of shells on ships, and especially those fired under such conditions, may read General
Paixhans's memoirs on the matter, and the report of a commission of French officers to investigate the disaster of
Sinope in 1854.
A few rifled 20-pounder batteries, firing such shells, and
concentrating their fire successively on the different gunboats, would soon drive them out of range; and if at this
moment the attack against the land force is well prepared,
by heavy masses of artillery drawing to very short canister
range, and followed up by a general onset, disorder in the
attacked party would ensue ; and as no space to retreat and
re-form is left, the slightest advantage gained becomes decisive, and finishes with the destruction of the whole, or at least
of a great part, of an army placed in such a position. It
· may be said also that the attacking party should not give
up the contest till the object-the destruction of the attacked force-is fully attained. It is evident that, whatever
be the loss of the attack at the commencement, the defending party will at the end experience the greatest loss.
On the 13th, the day after the battle, the whole army
leaves, with the exception of 10,000 men left on the battle-

•
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field to attend to the dead and wounded.
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The army moves

to Kingston, and, on the 17th, is back at Weldon. From
there, 35,000 are transported by railroad to Richmond,
where they arrive between the 11th and 19th. The remaining 35,000 march to Suffolk, attack the Union force~ there,
and join the Richmond army on about the 25th to 27th of
month 1. The 10,000 left on the battle-field may move by
railroad to Charleston or Richmond ; this movement depending on where the need of troops is the greatest. The
general-in-chief leaves the army on the 13th to proceed to
Chattanooga, where meanwhile another great movement has
been prepared.
Evidently 87,000 men, or the number of the Virginia
army after the deduction of 33,000 men for Goldsborough,
would never be able to resist 140,000 men, ~hich we have
supposed to be the strength of the Potomac army. It
would therefore be a great mistake to engage with this
number in a battle.

.All that is required, is to observe the

army of the Potomac, and when it moves forward to retard
its march; 50,000 men are quite sufficient to accomplish
this task, and even more fit for it than 87,000; because a
smaller number can always be quicker put in motion, and if
a disaster occurs, the risk is not so great.
We reduce, therefore, the army of Virginia by 27,000 men
more, which we would send to Tennessee, giving positive
orders to the remaining 50,000 to accept no engagement of
consequence; to retreat if the army of the Potomac advances ; and to be satisfied with defending the passage of
the rivers, beating an advanced guard, etc.
The campaign in Tennessee, as the next in importance,
we would conduct almost simultaneously with that against
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Newbern ; and this is possible in the present case : first, because the Union armies of Newbern and Murfreesborough
are not large ; and secondly, because the army sent to
Goldsborough is not far from the decisive point, which we
will suppose to be Richmond, and might be back there
before a Union army could reach it.
It is evident that all the troops executing these different
manamvres are to be in the lightest marching order ; and
to facilitate their rapid movement, the inhabitants of the
places through which troops pass ought to be instructed to
prepare rations sufficient for the number of troops passing,
for which they are to be liberally remunerated.
The movements against Murfreesborough might be combined in the following way : Army at Tullahoma ........•.....••....•............
From the army of Virginia ....................... .
Vicksburg ....................•
"
"
J\:Io bile ................. ......"'.. .
"
"
" different detachments, etc ................. .

50,000 men.
27,000 "
25,000 "
5,000 "
10,000 "

Total ...................................... 117,000

''

The 25,000 men from Vicksburg ought to be partly replaced by the 15,000 from Arkansas and Texas.
The following table will show how the concentration is
to be conducted-the different corps being transported all
by railroad as far as Chattanooga and London. From this
line as a base, the movement is to be executed. We suppose, as we have done before, that the longer railroad
· lines are able to transport 2500 men per diem; and that
on some of the shorter, the number might be augmented
by running the cars day and night, and by stopping for a
few days all other traffic:-

lQ
~

01

.
Start by railroad

Men.

from-

.
For-

Month 1.

I

Arrive at-

:Month 1.

-

~
~

00
,-,f

~

0

z

C')

~~
<1

0

2500 each day ..
2500 "
"
2500 "
"
2500 "
"
2500 "
"
2500=27,000 ...
5000 ..............
5000..............
5000 ..... .........
5000 ................
5000=25, 000 ...
2500 each day ..
2500=10,000.
2500 each day··
"
2500 "
2500 "
"
2500=20, 000...

Fredericksburg ..
Fredericksburg ..
Fredericks burg ..
Frederic ks burg ..
Fredericksburg ..
Fredericksburg..
Vicksburg ........
Vicksburg ........
Vicksburg ........
"\Ticksburg........
Vicl{s burg ........
Mobile ...... ..•...
Mobile ....... .....
Mo bile .......... ; .
lVIo b~le ...... , . . . ..
i1ob1le ....... .....
Mobile . .. .. . . . . . ..

Lynchburg, Knoxville, Clevela,nd. 4th and 5th ....
Lynch burg, Knoxville, Cleveland. 6th and 7th ....
Lynchburg,' Knoxville, Clevela,nd. 8th and 9th ....
Lynch burg, Knoxville, Cleveland 10th and 11.t.h.
Lynchburg, Knoxville, Cleveland. 12th and 13th.
Lynchburg, Knoxville, Clevela,nd. 14th ..............
J\Io bile ................................... 1st ...............
11 obile .............................. t.... 2c.l ...............
J\Iobile ................................... 3d ...............
J\Iobile... ... . . .. . ..•... ...•.. ...... .. .... 4th ...............
, J\Io bile........... . . . . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . •. . •. . 5th ...............
Chattanooga ........................... 2cl and 3d ......
Chattanooga ............•.............. 1, ,Jt h and 5th ....
Harrison ....... , .................. \ .... · 1 6th and 7th ....
Harr~son ..................••..•........ · I 8th a.nd Dth ....
Harrison ........•...................•... , 10th and 11th.
Harrison .......................... ·....•. I 1,2th and 13th.

Cleveland.....
Cleveland .....
Cleveland.: ...
Cleveland.....
Cleveland.....
Cleveland.....
Mo bile ..... !...
Mobile .........
Mo bile .........
Mobile .........
Mobile .........
Chattanooga.
Chattanooga.
Harrison ......
Harrison ......
Harrison ......
Harrison ......
London
.....•..
Deta_chm~nts,
guerrilla_s,.
and
cavalry
f1:om
Kentucky
(
com{
7000.
"000} 10,000...
3000
prised m the table g1vmg the respective forces)............. 3000. Cleveland .....

5th and 6th.
7th :rnd 8th.
9t.h :rnd 10th.
11th and 12th.
13th antl 14th.
15th.
1st.
2d.
3cl.
M.h.

5th.
4th and St.h.
Gth and ,th.
8th and Vth.
10th and 11th.
12th and 13th.
14th and 15th.
12th.
13th.

0
o-1
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On the 14th, the commander-in-chief should arrive at
Chattanooga; and on the same day the offensive operation
should be commenced. With 117,000 men against 40,000
to 50,000, a commander can well propose to himself to destroy this latter army; and the only correct way to do this
is to execute similar manreuvres to those executed by N apoleon in 1805 and 1806,-the relative position of the base
of operation of the Rebels to that of the line of operation
of the Union army facilitating such action.
We will ·try to describe such a movement here, though the
task is somewhat above our abilities, notwithstanding we
have the brilliant examples of 1805 and 1806 before our
eyes.
On the 13th of month 1st, 7000 men start from London,
and march for Crossville. On the 15th of month 1st, 30,000
men start from Cleveland, on the road to Sparta, and cross
the Tennessee.
For easier understanding, I have added an engraving,
showing ·the position of the different corps. U. S. is the
Union army, stationed nine to ten miles south from Murfreesborough. For better distinction, we will divide the
Rebel army into divisions of 10,000, numbered from one to
twelve, as shown on the plate. (See Fig. 8.)
On the 16th, all the divisions are put in motion. Division 6 $tarts from Chattanooga, and is on the 18th, in the
evening, at Manchester; 7 and 8 march from Harrison for
R, where they arrive on the 18th, in the evening; 9 and 10
leave Tennessee River, and arrive at McMinnsville on the
18th, in the evening; and finally, divisions 11 and 12 march,

Fig. 8.

.

f~

I

.

~

NOTE.-Read London for Loudon ; Crossville for Cronville; Harrison for Clarrison.
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by way of Sparta, to about ten miles from Smithville, where
they arrive also on the 18th, in the evening.
.All distances, as will be seen, are three days' march. On
the 19th, the divisions arrive in the positions shown in the
engraving; and for the 20th, the action is impending. On
the 20th, divisions 11 and 12 start on their. respective routes
at four o'clock A.M. At two o'clock, they have to strike the
railroad above Murfreesboro gh; and at five o'clock, they
have to be half way to Franklin, on the Franklin and Murfreesborough Turnpike. Division 12, which shonld consist
in great part of cavalry, with some batteries, should be. very
near Franklin at that time.
On the same day, divisions 9 and 10 start at four o'clock
A.M., and march for Murfreesborough, where they should be
at twelve o'clock, changing their front, and moving in a
southwesterly direction. (The map at my disposal is not
exact .enough to designate any special point.) Thes·e corps
have to communicate with divisions 7 and 8, and may receive
special orders about the direction· they are to take during
the day.
On the 20th, also in the morning, at five o'clock, '1 and 8
move against the railroad, half way between ~Iurfreesborough and the Union army, from where they have to be
at about nine o'clock ; then they take also a southwesterly
direction to join in the ·battle at about ten o'clock, and to
attack the extreme right and rear of the Union arm .
Finally, divisions I, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 attack the Union army
U. S. at six o'clock in the morning, holding at first somewhat back till ! and 8 arrive on the battle--field, when the
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reserves are brought in the action and the coup-de-collier
is given. Should the retreat of the U. S. troops commence
very early, and in the direction of .Franklin, the direction of
9, 10, 11, and 12 should be changed to clear west, or per-haps even somewhat west-northwest. These corps have to
pursue on the flank ·of the Union army, and continually
prevent its going north; the remainder of the Rebel army
pursue in the rear. A few days of such pursuit, especially
if the battle has been conducted with great energy, would
entirely break up and finish the U. S. army, the remainder
of which would, besides, be obliged to surrender near the
Tennessee River.
The great mistake to be a voided in the battle, is one
similar to that committed by Ney in the battle of Bautzen.
The corps 7, 8, 9, and 10 have always to act more to their
right than to their left ; and wherever they meet the enemy,
they have to attack with the utmost impetuosity, and to fall
headlong on him. The reason for such action is obvious.
By the direction of their march, they will appear in the
flank or rear of an army already fully engaged in front
against superior numbers. To proceed slowly under such
circumstances, would give the attacked army time to retreat
and escape from the impending peril.
After the battle, 117,000 men are obviously too many to
pursue some 25,000 or 30,000 constituting the remainder
of the Union army. Under these circumstances, a division
of force is according to the rules ; therefore, immediately
after the battle, the divisions 3, 5, and 6 march to Nash ville,
. which town they attack on the 21st, in the afternoon, and
20*
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which they have to carry by assault. '.rhcse three divisions
ought to be well provided with artillery for this purpose .
.After the capture of Nashville, the divisions 3, 5, and 6
cross the Cumberland and march to Gallatin. On the 25th
they ought to be at Glasgow, K.eutucky; 27th at l\fumfordsville, beating and destroying ·all smaller Union corps on
their way. On the 27th they might be at Lebanon, and, if
there is the slightest chance of the capture of Louisville, it
should be attempted; after which the movement is to be continued to Lexington, pushing cavalry parties as far as Covington. From Lexington the corps proceed to Cumberland
Gap, and arrive at Rodgersville Junction about the 20th
of month 2. From there they will be transported by rail to
the East, so as to form a junction with the Rebel armies in
the left zone. This junction ought to be effected by the 1st
of month 3.
The main army, some 80,000 strong, is meanwhile marching by forced marches toward Savannah, Tenn., or any point
where the pursuit of the Cumberland army carries it to, or
where it can easily cross the Tennessee River. Supposing
that the crossing will take place at Savannah, where the army
has arrived on the 26th of month I, on the 27th the crossing and advance to Purdy takes place; on the 28th 15,000
men march to Jackson, the same day 35)000 more to Bolivar, 20,000 to Pocahontas, and 10,000 remain on the road
from Purdy to Corinth. On the 29th the Union troops at
Bolivar and Jackson are beaten ; those at the former place
are pursued by 15,000, and those at the latter by 3000 or
4000, of which abont 2000 should be cavalry, and which
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troops shotrld push on as far as Columbus. The remaining
10,000 or 12,000 march to Somerville or Raleigh, and form,
. on the 2d of month 2, a junction with the 15,000 Rebel
troops coming from Bolivar. .An attack on Memphis should
take place immediately, if this place has not meanwhile been
reinforced by Union troops returning from Vicksburg. The
remainder of the 35,000 at Bolivar march to Pocahontas,
join with the 2?,000 there, and proceed on the 30th to the
attack of Corinth, which, attacked by 50,000 men, and from
several sides, would be obliged to surrender. After this
action, the Rebel troops should have two or three days of
repose, and then commence their eastward movement. The
troops left before Memphis, after the capture of this place,
should also commence their movement to the East. By using
far as railroads are concerned, this
all possible means,
whole army ought to be, by the 1st of month 3, in the left
zone, ready to effect a junction with the Rebel forces there.
The beating of the armies~t Corinth, Bolivar, Memphis,
etc. necessarily disengages Vicksburg, if this place has not
meanwhile been carried by the Union troops. We have
supposed that the Rebel troops there have been reinforced
by 15,000 troops from Arkansas. If those 40,000 have
been able to withstand all assaults undertaken by the Federal army, it cannot be doubted that about the 2d or 3d of
month 2 the siege of Vicksburg would be raised. This
should immediately be taken advantage of by sending 30,000
men to the East, where they should .arrive also about the_1st
of month 3. By using the Mobile and Savannah and Lynchburg and Knoxville Roads, 5000 troops ought to be conveyed daily from west to east.

as

232

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

We have now to return to the East, to see what has happened meanwhile there.
Probably, after some time, the departure of so great a
number of troops from the Virginia army for the South and
West will be noticed by the army of the Potomac, and a forward movement will take place. Three directions may be
chosen by this army for its advance toward .Richmond, the
capture of which we still suppose to be the object of its
offensive campaign. These three directions are give~ strategically in the action of ~he center, by the right or by the
left. The action by the center means a straight movement
·from Fredericksburg toward Richmond, taking the road
leading from the first to the latter place as the line of operation. The crossing of' the _Rappahannock would be required
.in this case, and this crossing, simply considered as a tactical
operation, might take place just as the whole operation, considered strategically, would, viz., by the right, left, or center;
that is to say, the army may er ss some miles above Fredericksburgh, turning thereby the left of the Rebel army and
marching straight to Bowling Green or Sexton Station; or
it may cross below, and turn ·the· right of the Rebel army by
marching to Bowling Green; or, finally, it may cross at
Fredericksburg, and attack the Rebels in front. This latter
expedient has already been tried in the battle of Fredei·icksburg, and it failed ; however, considering the weakened
state of the Rebel army, it might be tried again. This latter army, as we have seen, after sending 30,000 men to Newbern, sends 27,000 off to Richmond, which place they leave
by lots of 2500 for the West, the last lot starting on the 14th
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of month L Immediately after the departure of these corps,
the Rebel army takes the following position : 20,000 remain
in and near Fredericksburg, 5000 march to Chancellorsville,
and stay there, and .finally 25,000 move to Bowling Green,
to await events. The Rappahannock is strongly picketed
from Fredericksburg some 10 or 15 miles above and below,
to prevent any surprise. Should the Union army cross once
more to F1~edericksburg, the 20,000 men there would be
joined, within three or four hours, by the 5000 at Chancel.
lorsville and the 25,000 at Bowling Green; and, as at the
first battle of Frederic~sburg scarcely more than 50,000
Rebels were actually engaged, it might be that the remaining 50,000 would be able to repulse the attack, or at all
events to inflict serious loss. It would probably take till
night before their position was carried, and then they would
have time to retreat, and place the Mattapony between them
and their pursuers. The bridges over this river would be
destroyed, and another river defense would take pla·ce; the
same game would be repeated at North and South .Anna
River, at the Chickahominy, and at Little River; till,
finally, arrived near Richmond, the Rebel army takes shelter under the cannon of the fortifications of their capital.
Should the Union army cross below Fredericksburg, and
advance straight to Bowling Green, the 25,000 Rebels at
this place would cross the 1'1:attapony, destroy the bridges,
and defend the passage over the river, till joined by the remainder of the Rebel force from Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, who would have marched by forced marches, and
by way of Mount Pleasant, to a junction with their friends.

~
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The fight at Fredericksburg would therefore be -avoided,
but at the Mattapony the same difficulties in crossing would
be experienced as before. Evidently the Mattapony, as well
as all the subsequent rivers, may be crossed above or below
the defending forces, who would have to conduct the defenses entirely according to the rules laid down for such
operations. (See "Summary of the Art of War.") Finally,
_ should the Union army cross above Fredericksburg, it would
immediately be attacked by the 5000 at Chancellorsville and
20,000 at Fredericksburg, who would soon be joined by the
25,000 froni Bowling Green.

Once the passage effected,

the case is the same as the two preceding.

The Union

army advances, and the Rebel army retreats in the direction of Richmond and along the }.,redericksburg and Rich . .
mond Railroad.

t

Let us suppose the movement of the Federal army to be
commenced on the 5th of month L

Considering the diffi-

culties of the advance, the crossing of five or six rivers over
which bridges have to be built, and, finally, the necessity for
rebuilding the railroad bridges also, in order to use the railroad for supplying the army,-considering all this, we could
not suppose that the army would take less than 10 to 12
days to. reach Richmond; it would probably take twice that
time.

Let us t~ke 12 days, and say that on the 11th of

month 1 the Federal troops find themselves in face of the
/

Rebel capital, occupied at that time by some 60,000 to
65,000 men-50,000 from Fredericksburg, 5000 who were
/

left as garrison, and some 5000 to 10,000 men who have
had time to arrive after the battle of Newbern.
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Richmond being fortified, two ways of action are open
for its capture-either a general assault immediately after
the ,,,.a1~rival of the army, or the formal siege of the place.
The fortifications around Richmond having more or less
the character of field-works,
the assault.

~

daring commander might try

Field-works of such a description, defended

by 65,000 men, who would be reinforced on the day of battle
by some 20,000 more transported from Weldon and Petersburg, are difficult to take. The position would have to be
carried without reference to the loss of life. The most energetic and decided action alone could warrant such_ an attempt
or render it successful. To make a11 assault just to try the
thing, at the same time being afraid of the loss, would evidently be useless-it would be repulsed with great carnage.
Supposing the first kind of action-that is to say, decided
action, like that of Napoleon at the battle of Smolensk or
Borodino-to take place, it is ·necessary to consider the respective chances. The Union army arriving before Richmond would probably not amount to more than 100,000 to
110,000 men, as it would have to detach largely to cover
its long line. of communications with its bridges, etc. . The
Rebels would oppose them with 65,000 to 85,000 men,
covered by redoubts and a strong artillery. . The beating
of these 85,000 men is not impossible under .such circumstances; but if well led, they ought to be victorious in the
end, and the loss of the attacking party after the repulse,
considering the desperate nature ,of the attack, would be so
enormous that it wouid probably force them to retreat.
The more prudent course would, therefore, seem ~o be to
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undertake the siege; but whether it be so or not, we will
suppose it to be undertaken without a previous assault.
The siege of Richmond would take a month at the least,
1>erhaps two.

Meantime the army must be supplied ; it

must therefore have a safe base and a secure line of communication.

The most natural lines of communication

that present themselves are the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railway line, the York River, York River Railroad,
and the James River.

r_rhe adoption of the two latter

would force the army to a change of front, in order to protect its coqimunications; but as these two cases are identical with the action of the Potomac army at Falmouth to
its left, we will treat of them when speaking of ~he latter
case.

We therefore suppose, first, that the Federal army

before Richmond keeps the .A.quia Creek and Richmoud
Railway line as a line of communication, in order to obtain
its supplies, etc. This line evidently requires strong detachments to protect it from surprise: 20,000 to 25,000 men, if
not more, would certainly be necessary to guard the many
bridges, the long trains of stores, arid the temporary magazines at .A.quia Creek and Fredericksburg, etc. On the 20th

of month 1 the army in Richmond would be increased to
90,000, and a few <lays later to 125,000 men, by the arrival
of 35,000 more, consisting of the corps which bas marched
against Suffolk and beaten the Federal army there.

The

Confederate forces would now be strong enough to take
the offensive; but, in this case, temporizing would probably
prove an advantage to· them: first, because within a month
they would be so heavily reinforced from the West that a
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decisive result, fi.nish.ing the war, might be obtained; and
secondly, the long line of operation of the Union forces
would offer an excellent chance for beating them in detail,
and hold out too great a temptation for a Jackson and a
Stuart, united, to gather fresh laurels by capturing or destroying those Federal corps scattered over a long space
of from 55 to 60 miles.
In order to execute such a raid, Jackson, with some
30,000 of good infantry, and Stuart, with some 4000 to
•
5000 cavalry, would move to Goochland 0. H., and cross
the James River there; thence they would march to Sexton's Junction, leaving a thousand cavalry, with about four
guns, at South Ann River, in the neighborhood of Allen's .
Creek, for the purpose of informing, the main body of any
movement taking place in the Federal army, and for retarding the march of a corps which might be sent by the Federal
commander toward Orange 0. H. to intercept the Rebels in
their retreat.
The main body, under Jackson and Stuart, arrived at a
distance of about eight miles from Sex-ton's Junction, would
detach some 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry to attack the
Union post at South Ann River, provided this post does not
number more than 4000 or 5000. If it should number more,
it would be preferable to march there with the whole force,
crush it, and destroy the bridges over the river; for it must
be borne in mind that this post might be reinforced within
an hour from the army before Richmond.
The next move is to North .Ann River, then to the Mattapony and to the Rappahannock. The Union troops at
21
/
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Fredericksburg are attacked, the bridges over the river destroyed, and the river itself passed above, and the movement continued to Aquia Creek.

This whole movement

must evidently be executed with great speed.

Rapidity,

energy, and determination would probably render it a complete success.

The consequent retreat from .A.quia Creek

would depend entirely upon the action of the army of the ·
Potomac. Three principal directions present themselves: a
movement to Gordonsville, or to Culpepper, or to Warrenton and Thoroughfare Gap.

The two latter would only be

executed in order to reach the Shenandoah valley, and with
it safety.
The Potomac army finds it If, in consequence of this
raid, in an embarrassing situation.

The Rebels would prob-

ably have spread reports of having 50,000 to 60,000 men
with them in this raid ; besides, the day the attack on South

.Ann River takes place, the army in Richmond would engage
in a fight which would detain the Union forces, and prevent
a large detachment being sent away.

It must also be con-

sidered that the Federal army would probably number not
more than 100,000 men; that to detach 40,000, 50,000,
or 60,000, would leave only about 50,000 exposed to the
blows of the

9o;ooo

forming the defending army of Rich-

mond, which, by crossing a few miles above Richmond,
might attack the remainder of the Union army in flank, and
destroy it before the detachment could return.

Send~ng

only a small detachment would expose the latter to a defeat

by Jackson; besides, sending troops after the Rebels on the
Richmond and Fredericksburg line would be entirely use-
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less, as they would continually come too late. The only
thing they would gain would be the la.test reports of the
.,
depredations c<ftnmitted by the Rebels.
In a case like this, the real character of different generals
would show itself. A Napoleon or a Cesar would, at the
Jirst notice of the raid, leave their trains and parks, and
move with their whole army, by forced marche~ toward
0 range C. H. or P otteisville, according to circumstances.
Executed against them, this raid would be destruction to
the corps who undertook it. A Wellington would probably at first do nothing at all, but raise the siege as soon as
the reports were fully confirmed, and move with his whole
material composedly back to his first base. A Jourdan or
a Victor would send a detachment after the Rebels, staying
themselves with the main body before Richmond. A Moreau
or Massena would get their trains in readiness, leave a strong
detachment to cover them, with orders to retreat as soon as
the Rebels in Richmond manifest a desire to attack, and
with their main body they would march to intercept the
Rebel corps which has undertaken the raid.
In our case, I think that the undertaking of the raid would
be sufficiently justified by the simple fact that a Napoleon or
Cesar would probably not have chosen the line of operation
from Fredericksburg to Richmond.
It would occupy us too long to enter upon a discussion
of how to act in a case like this. We may merely say that
Jackson should by all means try to escape to the Shenandoah valley, and the Union forces should endeavor to prevent him from doing so. Once plunged in this valley, all
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pursuit would be useless, as the different gaps give him the
facilities to execute movements similar to those of some
Spanish generals- La Romana, for instalice, in the Asturias and Gallicia, against Ney, where the-latter descended
one valley in pursuit .of a Spanish column, which remounted
at the same moment a parallel valley, separated from the
first by impassable ridges, and thereby escaped.
If the siege, notwithstanding this raid, should be continued-the Rebels carrying on all the while a kind of
counter-siege-the Confederate forces would have to prepare for a final and decisive action. In the middle and at
the end of month 2, their reinforcements from the West
begin to arrive ; and by the 25th their strength is sufficient
to allow of its coming to decisive blows. With the superiority they would have at that time, they should prepare
themselves for more than simply beating the Union army;
they should try to destroy it. The necessary movement for
this might be executed in the following manner:About 200,000 troops are to be disposed ·along the Richmond and Burkesville Railroad, atMattoax, Powhatan, Tomahawk, and Coal Mines. From there they advance, in one
day, to Tay, and cross., the James River; moving then, in
the mode we have indicated for the engagement in Tennessee, by parallel columns, the right wing to Hungary, pushing a detachment to Scuffietown, the center on the road
from Montpellier to Richmond, and the left wing at Ashland. ~fter having taken possession of all the bridges over
the Chickahominy, the army changes front to the south.
The advanced guard of the center -becomes the left wing,
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and the reserve which marched with the center becomes the
center, the left becomes the reserve.
The Union army is attacked in this way in its rear by
some 180,000 or 200,000 men. Moreover, 40,000 or 50,000
debouch from Richmond and attack its left, to prevent its
retreating once more to Harrison's Landing or Malvern
Hill. if, under such circumstances, the battle is rightly
planned and carried out with sufficient speed, it must end
with the entire destruction of the Federal army, which is
inclosed between the fortifications of Richmond and the
main Rebel army, and has, besides, a corps of 50,000 men
on its flank. After this battle, the Rebels have to take the
offensive against the North. We will treat of this here-after.
The Union army, instead of acting by the center, may
act by its left-that is, for its advance from Fredericks-burg it may cross the Rappahannock very far below, at
Urbana, for instance, march to York River, cross it by
means of steamers, and push toward Richmond from West
Point or White House as a base. Or it may be transported
to James River, taking this river as a base, and move either
on its right or its left bank toward Richmond. The distinctive feature of this manreuvre by the left is, that the
army would base itself on a river, and the navy would have
to play a great part in the operations. The cases to be considered, as we have already seen, are three: 1, York River
as a base; 2, James River as a base, with an advance on
the right bank against Richmond ; 3, James River as 0,
base, with an advance on the left bank against Richmond.

21*
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Taking York River as a base, the Union army would
have to go over the campaign on the Chickahominy once
more.

It could not be supposed that the Rebel army would

be surprised, or their corps at Fredericksburg be outflanked
by the movement of the Federal troops to West Point, as
they might reach Richmond in two days from Fredericksburg, the distance being only some 60 miles.

If General

Banks's soldiers in the _Shenandoah valley could march 60
miles in two days, those of Jackson or Longstreet might
well travel the same distance in the same time. Considering
carefully such a movement, consisting partly of transportation, partly of marching, it would be found that in less than
10 or 12 days the Union army, leaving Fredericksburg, could
scarcely reach Richmond. It would arrive there without
previous loss, and this certainly is. to be taken into account.

It is not necessary to discuss the chances of the campaign
against the Confederate capital, with York River as a base.
The study of the campaign of the Potomac army in 1862
will be sufficient · to show the dangers and difficulties an
army would have to contend with.
Choosing James River as a base of operation against
Richmond, the army might reach there by marching from
York River to Harrison's Landing or Malvern Hill, or any
other place on this river where the army would be in communication with the gun-boats and transports; or the army
might arrive at the appointed place by being transported to
it from Aqu'ia Creek.

This arrangement would evidently

, take a great length of time, and in no ca3e could the army

be before or near R,iehmond under 12 to 15 days, counted
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from its starting from Fredericksburg. Arrived at James
River, let us suppose, first, that the advance takes place on
the right bank of this river. If so, mu.ch will depend if
Petersburg and Walthall form fortified double tetes-de-pont,
able to resist an attack of a strong army ; much also depends on Fort Darling forming a similar fortified double
tete-de-pont. Should, in fact, a system of fortifications exist
such as we have spoken of in Chapter III., Fig. 5, little can
be expected from th~ action of the Federal army. It would,
in order to approach Richmond, have to make the siege of
Petersburg, and especially of Fort Darling, in the first instance, and this in the face of an army of 120,000 men,
which within a month would be reinforced by 125,000 men
more. The Union army might think itself lucky if, after
some attempts to carry the fortifications, it could save onehalf of its numbers; and certainly the Rebels would deserve
severe criticism if so large a portion of the Union army
s~ould escape, inclosed as it is or would be by the James
and Appomattox Rivers, and by a Rebel army acting
against its left flank and its rear.
If no fortifications exist at Petersburg and Wa.lthall, if,
moreover, the James River is open to gun-boats and transports above Appomattox River, then the Union army might
at once cross above this latter river and advance against
Manchester. The gun-boats could only follow as far as
Fort Darling, and if the Union army would advance farther,
it would run straight into destruction. Evidently the Rebel
army would not commit so ridiculous a blunder as to place
itself square before Manchester.
would take a position

It

244

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY.

at Coal Mines or Tomahawk, on the left flank of the Union
army, and, as soon as the latter would have advanced above
Fort Darling, it would immediately advance to Cedar Row,
taking the Federals on the l~ft flank and rear, and throwing
them into the corner formed by the James River at Richmond
or Manchester. Should the Union army be defeated in such
a battle, its total loss would evidently be the consequence.
To avoid such a disaster, the reduction of Fort Darling and
the opening of James River would probably be tried before
any farther advance against Richmond takes place_. This,
however, the Rebels should endeavor to prevent by all means.
They should attack the left flank of the Union army with
impetuosity; they should construct in the James River other
bars above the first; should drive off the gun-boats by firing
incendiary shells at them; they should continually reinforce,
till their superiority had "become such that the Union army
could not resist a further assault, and is finally thrown into
the river. Here, as well as before, if the attack is executed
rightly, the Federal army ought, in consequence of its ·position, backed by a river, to be completely destr.oyed, and the
gun-boats should not be able to save it. In this operationthat is, along the right bank of the James ~iver-t~e Federal army is obviously more exposed t~an fa our first operation, when acting along the railroad from Fredericksburg.
Its entire safety depends on its gun-boats; i_t has no space
to manoouvre in, to advance, or to retreat; it is chained to
James River, and the slightest accident happening to the
flotilla, the appearance and fortunate action of a Merrimac
No. 2, for instance, would be the ruin of this army.
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There remains to be considered the advance against Richmond along the left bank of James River, from a point below
Fort Darling as a base. .An attack on this side would lead
to the same disasters as on the right bank, if the crossings
over the Ohickahominy remained in possession of the Rebels.
Holding the bridges over this creek, the Rebels might at
any moment debouch against the right flank of the Union
army, and throw it against the James River; or, if Fort
Darling forms a double tete-de-pont, they might cross the
James River there, and attack the Union army in the rear.
This fort, if forming a tete-de-pont, ought, therefore, to he
masked or reduced before the Federal army proceeds any
farther. This takes time, and meanwhile the Rebel army
is continually reinforced; the final result can, therefore, not
be doubtful. No special manceuvre could be made by the
Rebel troops whe~ once the siege was commenced, unless
by holding the bridges over the Chickahominy from Meadow
to Bottom Bridge, and, passing behind the creek, they were
to deboucl~ by these bridges and attack the Union army in
the rear. It would be a manceuvre somewhat similar to
that of 1862, executed on the same spot. If this manamvre
is impossible, mere strength or numbers would decide; only
~actically the attack would probably be directed against the
center or right wing of the Union forces, as in both these ·
cases, if the attack is successful, great results would be
pbtained.
We have, lastly, to consider the third case,~ that of the
Union army acting by its right. This operatio_n differs
from the two others only by the route the army takes. Once
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before Richmond, in order to make the siege, one of the four
cases already considered will take place, as the army, for its
supplies, has to base itself on ..A.quia Creek or York or James
River. (If Richmond, were not fortified, the operation to
the right would be decisive.) We have supposed, in our
imaginary campaign, that. orrly 50,000 men oppose the army
of the Potomac; these have, therefore, nothing better to do,
when the Union army commences its movement to the right,
than to march, at first parallel with the Federal army, and
then retreat to Richmond. The defense of rivers is out of
question, as the Union army may pass high enough, where
the rivers are so unimportant that their defense would be of
no avail. Little would, therefore, be changed by this action
to the right, and only the fights on the different crossings
avoided. Were the Rebel army equal, or very nearly so, to
the Federal army, the matter would be different. In the
same way that the Union army moves to the right the
Rebels should move to their left, continually parallel with
the Union army, and finally, arrived near Gordonsville, they
might, by making good use of the different gaps, perhaps
be able to beat the Union army in detail. .At all events,
here ·the Confederates might permit the Union forces to
pass to their right and to march toward Richmond, provided that place has a sufficient garrison,. and, by following
this army immediately, render its march a kind of retreat.
Should the Federals, under such circumstances, try an assault against Richmond, their rear and right flank would
he attacked at the same moment by the entire Rebel army,
.
the case being the same as the one we first considered, viz.,
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the Union army qndertaking the siege of Richmond, having
Aquia Creek as a base.
Returning to our imaginary campaign, it ~ill be understood that, immediately after the decisive defeat of the
Union army before Richmond, the offensive should be taken
against the North. If the destruction has been complete,
the entire Rebel army should move. If the defeat has
been only such as after the seven days' fight, 50,000 men
left at Richmond would be sufficient to defend the town;
the remainder-some 180,000 to 200,000-should move on
the day after the battle, by forced marches, to the North.
Washington we will suppose strongly garrisoned, as well as
Harper's Ferry and Baltimore. At Warrenton 30,000 men
would be detached, to move by way of Centreville against
the Federal capital, as a kind of corps of observation :
20,000 men would be sent through Ashby's Gap against
Winchester, and thence against Martinsburg. Arrived at
Buckletown, they would march east, and thereby prevent
the garrison of Harper's Ferry escaping west or north west.
The main body of the army has meanwhile moved along
Loudon valley; at .A.ldie Gap about 100,000 pass through
it; the remainder (some 40,000) move to Berlin; a detachment takes Loudon Heights; 10,000 men move to Fredericktown, and the remaining 30,000 march into Pleasant Valley,
take Maryland Heights, and force the garrison of Harper's
Ferry once more to surrender. Immediately after the surrender, and if in the meanwhile Washington has been captured,
the entire corps moves toward Chambersburg, for an invasion of the North ; if Washington has not been captured, then
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it moves against Baltimore. The main body having passed
through Aldie Gap, advances to Con's Ferry, er sses the
Potomac, and immediately proceeds toward Washington,
which place ought to be attacked simultaneously, on the
right bank of the Potomac by the 30,000 Rebels coming
from Centreville, and by the 100,000 coming from Con's
... Ferry on the left bank. One or two forts carried on the
left bank would open the way into the city, and this once
occupied, the garrison in the forts on the right would probably be obliged to surrender.
rrhis short expose will show that the Rebels, qy taking to
grand offensive operations under the present circumstances;
by defeating first the smaller Union bodies, and then by
concentrating all their forces for the last decisive struggle;
by leaving the Union armies in the West, far a_way from the
decisive point, perfectly free to capture cotton plantations,
and open Western rivers to Northern navigation, while they
(the Rebels) are dealing decisive blows, and capturing large
Union cities in the East, might finish the war to their own
advantage, and this simply in consequence of the wrong
plan of conquest followed by the Northern troops. .
Grand operations, however, as we have just described
them, demand. for their execution more than ordinary
talents in the leader ; and the question would be, have the
Confederates a general able to execute such movements and
·manamvres ? Supposing they have not, and supposing they
keep strictly on the defensive, (which, in their case, is obviously a mist~ke,) and that the defense is conducted according to the rules of military science, even then they ·might

249

CAMPAIGN OF 1863.

protract the war, and perhaps pr~vent any decisive result
being obtained by the North.
The whole course of our imaginary campaign was based
on two preliminary successes-the destruction of the Cumberland and the Newbern armies.

11

once those gaps were

made in the immense front of operation of the Union armies,
the remainder of this front must break to pieces.

In a

purely defensive campaign, the Rebels would be satisfied
with repulsing the Union armies, instead of destroying
them.
The army of the :Potomac, in its advance, would have to
contend with exactly the same difficulties, and perhaps even
with more, if the Virginia army should not have been weakened by strong detachments, as we have supposed in our
imaginary campaign.

.Arrived before Richmond, the same

difficulties about the line of communication and base of operation, that we have discussed, would occur.

The Rebels,

receiving a few reinforcements from Tennessee, Vicksburg,
and Charleston, would be able to take the offensive.

Acting

according to the position of the Union army, as we have
shown above, the final retreat of the army of the Potomac
can scarcely be doubted, if the defense is anything like correctly and vigorously conduct~d.

As soon as the Potomac

army retreats, the. Rebels would send reinforcem~nts to the
West, to push back the Union armies which-have meanwhile
advanced.
The army of the Cumberland, after the bloody battle of
Murfreesborough, might advance.
of battle at Tullahoma.

It finds its enemy in line

Another victory and another ad-

22
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vance only find the enemy once more in line of
behind the Tennessee. A third victory, and General
crans might find himself in the situation of Pyrrhus,
after his victory over the Romans, he said, '' One

battle
Rosewhen,

'more

victory like this, and I am undone."
The armies of the Mississippi may take Vicksburg ; but
what is gained, what is achieved if they do? Another post
which must be occupied by Union troops ; a blessing for the
Rebels, who obtain by it some 40,000 or 50,000 men free
for action elsewhere. But, by opening the Mississippi, th~
whole right zone will be separated from the rest of the
theater of war. The Rebels cannot draw thence any more
reinforcements and provisions, and we have often been told
that the re hellion, in that case, is bound to fall. This assertion, before being credited, requires proof. It is but
an assertion. The capture of Vicksburg would give the
Rebels some 40,000 to 50,000 men, who might immediately
be brought to the Tennessee to join the Rebel army there,
and defeat the Cumberland army. The Mississippi Union
armies would perhaps advance into the State of Mississippi;
this would be another chance for the two united Rebel armies
to gain a victory.
The army at Newbern, what can it achieve besides some
annoyance to the Rebels ? March to Raleigh ? This might
prove disastrous, at least it ought to do so; and even if it
does not, after awhile the Union army would be obliged to
retreat. Capture Wilmington? Be it so; but what would
be gained by taking this town, _beyond the necessity of sending another detachment to hold it? The conquest of the
South is not one inch advanced by it .

•
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Finally, let us suppose Richmond carried, Raleigh taken,
Charleston occupied, Chattanooga seized, and the Union
armies from the West advanced to the Tombigbee River;
but the Rebel armies stiJ} existing, and still holding their
interior lines, which become the more valuable and the
more effective the more the Union armies approach, what
prevents them from uniting all their forces nearly in one,
gaining thereby a decisive superiority over every on~ of the
su~rounding Federal armies, defeating the Cumberland army
first, the Newbern army next, and the army of the Potomac
last, and regaining in a few weeks all they nave lost the last
few months?
It is like the work of Penelope, done by day and undone
by night; only with this difference, that we do it in the
spring, and the Rebels undo it in the fall.
In war sometimes accidents happe·n, accidents above
human power to P.revent ; they are like the interfering of
Providence. Na pol eon, after the battle of Dresden, was
the victim of one of these accidents.
The .Allies had
crowned all the blunders they had committed before and
in the battle of Dresden, in 1813, by a retreat against all
military rules and even against all common sense. The
destruction of nearly half their army would have been the
consequence, had Napoleon not been taken ill by a violent
attack of fever, compelling him to go home after the battle.
The pursuit was badly conducted, and not only obtained no
advantageous results, but ended even in the disaster of Culm,
where nearly an entire corps of Napoleon's army was destroyed. It is difficult to say what turn events would have
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taken had Napoleon not been prostrated by disease, and had
half the allied army been destroyed.
It is to be hoped that Providence may interfere in a similar way for the Union, as with the present plan of invasion
-that is to say, the plan of invasion which is indicated by
the position of the union armies at the present moment (the
middle of January)-it is difficult to see how any really de-,
cisive results are to be obtained, so long as the Rebels act on
the defensive correctly, and are not so exhausted as they are
reported to be.

THE END . .
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